



# 2024 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS



# 2024 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

## Required citation

FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2024.  
*GRFC 2024*. Rome.

When citing this report online please use this link  
<https://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024>

All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non-commercial uses are authorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Reproduction of material in this information product for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission. Applications for such permission should be addressed to the Food Security Information Network Secretariat, email: [fsin-secretariat@wfp.org](mailto:fsin-secretariat@wfp.org)

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), its constituent parties and its partners concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

©FSIN 2024.

# Acknowledgements

This eighth edition of the *Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)* continues the collaboration established in 2016 between the Food Security Information Network and the 16 GRFC partner agencies. While the drafting and review process are facilitated by the FSIN Secretariat, the robust and comprehensive content relies on the contribution of data, technical expertise and content from our partners. Special thanks in particular are extended to the FSIN team who once again worked tirelessly to produce the document, listen to reviewers and enrich the product based on their feedback; to the GRFC Senior Committee who provided guidance and support through complex decisions; to the GRFC Technical Working Groups who brought their knowledge and expertise to deepen the analysis; and to our partners' communications teams who ensured that the findings of the GRFC 2024 are widely disseminated and known. Thanks are also extended to all the individuals based in regions and countries who brought their expertise to the product. The names listed below are by no means exhaustive for a product of this nature:

## FSIN Secretariat

Federica Carfagna, Evan Carr, Lynn Clark, Carlos Manuel Estevez Reyes, Giulio Fabris, Maria Paola Guerra, Sara McHattie, Emily Olsson, Claudio Ribotta, Ziad Rizkallah and Katy Williams.

## GRFC partners

Hassan Ali Ahmed, Jonathan David Andrews, Lavinia Antonaci, Vicente Anzellini, Lilian Barajas, Simona Bortolotti, Helene Berton, Eric Branckaert, Giulia Caivano, Alice Clough, Gemma Connell, Sophie Chotard, Cristina Coslet, Alessandro Costantino, Anne-Celine Delinger, Eve Suzy Clara Le Dem, Nana Dlamini, Anteneh Dobamo, Stefano Fedele, Abdi Fidar, Gwenaelle Garnier, Valerie Gatchell, Rodrigo Gil-Quintana, Shannon Hayes, Nikki Alexandra Herwanger, Lena Hohfeld, Arif Husain, Kahin Ismail, Baoua Issoufou, Sally James, Douglas Jayasekaran, Damien Joud, Justin Kabuyaya, Angela Kimani, Janet Kimani, Marie-Helene Kyprianou, Naouar Labidi, Brenda Lazarus, José Lopez, Oliver Maes, Hamadoun Mahamadou, Abdul Majid, Williams Massaoud, Aurélien Mellin, Quraishia Merzouk, Nicholas Minot, Naser Mohmand, Siphokazi Moloinyane, Cinzia Monetta, Susana Moreno Romero, Mactar Moussa, Giampiero Muci, Charity Mumbua, Anuradha Narayan, Mary Njenga, Terry Njeri-Theuri, Marta Ortiz, Cinzia Papavero, Hyunju Park, Elise Polak, Benedetta Pompili, Jonathan Pound, Samia Rahman, Hasina Rakotomanana, Felix Rembold, Brendan Rice, José Ruiz Espí, Mohamed Salem, Duncan Samikwa, Charity Sammy, Britta Schumacher, Edgar Scrase, Almudena Serrano, JungEun Sohn, Ahmed Sulaiman, Felicia Takavarasha, Gaolathe Thobokwe, Philippe Thomas, Laura Tosi, Monika Tothova, Jose Manuel Veiga Lopez-Pena, Roosmarijn Verstraeten, Joseluis Vivero, Rob Vos, Anne Wagner, Massaoud Wiliams, Fleur Wouterse, Lisamarie Zammit and Mario Zappacosta, Hein Zeelie.

In memoriam: Ricardo Sibrián and Djimé Adoum.

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the European Union. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
United Nations



FOOD SECURITY  
CLUSTER



Global  
NUTRITION  
CLUSTER



INTERNATIONAL  
FOOD POLICY  
RESEARCH  
INSTITUTE



SICA  
Sistema de la Integración  
Centroamericana



unicef  
for every child







# Contents

<b>Foreword</b> .....	<b>vii</b>	South Sudan .....	60	<b>LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN</b> .....	<b>109</b>
<b>Key findings</b> .....	<b>ix</b>	Sudan .....	61	Colombia .....	116
Acronyms .....	x	Uganda .....	62	Dominican Republic .....	117
Glossary .....	xi	Additional countries of concern .....	63	El Salvador .....	118
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>	<b>WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL</b> .....	<b>65</b>	Guatemala .....	119
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>		Benin .....	73	Haiti .....	120
<b>GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES</b> .....	<b>5</b>	Burkina Faso .....	74	Honduras .....	121
Spotlight   Displacement .....	18	Cameroon .....	75	Nicaragua .....	121
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>		Chad .....	76	Migrant and refugee populations .....	122
<b>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA</b> .....	<b>25</b>	Côte d'Ivoire .....	77	Additional countries of concern .....	123
Angola .....	33	Guinea .....	78	<b>MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA</b> .....	<b>125</b>
Central African Republic .....	34	Liberia .....	79	<b>Focus   Palestine (Gaza Strip)</b> .....	<b>133</b>
Congo .....	35	Mali .....	80	Lebanon .....	136
Democratic Republic of the Congo .....	36	Mauritania .....	81	Palestine .....	137
Eswatini .....	37	Niger .....	82	Gaza Strip .....	137
Lesotho .....	37	Nigeria .....	83	West Bank .....	137
Madagascar (specific areas) .....	38	Senegal .....	84	Syrian Arab Republic .....	138
Malawi .....	39	Sierra Leone .....	85	Yemen .....	139
Mozambique (specific areas) .....	40	Togo .....	86	Refugee populations .....	140
Namibia .....	41	Additional country of concern .....	87	Additional countries of concern .....	141
United Republic of Tanzania (specific areas) .....	42	<b>ASIA</b> .....	<b>89</b>	<b>APPENDICES</b> .....	<b>143</b>
Zambia (specific areas) .....	43	Afghanistan .....	97	1   Trend graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity .....	144
Zimbabwe .....	44	Bangladesh (specific areas) .....	98	2   Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 .....	154
<b>EAST AFRICA</b> .....	<b>45</b>	Myanmar .....	99	3   Table of forcibly displaced populations .....	158
<b>Focus   Conflict in the Sudan</b> .....	<b>53</b>	Pakistan (specific areas) .....	100	4   Indicators .....	161
Burundi .....	55	Sri Lanka .....	101	<b>TECHNICAL NOTES</b> .....	<b>165</b>
Djibouti .....	56	Additional countries of concern .....	102	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>176</b>
Ethiopia .....	57	<b>EUROPE</b> .....	<b>103</b>		
Kenya (specific areas) .....	58	<b>Focus   The far-reaching impact of the war in Ukraine</b> .....	<b>104</b>		
Somalia .....	59	Ukraine .....	107		
		Additional country of concern .....	108		



# Foreword

This *Global Report on Food Crises* is a roll call of human failings.

In a world of plenty, children are starving to death. War, climate chaos and a cost-of-living crisis – combined with inadequate action – mean that almost 300 million people faced acute food crisis in 2023. The number of people on the brink of famine rose to over 700 000 – almost double the number of 2022.

The conflicts erupting over the past 12 months compound a dire global situation. The Gaza Strip has the highest number of people facing catastrophic hunger ever recorded by the *Global Report on Food Crises*, even as blocked aid trucks line up at the border. Conflict in the Sudan has created the world's largest internal displacement crisis, with atrocious impacts on hunger and nutrition, particularly for women and children.

This crisis demands an urgent response. Using the data in this report to transform food systems and address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition will be vital. So will finance. Funding is not keeping pace with need. Governments must boost the resources available for sustainable development – by putting our proposals for an SDG Stimulus in support of developing countries into action, and fully funding humanitarian operations.

Humanity can and must do better. Together, with commitment and concerted action, we can create a world where hunger has no home.

António Guterres  
*Secretary-General of the United Nations*



# Key findings

In 2023, **281.6 million people** or **21.5 percent** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 food-crisis countries/territories.



The overall share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was **marginally lower** than in 2022, but still higher than pre-COVID-19.



Nearly **24M more people** faced high levels of acute food insecurity than in 2022 – explained by expanded analysis coverage as well as deteriorating acute food insecurity in some countries/territories outweighing improvements in others.



Acute food insecurity deteriorated in **12 countries** with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, where **13.5M more people** needed urgent assistance, mostly in the **Sudan**.



Food security improved in **17 countries** with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, resulting in **7.2M fewer people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity.



Over **36M people** in 39 countries/territories faced Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), with more than a third of them in the **Sudan** and **Afghanistan**.



Around **165.5M people** in 41 countries/territories faced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3).



Around **292M people** in 40 countries faced Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2).



Food crises escalated alarmingly in conflict hotspots in 2023 – notably **Palestine (Gaza Strip)** and the **Sudan**. The Gaza Strip became the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history.



The number of forcibly displaced people reached **90M** in the 59 countries/territories – the highest in eight years of GRFC reporting – showing the high correlation between displacement and acute food insecurity. The **Sudan** became the world's biggest internal displacement crisis. By the end of 2023, almost 80% of the population of the **Gaza Strip** was internally displaced.



**Acute malnutrition** among children and women continued to deteriorate, especially in conflict-affected areas. In 2023, over **36M children** under 5 years old were acutely malnourished in 32 food-crisis countries with data, of whom nearly 10M had severe acute malnutrition. Some 60% of these children were in the ten largest food crises.



**Data gaps remain a concern.** While food security analyses expanded coverage to an additional 177.6M people, particularly in vulnerable areas, data gaps remain a challenge with populations in **14 food-crisis countries** not accounted for due to lack of data or data not meeting GRFC technical requirements.

## Populations projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)



About **0.7M people** – 0.6M of them in **Palestine (Gaza Strip)** – were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in five countries/territories in 2023.

More than a quarter of the population of the Gaza Strip were projected to be in this phase from December 2023 to March 2024, with the risk of Famine increasing each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted. By March–July 2024, over half the population of the Gaza Strip (1.1M people) were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), rising to 70% in northern governorates where **Famine was imminent**.

**Burkina Faso, Somalia, South Sudan** and **Mali** also had populations facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

## Drivers of acute food insecurity

Drivers are interlinked and superimposed on structural vulnerabilities that make it more difficult to respond and recover from a shock.



**Conflict/insecurity** was the primary driver in 20 countries/territories with **135M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. It was the main driver in most of the ten largest food crises (by number or share).



**Weather extremes** were the main driver for 18 countries with over **72M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Many countries were grappling with prolonged recovery from drought or flooding. The El Niño event and climate change-related weather phenomena made 2023 the hottest year on record.



**Economic shocks** were the main driver in 21 countries with over **75M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Decreasing global food prices did not transmit to low-income, import-dependent countries. Continued high public debt limited government options to mitigate the effects of high prices.

## Bleak outlook for 2024

Conflict/insecurity – especially in **Palestine (Gaza Strip)**, the **Sudan** and **Haiti** – will continue to be the main drivers of acute food insecurity throughout 2024.

While **El Niño** peaked in early 2024, its full impact on food security – including flooding and poor rains in parts of East Africa, and drought in Southern Africa, especially **Malawi, Zambia** and **Zimbabwe** – are likely to manifest throughout the year. Some of the impacts of El Niño may be positive, including better harvests in parts of East Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Net food-importing, low-income countries, especially those with weakening currencies, are still grappling with **high domestic food prices** and weak household purchasing power.

**Decreasing humanitarian funding** and increasing costs of delivery pose a further threat, already resulting in reduced beneficiary numbers and food assistance rations among many food-insecure populations.

# Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan	FSIN	Food Security Information Network	NFSS	Nutrition and Food Security Surveillance
ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project	FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit	NGCA	Non-Government-Controlled Area (Ukraine)
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	FSNMS	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System	NNS	National Nutrition Survey
ALG	Liptako–Gourma Authority (Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région du Liptako Gourma)	FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
AMN	Acute malnutrition	GAM	Global acute malnutrition	OAS	Organization of American States
AML	African migratory locusts	GDP	Gross domestic product	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ARI	Acute respiratory infection	GFA	General food assistance	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands	gFSC	Global Food Security Cluster	OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ASAP	Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production	GHO	Global Humanitarian Overview	OIP	Other people in need of international protection
AWD	Acute watery diarrhoea	GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises	PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
BAY	Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (Nigeria)	GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster	PDM	Post-distribution monitoring
CADC	Central America Dry Corridor	GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises	PIN	People in Need
CARI	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security	HDI	Humanitarian Development Index	PBW	Pregnant and breastfeeding women
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immune deficiency syndrome	R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CEPAL	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts	REVA	Refugee influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment
CFS	Committee on World Food Security	HNAP	Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme	RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
CH	Cadre Harmonisé	HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires)
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control	HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism (Yemen)
CONASUR	Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (National Emergency Response and Rehabilitation Council), Burkina Faso	IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee	SADC	Southern African Development Community
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
CPI	Consumer Price Index	IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	SBA	Sana'a-based Authority (Yemen)
DEVCO	International Cooperation and Development of the European Commission	IDP	Internally displaced persons	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
DGPC	Direction Générale de la Protection Civile (Haiti)	IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	SEFSEC	Socio-Economic & Food Security Survey (Palestine)
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey	IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute	SENS	Standardised Expanded Nutrition Survey
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross	SFSA	Seasonal Food Security Assessment
DRPIA	Direction Régionale de la Protection Industrielle et Animale	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)	SICA	Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	ILO	International Labour Organization	SISAAP	Système d'Information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et d'Alerte Précoce
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations of the European Commission	IMF	International Monetary Fund	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
EC-JRC	European Commission – Joint Research Centre	INFORM	Index for Risk Management	SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	INGD	National Institute for Disaster Management (Mozambique)	SNNP	Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO))	IOM	International Organization for Migration	SOFI	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment	IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification	TWG	Technical Working Group
ENCOVI	Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida	IPC FRC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee	UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit	IRG	Internationally recognised government	UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine
ENA	Essential Needs Assessment	ISCG	Inter Sector Coordination Group (Bangladesh)	UN	United Nations
E-VAC	Emergency Vulnerability Assessment Committee	IYCF	Infant and young child feeding	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	JME	Joint Malnutrition Estimates	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FAO-GIEWS	FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture	JMP	Joint Monitoring Programme	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
FCS	Food Consumption Score	JRP	Joint Response Plan	UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
FCT	Federal Capital Territory	LGA	Local government area	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	MAD	Minimum Acceptable Diet	USD	United States dollar
FSC	Food Security Cluster	MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition	VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale	MCNA	Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment	VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
		MDD	Minimum Dietary Diversity	WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
		MENA	Middle East and North Africa	WB	World Bank
		MFB	Minimum Food Basket	WFP	World Food Programme
		MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey	WHO	World Health Organization
		MoH	Ministry of Health	WoAA	Whole of Afghanistan Assessment
		MPI	Multidimensional poverty index	ZimVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
		MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference		

# Glossary

## **Acutely food-insecure people**

The number of people in Stressed or worse (IPC/CH Phase 2 or above) are considered “acutely” food insecure. Those in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) require urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods. This might not necessarily reflect the full population in need as some households may only be classified in IPC/CH Phase 1 or 2 because they receive assistance and need continued action. In many countries, the number in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) refers to populations in need of action further to that already taken.

## **Acute food insecurity**

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition (IPC, 2019). Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover.

## **Asylum-seekers**

Asylum-seeker is a general term for any person who is seeking international protection. In some countries, it is used as a legal term referring to a person who has applied for refugee status or a complementary international protection status and has not yet received a final decision on their claim. It can also refer to a person who has not yet submitted an application but may intend to do so, or may be in need of international protection. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

## **Chronic food insecurity**

Chronic food insecurity refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. The definition includes seasonal food insecurity that occurs during periods with non-exceptional conditions. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food

consumption for an active and healthy life (FAO et al., 2021). FAO defines this as “undernourishment” and it is the basis for SDG indicator 2.1.1 published in the SOFI report.

Moderate chronic food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), in which people face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. It thus refers to a lack of consistent access to food, which diminishes dietary quality, disrupts normal eating patterns, and can have negative consequences for nutrition, health and wellbeing.

Severe food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity in which people have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at grave risk, based on the FIES (FAO et al., 2021). According to the SOFI report, between 691 and 783 million people in the world faced hunger in 2022 – or 122 million more people than in 2019, before the global pandemic. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at the global level (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) remained unchanged for the second year in a row after increasing sharply from 2019 to 2020. About 29.6 percent of the global population – 2.4 billion people – were moderately or severely food insecure in 2022, of which about 900 million (11.3 percent of people in the world) were severely food insecure.

## **Coping strategies**

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

## **Export prohibitions and restrictions**

Measures that have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product being exported. They can take the form of a tax or a quantitative restriction. The latter is generally prohibited with some exceptions, notably those applied to prevent or relieve critical shortage of foodstuffs.

## **Famine**

An IPC/CH area classification and is the highest phase of the IPC acute food insecurity scale. It suggests that starvation, death, destitution and Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. A Famine classification is attributed when at least 20 percent of households in a given area face an extreme lack of food, at least 30 percent of children are suffering from acute malnutrition, and two people or four children for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (IPC, March 2024).

## **Food access**

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

## **Food availability**

The availability of enough food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

## **Food crisis**

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond. Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can occur anywhere and can have global ramifications. For instance, the war in Ukraine also has food security impacts outside its own borders since the country is a major food exporter. Furthermore, the capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises.

## **Food inflation**

Monthly food inflation, as measured by a price index, reflects the year-on-year percentage change in the cost of purchasing a basket of commonly consumed food items (WFP).

## **Food security**

This exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (HLPE, 2020). For people to be food secure, food must be both consistently available and accessible in sufficient quantities and



diversity, and households must be able to utilize (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

### **Forced displacement**

Forced displacement is the movement of people who have been obliged to leave their homes, particularly to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. Displacement is often a side-effect of conflict, food insecurity and weather shocks.

### **High levels of acute food insecurity**

This refers to populations in Crisis or worse (Phase 3 or above) according to the IPC/CH classification or moderate and severe acute food insecurity categories in CARI, and HNO/HRP food security People in Need (PiN) number as an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. These are the populations who face high levels of acute food insecurity and are in need of urgent assistance.

### **Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) Nexus**

Refers to the interlinking of efforts by humanitarian, development and peace actors. This approach advocates for improved coordination between actors and alignment around common goals to address crises, food security and overcome conflict.

### **INFORM**

The INFORM Risk Index is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters. It can support decisions about prevention, preparedness and response.

### **Internally displaced persons (IDPs)**

IDPs are those forced to flee their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.

### **International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS)**

Internationally agreed framework for countries and international organizations to improve production, coordination and dissemination of high-quality official statistics on IDPs that are consistent over time and comparable between regions and countries.

### **Lean season**

The period of the year when food access is most difficult and food prices are typically at their highest. It typically corresponds with a time of reduced food stores prior to harvest after the previous

harvest has been exhausted. It occurs at different times of the year in different locations, depending on local climate conditions and agricultural practices.

### **Livelihoods**

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

### **Magnitude**

Magnitude refers to the total number of people experiencing acute food insecurity in a reference population.

### **Major food crisis**

A food crisis is defined as “major” if more than 1 million people or more than 20 percent of the total country population is estimated to be facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, or if at least one area is classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above, or if the country is included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3.

### **Malnutrition**

An umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. See <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition>.

In food-crisis countries/territories, this term usually refers to undernutrition. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting, thinness and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

Malnutrition has immediate and long-reaching consequences, including stunting children's growth, increasing susceptibility to disease and infections, and contributing to 45 percent of deaths among children under 5 years old (WHO). The determinants of malnutrition also include inadequate access to healthcare, poor water and sanitation services, and inappropriate child-feeding and care practices, as described in the UNICEF framework.

### **Migrants**

According to IOM, “migrant” is an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a

person who moves away from their place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.

A migrant with the intention to settle is someone who has reached a final destination country, where they wish to remain permanently.

An in-transit migrant is someone who is temporarily staying in one or more countries with the objective of reaching a further and final destination country.

A pendular migrant is someone who regularly commutes or travels between their country of residence and another country, typically for work or economic reasons. These migrants often maintain a pattern of back-and-forth movement, crossing international borders frequently but without necessarily establishing permanent residence in the destination country.

### **Nutritional status**

The physiological state of an individual that results from the relationship between nutrient intake and requirements and the body's ability to digest, absorb and use these nutrients.

### **Nutritious foods**

Safe foods that contribute essential nutrients, including carbohydrates, lipids, vitamins, proteins (macronutrients) and minerals (micronutrients), fibre and other components to healthy diets that are beneficial for growth, and health and development, guarding against malnutrition.

### **Other people in need of international protection (OIPs)**

Other people in need of international protection refers to people who are outside their country or territory of origin, typically because they have been forcibly displaced across international borders, who have not been reported under other categories (asylum-seekers, refugees, people in refugee-like situations) but who likely need international protection, including protection against forced return, as well as access to basic services on a temporary or longer-term basis. The terminology was first introduced in mid-2022 reporting by UNHCR.



### Pastoralists

Pastoralists are people whose primary means of livelihood involves raising livestock, such as cattle, sheep, goats, camels or yaks. These communities typically rely on animal husbandry as their main source of sustenance and often lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, moving their herds seasonally in search of water and pasture.

### Peak period/number

The GRFC reports on the period with the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the year in question as reported by endorsed sources. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available, and it often, but not always, coincides with the lean season.

### People in Need (PiN)

People in Need, used in HNOs, is based on analysis that estimates who needs assistance, regardless of whether or not assistance is already provided. There are multisectoral and sectoral PiN. The GRFC only contains the sectoral PiN specific to people who are estimated to be highly acutely food insecure.

### Prevalence

Prevalence refers to the proportion or percentage of a population that exhibits a particular characteristic or condition at a specific point in time or over a specified period. In the context of food insecurity and/or malnutrition, prevalence indicates the extent of the food insecurity or wasting condition within a given country or population group. It is calculated by dividing the number of individuals with the characteristic or condition of interest by the total reference population, expressed as a percentage or a rate.

### Primary driver

Although acknowledging that drivers are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the GRFC identifies the primary driver as the most prominent trigger of acute food insecurity for each country/territory in terms of number of people affected. This term is used interchangeably with “most significant driver” in the GRFC.

### Protracted food crisis

A food crisis is defined as “protracted” if included as such in all eight editions of the GRFC. If the food crisis met the criteria to be defined as a “major” food crisis in all editions then it is defined as a “protracted major” food crisis.

### Refugees

Refugees are persons outside their countries of origin who are in need of international protection because of feared persecution, or

a serious threat to their life, physical integrity or freedom in their country of origin as a result of persecution, armed conflict, violence or serious public disorder. The International Recommendation on Refugee Statistics provides a statistical definition of refugees.

### Remittances

The term refers to the transfer of money or resources by migrants to their families or communities in their countries of origin. These transfers are typically sent by migrants who have moved to another country for employment or other reasons, and they serve as an essential source of financial support for their families back home.

### Resilience

The capacity to absorb, prepare for, and prevent humanitarian disasters, crises and long-term stresses. It also contributes to the adaptation and transformation of livelihoods and food systems, progressing along a pathway out of the protracted crisis situation.

### Stateless persons

Someone who does not have a nationality. Some people are born stateless, but others become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that “Everyone has the right to a nationality” (UNGA, 1948, article 15).

### Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB)

While the MEB is defined as the minimum amount of money that a household requires to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, at its average cost, the SMEB is the absolute minimum amount required to cover life-saving needs, which could involve the deprivation of certain rights as health or education. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/>

### Transhumance

Transhumance refers to the seasonal movement of people along with their livestock between fixed summer and winter pastures. This traditional practice is common in pastoral communities and is often driven by the need to find suitable grazing areas and water sources for livestock, which may vary with changing seasons.

### Vulnerability

Refers to the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Vulnerability to food insecurity is the range of conditions that increases the susceptibility of a household to the impact on food security in case of a shock or hazard.

## Key to icons

	Acutely food-insecure people		Major food crisis
	Conflict/insecurity		Nutrition
	Weather extremes/drought		Acute malnutrition
	Weather extremes/flooding		Pregnant and breastfeeding women
	Economic shocks		Infectious diseases
	Agricultural pests		Inadequate health and nutrition services
	Livestock		Food insecurity/ lack of food
	Displacement – IDPs		Inadequate maternal and child-feeding practices
	Displacement – refugees		
	Displacement – returnees		

## Map disclaimer

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on all the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

# Introduction

## About the report

The Global Report on Food Crises 2024 provides analysis and evidence on acute food insecurity and malnutrition in countries/territories identified as being in food crisis in 2023. It is a document of reference that consolidates data from various sources using rigorous methodologies and a transparent and consultative multi-agency process.

### The purpose of the GRFC is to:

- provide consensus-based analysis of countries/territories with food crises for humanitarian and development stakeholders and policymakers;
- present underlying and immediate drivers of acute food insecurity and malnutrition and analyse the evolution of food crises for countries/territories included in past editions;
- contribute to maintaining food security and nutrition as priority sectors for policymakers and donors;
- advocate for timely responses to food crises,
- offer insights into immediate and medium-term risks to food security and nutrition status of populations.

### The foundation of the GRFC: an evidence-based public good



A strong partnership



A highly consultative process



A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses



A technical document of reference on food crises

## What constitutes a food crisis?

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond.

Food security (is) a situation that exists "when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (HLPE, 2020).

Food insecurity arises when one, some or all of these dimensions – availability, access, utilisation and stability – is disrupted, whether by shocks or other factors. It can be chronic, which is when food insecurity persists over time, largely due to structural causes, or acute, which means that it occurs at a specific point in time and of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. Chronic and acute food insecurity are overlapping concepts (*see box, right*).

Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can occur anywhere and have global ramifications, such as the crisis in Ukraine – a major food exporter – that has had ripple effects globally. The capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises in a country/territory.

Addressing the interconnected root causes of food crises demands comprehensive strategies that promote economic stability, climate resilience and conflict prevention, aligning activities with the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus.

## Persistent and seasonal acute food insecurity as a form of chronic food insecurity

**Acute food insecurity** refers to a situation in which populations face food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration. Action becomes a matter of life or death when the situation is particularly severe, such as in IPC/CH Phase 4 or 5.

**Chronic food insecurity** is defined as the persistent or cyclical inability to consume adequate diets for a healthy and active life and it is mainly due to structural causes (e.g. poverty, marginalization, lack of access to basic services).

The concepts are therefore interlinked and not mutually exclusive. Understanding their overlaps and linkages is important to develop more integrated and better coordinated response planning. Food gaps and unsustainable coping strategies deserve equally urgent action whether they are transitory or persistent/seasonal.

Acute food insecurity analyses consider the indicators at a specific point in time, but as they are replicated at near-regular intervals it is possible to identify the protractedness or cyclical nature of acute food insecurity.

One of the most common chronic food insecurity forms found in the acute analyses are the cyclical recurring "hunger seasons". In areas where there is a high reliance on subsistence agriculture as the principal livelihood, food reserves from own production often do not last until the following harvest and households must rely on market purchases to cover food needs at a time when income-generating opportunities are limited, and food prices reach a seasonal peak due to increased demand and reduced local grain

supplies. Households that experience recurrent hunger face a double-edged sword: on the one hand they eat inadequate diets, which potentially impacts their lives and livelihoods, while on the other they are unable to build resilient livelihoods, which makes them more vulnerable to future food crises. Estimates state that around 310 million people are employed in agriculture, fishing and forestry across the 59 GRFC 2024 countries/territories with data meeting GRFC requirements. They are at risk of entering the vicious cycle of seasonal hunger (FAO, 2023).

In an acute food insecurity analysis, people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent during the lean season, even under non-exceptional circumstances, should not only be assisted with the short-term objectives of covering food gaps, but also with the medium to long-term objective of addressing the underlying factors and improving the quality and quantity of their food consumption. The United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS) categorizes possible structural factors underlying chronic food insecurity as: Governance, Economic and Production issues, Demographic and Social issues, and Climate/Environment.

The GRFC does not provide a detailed analysis of the structural issues that determine chronic food insecurity but it does identify which are the immediate drivers of the food crises and reports on the main structural vulnerability indicators available at country level in each of the regional chapters. Together these two pieces of information offer valuable insights for informing broader initiatives related to climate change adaptation, conflict prevention and resolution, economic development, and resilience.

## The GRFC is based on partnership, consultation and consensus

The production of the GRFC is coordinated by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) in support of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC).

It is the product of a collaboration among 16 partners consisting of regional intergovernmental bodies, donors, technical bodies, clusters and United Nations agencies: Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS), the European Union (EU), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Security Cluster (FSC), Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Sistema de la Integración Centroamericano (SICA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

The result is an independent reference document presenting a consensus-driven analysis validated and endorsed by global and regional experts in food security, nutrition and forced displacement.

### All 16 partners participate in the following:

- Technical Working Groups (displacement, food security, nutrition) consisting of technical experts from partner agencies who contribute data and analysis, participate in the review of content and make recommendations to the Senior Committee for endorsement.
- The Senior Committee consisting of senior representatives from each partner agency who make the final decision on content and coordinate institutional clearance.

## Country/territory selection and inclusion

The GRFC follows the process defined in the table below to identify food-crisis countries/territories through the application of multiple, agreed-upon criteria established by the GRFC's Technical Working Group and endorsed by its Senior Committee (*see table, below*).

Following a review of the available data and evidence, the GRFC Technical Working Groups validate acute food insecurity estimates, malnutrition indicators and displacement figures for food-crisis countries/territories. Endorsement of data is based on their relevance for the

timeframe of the report, their source and whether the methodology meets the GRFC partners' technical requirements, further described in the Technical Notes.

### 1 PRE-SELECTION OF QUALIFYING COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

**46** countries/territories that required external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2023

**4** additional countries that had a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in 2023

**23** additional low- or middle-income countries/territories were not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but requested external assistance as a result of:

- hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP
- having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced
- having populations affected by conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks

High-income countries were excluded as they were deemed able to cope with shocks without requesting external assistance

**73** food-crisis countries/territories identified

### 2 SELECTION AND GROUPING OF COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

**14** of the 73 countries/territories identified had data gaps or did not meet GRFC partners' technical requirements to produce estimates of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.

The remaining **59** food-crisis countries/territories have data available for Q4 2022 and 2023 using GRFC-accepted methodologies.

#### Countries/territories are grouped into 7 regions:

- Central and Southern Africa
- East Africa
- West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon
- Asia
- Europe (Ukraine)
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Middle East and North Africa

**59** countries/territories identified

### 3 IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR/PROTRACTED FOOD CRISES

**44** of the selected countries/territories were identified as **major food crises** in 2023 based on meeting one or more of the following criteria:

- at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- any area in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above
- included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3

**36** of the selected countries/territories were identified as **protracted food crises** in 2023 as they required emergency assistance and had evidence of populations facing acute food insecurity in all eight editions of the GRFC.

**19** of the selected countries/territories were identified as **protracted major food crises** in 2023.

# Methodology at a glance

## Data sources

### Acute food insecurity data

The main data sources for acute food insecurity are the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH). These are multistakeholder, consensus-based processes that result in a classification of the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity based on a convergence of evidence and that are comparable across countries.

For countries where these analyses are not available, acute food insecurity estimates are derived from IPC-compatible Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analyses, or categorization of WFP's Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Insecurity (CARI), where populations that face "moderate acute food insecurity" and "severe acute food insecurity" as per this methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

The number of people in need (PiN) for the food security sector provided by OCHA assessments (HNO/HRP) can also be used as a proxy for high levels of acute food insecurity (see *Technical Notes*).

### Projection data for 2024

IPC, CH and FEWS NET methodologies "project" the acute food insecurity situation based on the most likely scenario by developing assumptions on the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security outcomes. All data presented in the GRFC 2024 are the latest available as of 7 January 2024, with the exception of the off-cycle analyses of Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Haiti.

### Malnutrition data

Acute malnutrition burden estimates are collected from IPC acute malnutrition analyses, HNOs and estimates by UNICEF and WFP. Acute

malnutrition prevalence data are collected from Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), or national nutrition surveys.

### Displacement data

Population statistics on forcibly displaced populations primarily come from the UNHCR through nowcasting figures for the end of the year 2023, and on internally displaced persons through the IOM, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and governments' data, based on figures available as of February 2024.

### Peak estimates

The GRFC 2024 reports the highest (or peak) estimates of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement in 2023. In three cases (migrants in Colombia and Ecuador, and refugees in Congo), acute food insecurity data from the second half of 2022 are still deemed relevant for 2023 because more recent data are not available.

As acute food insecurity can be seasonal or the consequence of a shock, the peak figure may not reflect the situation throughout the year in that country and can be based on a projection. When the analysis spans two calendar years, the peak estimate may straddle late 2022 and early 2023, or late 2023 and early 2024.

### Data gaps

Some food-crisis countries are not analysed in the GRFC 2024 because they face data gaps, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Eritrea, or do not have data that meet GRFC technical requirements or lack partner consensus. Data gaps can be driven by lack of processes to systematically collect information, lack of funding to conduct assessments, as well as lack of access due to insecurity. Countries that are not analysed are discussed at the end of each regional chapter.

## IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
<b>Phase 1</b> None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
<b>Phase 2</b> Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
<b>Phase 3</b> Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or</li> <li>• are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.</li> </ul> <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
<b>Phase 4</b> Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or</li> <li>• are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.</li> </ul> <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to save lives and livelihoods.
<b>Phase 5</b> Catastrophe/ Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)* <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

\* A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with solid evidence or as IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence.

### Acute food insecurity in upper-middle-income countries

Seven countries/territories in the GRFC 2024 were classified by the World Bank as upper-middle-income, but their populations can still experience chronic and/or acute food insecurity.

These countries/territories were mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru) but also included Namibia and, until recent events, Palestine. These countries/territories present very different contexts where levels of income are higher and living standards and livelihoods are different, including the strategies adopted by households to cope with food insecurity.

Colombia lacks an IPC analysis and concerns regarding the approximation of CARI levels 3 and 4 to IPC Phase 3 or above in these contexts resulted in the reporting of only the most severe category of CARI level 4 acute food insecurity for resident populations. Since 2016, insecurity has led to internal displacement which, when combined with an influx of migrants from neighbouring countries, has resulted in pockets of the population facing acute food insecurity.





# Global overview of food crises

Over 281.6 million people in the 59 countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

.....

This fifth consecutive annual increase is mostly attributed to expanded analysis coverage. At 21.5 percent, the prevalence was marginally lower. Among countries with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, the situation worsened in 12, driven by conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks, but it improved in 17.

.....

Escalating conflicts in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and the Sudan drove extraordinarily high levels of acute food insecurity. The Gaza Strip became the most severe food crisis in IPC history.

.....

Thirty-six countries/territories are considered protracted food crises in the GRFC, having been included in all eight editions. Among them, 19 are protracted major food crises and accounted for up to 80 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across food-crisis countries/territories each year.





## Early 2024 analyses and alerts raise concerns

### Famine imminent in Palestine (Gaza Strip) in March–May 2024

An IPC analysis released on 18 March 2024 warned of further deterioration in the Gaza Strip's catastrophic food crisis, driven by relentless hostilities, siege, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access.

Since the IPC analysis of December 2023, the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – have not been met. Famine was projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza where the Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently.

Through July 2024, the entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.2 million) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Half of the population (about 1.1 million people) are expected to experience catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5), an increase of 530 000 since the December 2023–February 2024 period. For the northern governorates, the share of population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) increased from 30 percent to 70 percent.

While the governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah were still classified in IPC Phase 4, in a worst-case scenario, these areas face a risk of Famine through July 2024 (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

In Haiti, nearly 5 million people or half the population face high levels of acute food insecurity from March to June 2024, a stark increase since the August 2023 projection. Some 1.6 million people face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), reflecting the surge in armed gang violence severely limiting movement of goods and people, causing internal displacement and driving up food prices. In the Artibonite valley – the country's breadbasket – armed groups have taken over farmland and stolen harvested crops. Also of concern are the West department, rural parts of Grand'Anse in the South, and poor parts of the capital, including Cité Soleil where pockets of the population faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in late 2022 (IPC, March 2024).

In the Sudan, the escalation of conflict and violence, especially in central, southern and western regions, is expected to exacerbate acute food insecurity and malnutrition, according to a March IPC alert. Khartoum, Gezira, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are at risk of catastrophic outcomes in the absence of a cessation of hostilities and significant humanitarian assistance. Immediate action is needed to prevent famine during the upcoming 2024 lean season (IPC, March 2024).


In West Africa and the Sahel, the late March CH analyses projected a worrying rise in high levels of acute food insecurity in Chad, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, driven by persistently high food prices and conflict disruptions to markets and livelihoods. About 2 500 people were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali (CH, March 2024). The FSIN CILSS Regional Report to be published in June 2024 will include this data.

In Southern Africa, El Niño-driven drought conditions led Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to declare national disasters in February/March 2024 due to the impact on crop production.

## Severity of acute food insecurity, 2023

Out of 281.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 203 million were in 41 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses and had data disaggregated by phase. Around 79 million were in 18 countries with FEWS NET, HNO or WFP CARI data with no phase disaggregation.

FIG. 1.1 Population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 (millions)



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

Over 705 000 people in five countries were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2023 – the highest number in GRFC reporting and almost double that of 2022

In this phase of acute food insecurity, people are facing extreme lack of food and exhaustion of coping capacities leading to starvation, acute malnutrition and death. They require urgent action to avoid more widespread extreme outcomes.

Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) categorizes an area evidencing critical levels of acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition and mortality rates above a given threshold. While no area was classified in Famine in 2023, there was a tangible risk of Famine in Palestine (Gaza Strip) (IPC, December 2023).

FIG. 1.2 Countries/territories with populations projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2023

PALESTINE (GAZA STRIP)	576 600
SOUTH SUDAN	43 000
BURKINA FASO	42 700
SOMALIA	40 400
MALI	2 500

Source: IPC TWGs, 2023; IPC Global Initiative, 2023; CH, 2023.

Around 0.6 million people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Palestine (Gaza Strip)

A quarter (26 percent) of the population of the Gaza Strip, corresponding to 576 600 people, were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between early December 2023 and early February 2024 due to intense hostilities, sharply reduced access to food, basic services and life-saving assistance, and the extreme concentration or isolation of people in inadequate shelters or areas without basic services.

This is the highest share of population in this phase in any country/territory in IPC history. As of late December 2023, the risk of Famine was expected to increase for each day that intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened (IPC, December 2023).

Around 43 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in South Sudan

In Jonglei and Unity states, 43 000 people were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the April–July 2023 lean season (IPC, November 2022). For the same lean period of 2024, the number was projected to increase to 79 000, of whom 28 000 were South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan who faced economic destitution (IPC, November 2023).





### Around 42 700 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Burkina Faso

In June–August 2023, around 42 700 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the regions of Boucle du Mouhoun and, mostly, the Sahel due to the intensity of conflicts that impeded the proper functioning of markets and left populations under siege, severely constraining population movements, access to fields and the delivery of humanitarian assistance (CH, March 2023).



### Over 40 300 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Somalia

Over 40 300 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in April–June 2023 among IDPs in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Burhakaba due to the lingering impacts of drought, breakdown of livelihoods, impact of high food prices and protracted conflict (IPC, April 2023).

However, this is a significant decrease from 214 000 people in 2022, attributable to the positive impact of the 2023 Gu rains and sustained humanitarian assistance (IPC, September 2022). In the last quarter of 2023, no populations were estimated in IPC Phase 5 despite large numbers remaining in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, February 2024).



### Around 2 500 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali

An estimated 2 500 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) over the June–August period in Ménaka as conflict impeded agricultural and market activities while also hindering the movement of populations and the delivery of humanitarian aid. About 37 percent of the affected population were IDPs (CH, March 2023).

### Update on countries with recent populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

In **Afghanistan** and **Nigeria**, people previously found to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in

2022 were no longer facing these severe conditions in 2023.

In **Haiti**, the population projected in this phase in Cité Soleil in September 2022–February 2023 no longer faced these conditions for the remainder of 2023.

There was no IPC analysis for **Ethiopia**, but FEWS NET declared that, in the aftermath of the 2020–2023 drought and the 2020–2022 conflict, some households were facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in southern, southeastern and northern areas, especially before the start of the Meher harvest in September and Deyr rainy season in October (FEWS NET, August 2023).

There was increasing concern for localized areas of Tigray and Amhara where the Meher harvest failed and households had limited food stocks (FEWS NET, January 2024).

Disaggregated data were not available in 2023 for **Yemen** where 31 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the first months of 2022.




### Over 36 million people in 39 countries/territories experienced Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2023

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. Households face large food gaps, which are either reflected in high acute malnutrition levels and excess mortality or mitigated by use of emergency coping strategies, which may entail households selling their last breeding animal or their land or house.

Among the 39 countries/territories with populations in this phase, 28 are comparable between 2022 and 2023 (see *Technical Notes*, page 165).

The 4 percent increase in the total number of people facing IPC/CH Phase 4 between 2022 and 2023 is largely due to the increase in severity in the Sudan crisis in the midst of deteriorating conflict

FIG. 1.3 Countries/territories with over 1 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), 2023



Source: IPC TWGs, 2023; Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP; IPC Global Initiative 2023; CH 2023.

(with an additional 3.2 million people in this phase). More than a third of the 36.4 million people in IPC/CH Phase 4 were in two countries alone: **Afghanistan** and the **Sudan** (see figure 1.3).

Palestine (**Gaza Strip**) had by far the highest share of its population (53 percent) in IPC Phase 4, followed by South Sudan (23 percent) and Haiti (18 percent). More than 10 percent of the population of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Somalia and the Sudan were in this phase.



### Over 165 million people in 41 countries/territories experienced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) in 2023

Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) either face food consumption shortfalls or make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods in the future.

In 2023, 165.5 million people faced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3). At 18 percent, the share of the

analysed population in this phase was on a par with 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria each had more than 20 million people in this phase, while Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Sudan each had over 9 million. More than 30 percent of the population of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Haiti, Lebanon, Madagascar and South Sudan were in IPC Phase 3.



### Almost 292 million people in 40 countries experienced Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 2023<sup>1</sup>

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) have minimally adequate diets but resort to coping strategies to afford non-food needs. They are vulnerable to shocks and require support to reduce risks related to disasters and to protect their livelihoods.

Thirty-five out of the 40 countries had more than 20 percent of their analysed population in this phase. The prevalence reached 45 percent in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**.

In **Burundi**, **Liberia** and **Senegal**, the significant increase in the number of people in this phase coincided with a decrease in people in Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1), suggesting a deterioration in food security.

In **Eswatini** and **Namibia**, the increase in the number of people in this phase mirrored a decrease in the number of people facing higher levels of acute food insecurity, suggesting an improvement in food security.

<sup>1</sup> The number of countries with data in this phase is 40 (not 41) because El Salvador is not included among the countries with populations in IPC Phase 2 since IPC Phases 1 and 2 are merged.

## Major food crises in 2023

Of the 59 countries/territories meeting GRFC technical requirements, 44 were identified as major food crises.


Major food crises have more than 1 million people or 20 percent of their total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), an area classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above, or were included in the Inter Agency Standing Committee humanitarian system-wide emergency response Level 3.

The number of major food crises in the GRFC has almost doubled since the first GRFC edition in 2017. Nineteen countries are classified as protracted major food crises, having been classified as major food crises in all eight editions (refer to *Technical Notes for full list*). Of these 19, **Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen** have been among the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people facing high acute food insecurity in all editions of the GRFC.

**Colombia (residents), Congo (residents), Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal** became major food crises for the first time in the GRFC 2024 either because data became newly available (Congo and Colombia residents) or levels of acute food insecurity increased to the extent that they met the inclusion thresholds (Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal).

**Mauritania and Guinea**, which were major food crises in the GRFC 2023, were no longer so in the GRFC 2024 as their situations improved.


MAP 1.2 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2023



### Ten largest food crises by number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity

Around 176 million people or 62.5 percent of the total number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories were in ten food crises, each with more than 10 million acutely food-insecure people needing urgent humanitarian assistance (see figure 1.4). The list of the ten largest food crises has changed little since the GRFC 2023. **Bangladesh** is listed for the first time due to increased analysis coverage. **Ukraine** was among the ten largest food crises in 2022, but not in 2023.

FIG. 1.4 Countries/territories with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023




Sources: IPC TWGs (Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Sudan); CH (Nigeria); FEWS NET (Ethiopia, Yemen); HNO (Afghanistan, Syrian Arab Republic); pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024 (Myanmar).

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Legend: < 1 million, 1–2.9 million, 3–4.9 million, 5–9.9 million, 10–15 million, > 15 million, Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements, Data gap, Country not selected for analysis, Migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.


MAP 1.3 Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories, 2023



### Ten largest food crises by share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity


At 100 percent of its population (2.2 million), the Gaza Strip had the largest prevalence of high acute food insecurity globally and in IPC history. South Sudan, Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic had more than half of their population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (see figure 1.5). More than half of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, refugees in Congo, and Syrian refugees in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon faced high levels of acute food insecurity (see figure 1.6).

FIG. 1.5 Countries/territories with the largest share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



Sources: IPC Global Initiative, 2023 (Gaza Strip); IPC TWGs (Central African Republic, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan); FEWS NET (Yemen); HNO (Afghanistan, Syrian Arab Republic).

FIG. 1.6 Refugee/migrant populations with more than half facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



This graphic only refers to countries that were selected for hosting migrant and refugee populations and therefore does not include Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh or Syrian refugees in Lebanon (see Spotlight on Displacement on page 18 for additional data).

Source: WFP CARL.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

< 10 percent   10–24.99 percent   25–49.99 percent   ≥ 50 percent   Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements   Data gap   Country not selected for analysis   ○ Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

## Outlook for 2024

**As of January 2024, projections were available for 41 out of the 59 countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024.**

Outlooks are based on information available at the time of the analysis, and projection periods do not extend for all of 2024 nor do they necessarily cover lean seasons or peak periods. In these 41 countries/territories, around 208.3 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024. This represents 19 percent of the analysed population, which suggests a possible improvement since 2023.

Around 1.2 million people are likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in two countries/territories. In **Palestine (Gaza Strip)**, Famine is imminent in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza and around 1.1 million people are projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between mid-March and mid-July (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024). In **South Sudan**, 79 000 people were projected to be in this phase during the April–July 2024 lean season. If security and humanitarian access deteriorate in **Burkina Faso**, food insecurity could rise to more severe levels.

Besides Palestine (Gaza Strip), acute food insecurity is expected to worsen in the Sudan due to the escalation of conflict and violence, with Khartoum, Gezira, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan at critical risk of catastrophic outcomes in the absence of a cessation of hostilities and significant humanitarian assistance (IPC, March 2024). A March 2024 IPC analysis also pointed to increasing numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in Haiti, reaching more than half the population in March–June 2024, reflecting the surge in armed gang violence severely limiting movement of goods and people, causing internal displacement and driving up food prices (IPC, March 2024).

Deteriorations are also expected in Chad, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. For Angola, Nicaragua, Uganda and Yemen, projections

are provided as ranges, and their upper bound represents a scenario of deterioration.

Improvements are expected in 17 food-crisis countries. Eight of these countries had more than 1 million fewer people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. The biggest improvement was projected for Kenya due to the impact of favourable weather on crops and livestock. Improvements in these countries may be seasonal or they may not materialize because of worsening or new/unforeseen drivers.

In net food-importing countries, a double burden is developing with high food prices coupled with a strong dollar contributing to currency depreciation that will continue to push up food prices and further erode households' purchasing power (UNCTAD, December 2022).

El Niño-driven drought conditions have led **Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe** to declare national disasters in February/March 2024 due to the impact on crop production. El Niño's sustained impact on global temperatures risks that 2024 could be hotter than 2023 (WMO, February 2024).

### Humanitarian operations in a context of reduced resources and increasing costs

The GRFC records a growing number of people in need of humanitarian food assistance at the same time as the cost of delivery is increasing. Inflation, supply chain disruptions and disrupted transport routes increased WFP's food procurement costs by 39 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WFP, 2023). Decreasing resources leads to a reduction in beneficiaries, ration sizes or both. Available analyses on reductions in food assistance show that they lead to a deterioration in food consumption and/or an increase in negative coping strategies to cover food needs, thus impacting future access to food. Women and children are most affected (WFP, April 2024).

## Acute food insecurity levels remain stubbornly high in the context of 2023 funding shortfalls following record humanitarian funding levels in 2022

**The current trends in external financing fail to pave the way for sustainable improvements in food security, according to the 2023 Financing Flows and Food Crises report (GNAFC, 2023).**

Between 2021 and 2022, humanitarian funding for food assistance, emergency agriculture and nutrition in 58 food-crisis countries/territories increased by over 50 percent, reaching a record USD 15.1 billion, the highest since 2016. However, the latest information from the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) shows that while needs remain high, the record 2022 levels of humanitarian funding were not sustained in 2023, and were similar to those of 2021. Based on the HRP funding requirements, this results in an increasing gap between needs and funding.

In 2022, the ten largest recipients of humanitarian funding for food assistance, emergency agriculture and nutrition were Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Lebanon and Democratic Republic of the Congo, ranging from USD 1.9 billion in Afghanistan to USD 0.5 billion in Democratic

Republic of the Congo. Overall, these ten countries received almost 71 percent of the total humanitarian assistance allocated to food sectors in countries with food crises.

According to preliminary data, development assistance to food sectors in food-crisis countries/territories increased by 16 percent from 2021 to 2022, reaching pre-COVID-19 levels (USD 7 billion). This increase can also be explained by the fact that more countries were categorized as food crises in the GRFC 2023. However, the overall trend of development assistance since 2016 has remained largely unchanged – at around USD 6–7 billion per year.

In 2022, the ten largest recipients of development assistance to food sectors were Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, the Niger, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Yemen, Uganda and the Sudan, ranging from USD 0.7 billion in Ethiopia to USD 0.2 billion in the Sudan. Overall, these ten countries received 46 percent of the total development assistance to food sectors in food-crisis contexts (GNAFC, 2023).

**FIG. 1.7 Humanitarian and development assistance to highly acutely food-insecure populations in food-crisis countries/territories, 2016–2023**



Source: GNAFC based on OCHA FTS and OECD CRS.



## Drivers of food crises in 2023–2024

**The drivers of food crises are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.**

Acute food insecurity is rarely driven by a single shock or hazard, but rather by the interaction between shocks and underlying poverty, structural weaknesses and other vulnerability factors.

Conflict is the major driver and amplifier of high levels of acute food insecurity, directly affecting food access and availability and the ability to cope with other shocks. Conflict also tends to reverse economic and development gains, limiting communities' and countries' capacity to withstand and recover from weather and economic shocks.


In 2023, the global shocks of climate change, continued and residual economic effects of the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic persisted, while the El Niño event and renewed intense conflicts, particularly in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and the Sudan, had national and regional impacts.

The GRFC 2024 aims to identify the driver that had the most significant impact on acute food insecurity for each country/territory. As it is difficult to disentangle other compounding factors, the total number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in that country/territory is used to calculate the aggregated statistics in figure 1.8. Secondary and tertiary drivers are also identified where relevant.

**Conflict/insecurity – primary driver in 20 countries/territories with 135 million people facing high acute food insecurity**

Among the 59 GRFC countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements, conflict/insecurity was the major driver in 20 of them where almost 135 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. In total, around 621 800 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in conflict-affected Palestine (Gaza Strip),

FIG. 1.8 Primary drivers of acute food insecurity in countries/territories with food crises, 2023



Food crises are the result of multiple drivers. The GRFC has based this infographic on the predominant driver in each country/territory.

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.

Burkina Faso and Mali. Out of the 36 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) globally, half were in countries where conflict was the primary driver. Conflict/insecurity was considered the secondary driver in nine food-crisis countries and the tertiary driver in six.

Around 181.7 million people in 13 of the 20 conflict-affected countries were estimated to be in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2).

Seven of the 20 primarily conflict-driven food crises were in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and six were in West Africa. Conflict/insecurity was the major driver in most of the ten largest food crises (by number and/or by share): Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip), the Sudan and Yemen.

### Intensifying impact of widespread and pervasive conflict in 2023

Globally there were 12 percent more conflict events in 2023 than in 2022, and 40 percent more than in 2020 (ACLED, February 2024). Eight of the ten

countries/territories classified as having “extreme” conflict by the January 2024 ACLED Conflict Index were major food crises in 2023, including, in order of conflict severity, Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Palestine, Nigeria, Colombia, Haiti, Yemen and the Sudan (ACLED, February 2024).

The index classified Palestine, Haiti and the Sudan as worsening conflicts and the rest as consistently concerning.

A further 14 countries included in the GRFC 2024 were among the 20 countries classified as having “high” levels of conflict (ACLED, February 2024).

Indeed the impact of conflict on acute food insecurity intensified since 2022 when 117 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 19 countries/territories where conflict/insecurity was the main driver.

Since 2021, the decrease in the number of countries with conflict as the primary driver can be attributed to a switch in primary driver from conflict/insecurity to economic shocks in

Afghanistan, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic though localized insecurity persisted in these countries, and years of conflict have left their economies in tatters and eroded people's resilience and ability to recover from external shocks.

Conflict continued to lead to displacement within countries and across borders, affecting not only displaced people but also the communities hosting them.

The conflict in the Sudan made it the world's largest internal displacement situation by the end of 2023, with the number of displaced people continuing to increase rapidly in early 2024. Limited humanitarian access to conflict hotspots in the country undermined the provision of assistance and support to affected populations.

Another 1.5 million people had fled from the Sudan to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, January 2024), including to parts of Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan where high levels of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition were already widespread. The increased influx of refugees and returnees is intensifying competition for already scarce resources.

From October 2023, around 80 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip became internally displaced (UNRWA, February 2024) due to continued air, land and sea operations, destruction of shelter, military evacuation orders, and lack of access to food, basic services and humanitarian assistance. Many were displaced multiple times in search of safety. The high concentration of IDPs – especially in Rafah governorate – inadequate shelter and lack of access to basic services were major factors increasing the risk of Famine (OCHA, January 2024).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, an estimated 6.6 million are internally displaced by the conflict and a further 5.5 million Syrian refugees are in neighbouring Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye, where many face high levels of acute food insecurity amid worsening socioeconomic crises and humanitarian funding shortfalls.



### Weather extremes – primary driver in 18 countries with 72 million people facing high acute food insecurity

In 2023, the world experienced its hottest year since records began in 1850 and approached the critical 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels Long Term Temperature Goal of the Paris Agreement. The rise in temperatures manifested in extreme heat, drought, wildfires, intense rainfall and flooding (WMO, 2024).

Climate-related shocks were the main drivers in 18 countries, where almost 72 million people faced high levels of food insecurity. This is an increase from 2022 (12 countries with 56.8 million acutely food-insecure people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance). Twelve of these countries are in Africa, with 47.8 million people requiring urgent assistance, and five in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 12.2 million. In Pakistan, 11.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity primarily due to weather extremes.

Weather extremes were considered the secondary driver in 12 food-crisis countries and the tertiary driver in 15 of them.

Weather extremes can also drive displacement and are known to impede voluntary returns for refugees and IDPs as livelihoods at the place of origin may be lost. Competition for resources can also limit livelihood opportunities at the site of displacement.

Around 51 million people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 11 of the 18 countries where weather extremes were the main driver of acute food insecurity, and are thus vulnerable to more severe levels of acute food insecurity if they face another shock.

The El Niño event drove many of the weather extremes seen in 2023, bringing hotter and drier-than-normal conditions across much of East Africa, Central and Southern Africa, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, reaching its peak intensity in late 2023 through mid-2024.

FIG. 1.9 Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent by primary driver, 2018–2023

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Conflict/ insecurity	73.9M 21 countries	77.1M 22 countries	99.1M 23 countries	139.1M 24 countries	117.1M 19 countries	134.5M 20 countries
Weather extremes	28.8M 26 countries	33.8M 25 countries	15.7M 15 countries	23.5M 8 countries	56.8M 12 countries	71.9M 18 countries
Economic shocks	10.2M 6 countries	24.0M 8 countries	40.5M 17 countries	30.2M 21 countries	83.9M 27 countries	75.2M 21 countries

Economic shocks include the indirect impact of COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021 and the effects of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Food crises are the result of multiple drivers. The GRFC has based this infographic on the predominant driver in each country/territory.

Source: FSIN, GRFC 2019–2023.

Until May 2023, the Horn of Africa experienced below-average rainfall for three consecutive years affecting both long rains and short rains, leading to the worst drought conditions in nearly 40 years, which affected rangeland, water resources and in turn crop and livestock production.

In Central and Southern Africa, 12 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity across seven countries primarily due to the impact of dry conditions on crop production and destruction caused by flooding from cyclone Freddy in March 2023. In February/March 2024 El Niño-driven drought conditions led Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to declare national disasters due to the impact on crop production.

In Asia, cyclone Mocha caused widespread destruction of farmlands, impacting over 3 million people in Myanmar alone (ECHO, June 2023).



### Economic shocks – primary driver in 21 countries with 75 million people facing high acute food insecurity

In 2023, economic shocks were considered the primary driver in 21 countries where 75.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of these, 12.1 million people faced Emergency (IPC/

CH Phase 4) in 15 countries and, in South Sudan, 43 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). This marks a decrease from 27 countries with 83.9 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022, although still more than double the numbers in 2019 before COVID-19 instigated major rises in domestic food prices. Economic shocks were considered the secondary driver in 27 countries/territories and the tertiary driver in five.

Around 59 million people were estimated to be in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 16 countries with economic shocks as the primary driver and thus vulnerable to more severe acute food insecurity if they face a shock.

In 2023, global economic growth slowed to 3.1 percent from 3.5 percent in 2022, as higher central bank rates set to curb inflation slowed economic activities. Despite tighter monetary policies and lower commodity prices, which helped to rein in the cost-of-living crisis, inflation remained above pre-pandemic levels (IMF, October 2023; IMF, January 2024).

Not all food-crisis countries/territories benefited equally from lower international commodity prices. For some food-crisis countries that export primary

commodities, it has meant lower export revenues, while for most countries that are net-importers of food, higher borrowing costs coupled with further depreciation of domestic currencies increased their debt burdens and raised the domestic cost of imported food and agricultural inputs. This kept inflation high and added pressure to existing macroeconomic woes created by high exposure to the global shocks posed by COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. Out of the 73 countries/territories selected for inclusion as food crises in the GRFC, 48 are net food-importing countries (FAO, 2023).

As of February 2024, 58 percent of low-income countries were experiencing inflation higher than 5 percent (WB, February 2024).

Governments continue to have limited budgetary resources to put towards social protection programmes and/or investments in building vulnerable households' resilience due to already elevated levels of debt that require increased spending on interest rate payments (IMF, October 2023).

These pressures contribute to a significant depletion of foreign exchange reserves, making it more difficult to import food and non-food essential items (WFP & FAO, November 2023).

In many instances, the persistence of high prices of food in domestic markets also reflects high costs and scarcity of labour as well as limited food availability due to weather extremes and/or escalating conflicts.

## Acute food insecurity, 2016–2023

The prevalence of high acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) doubled from 11 percent in 48 countries/territories in 2016, to 21.5 percent in 59 countries/territories in 2023.

The sharpest increase was between 2019 and 2020 when the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 17 percent to 21 percent as protracted conflict, the economic fallout of COVID-19 and weather extremes exacerbated existing fragilities.

There was also a significant increase in prevalence between 2018 and 2019, reflecting worsening acute food insecurity in key conflict-driven crises, notably in the Central Sahel, Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, and the growing intensity


of weather extremes and economic shocks as drivers in countries such as Guatemala, Haiti, Pakistan and Zimbabwe (see figure 1.10).

### Protracted crises

Thirty-six countries/territories are considered to be protracted food crises in the GRFC, having been included as food crises in all eight editions. Among them, 19 are defined as both protracted and major food crises (see *Technical Notes*). These 19 protracted major food crises encompassed 65–80 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across food-crisis countries/territories each year.

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in these 36 countries/territories increased from 93.4 million or 13 percent of the analysed population in 2016 to 203.3 million or 22 percent in 2022. It further increased to 225.2 million or 23 percent in 2023.

FIG. 1.10 Numbers of people and share of analysed population in GRFC countries/territories facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC, CH, FEWS NET, WFP, SADC and OCHA data from 2016–2023.


## Populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023<sup>1</sup>



### Populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

In 2023, the total population projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in five countries/territories was over four times higher than 2016 and the highest in eight years of GRFC reporting. More than 80 percent of the population in this phase in 2023 were in Palestine (Gaza Strip).

FIG. 1.11 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 5, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

Between 2016 and 2023, 11 countries/territories have had populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5): Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Sometimes these estimates have been outside the peak period of acute food insecurity and are therefore not included in figure 1.12. South Sudan has had populations in this phase almost every year, ranging between 21 000 people in 2016 to 155 000 in 2018, and Yemen for five consecutive years from 2018 to 2022.

The high numbers in 2021 were driven by the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia<sup>2</sup> and a convergence of


conflict, economic shocks and weather extremes in South Sudan and Yemen. The numbers were also high in 2022 with 57 percent of the 351 300 people in this phase in Somalia largely due to the prolonged drought. In localized parts of Somalia and Yemen, a risk of Famine was identified in 2022 according to worst-case scenarios, although it did not materialize in either country.



### Populations in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)

When considering the 19 countries with disaggregated Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) data across all editions of the GRFC, the share of analysed population in this phase increased from 1.7 percent in 2016 to 4.1 percent in 2023, peaking at 4.4 percent in 2021 due to the economic fallout of COVID-19 as well as conflict and weather extremes. Five conflict/insecurity-affected countries have had more than 1 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) each year since 2019 – Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, South Sudan and the Sudan. No disaggregated data were available for Yemen in 2023. Since 2020, four countries have had more than 10 percent of their analysed populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Haiti and South Sudan.

FIG. 1.12 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 4, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.


- Discrepancies with past GRFC editions are due to a more accurate and consistent methodology for reporting aggregates by IPC phase.
- The IPC estimates for Ethiopia in May–June 2021 reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC analysis results. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.

## Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)

In the 19 countries with disaggregated data across all editions of the GRFC, the share of the analysed population facing Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) increased from 10 percent in 2016 to 18 percent in 2023. This corresponds to a more than threefold increase in the number of people in this phase since 2016, noting a 59 percent larger analysis coverage between 2016 and 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen have had more than 10 million people in this phase in five editions since 2016.

Central African Republic, Haiti and South Sudan consistently had more than 20 percent of their population analysed in IPC Phase 3 since 2017, and this trend continued through 2024.

FIG. 1.13 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3, 2016–2023




Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

## Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)

In the same 18 countries with disaggregated IPC/CH Phase 1 and 2 data across all eight GRFC editions, the share of the population facing Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) has increased from 21 percent in 2016 to 29 percent in 2023. This is in parallel with a decrease in the share of the food-secure population (IPC/CH Phase 1) from 63 percent of the population analysed in 2016 to 52 percent in 2023, pointing to a deterioration in food security.

Across the 18 countries, the number of people in this phase more than doubled from 63 million in 2016 to almost 144 million in 2023, reflecting sustained drivers increasing food insecurity as well as increased analysis coverage.

FIG. 1.14 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 2, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

## Nutrition overview


**Acute malnutrition among children and women in food-crisis countries continued to worsen in 2023, particularly among displaced populations and those affected by conflicts.**

This included a troubling increase in the number of children suffering from the most severe form of acute malnutrition,<sup>1</sup> who are up to 12 times more likely to die than their well-nourished counterparts. Out of 36.4 million children aged under 5 suffering from acute malnutrition in 2023, 9.8 million were severely acutely malnourished and in need of urgent treatment in 32 food-crisis countries.<sup>2 3</sup>

Globally, nearly half of all deaths in children under 5 years old are attributable to malnutrition (UNICEF, March 2023). The ripple effects of malnutrition extend to diminished immune function, linear growth and cognitive development, with profound impacts for the economic potential of communities and countries. Malnourished women are at a higher risk of giving birth to low birth-weight babies, who are more prone to illness, malnutrition and mortality in infancy and early childhood, and may suffer from chronic diseases in later life (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

In the contexts of major conflicts, especially in the Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Palestine (Gaza Strip), leading to the uprooting of large populations, the nutrition situation of children, and of pregnant and breastfeeding women is of great concern. Such conflicts have caused a severe reduction in the access to and availability of nutritious, affordable and safe foods for children, essential health and nutrition services for children and women, and

FIG. 1.15 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 32 food crises, 2023



Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

**9.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 22 food-crisis countries with data in 2023**

Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

humanitarian assistance. Dire living conditions and lack of safe water are enabling the spread of infectious diseases. All these factors raise the risk of life-threatening acute malnutrition.

This edition of the GRFC aims to provide a holistic understanding of available acute malnutrition data in GRFC food-crisis countries/territories since 2021. To do so, the GRFC Nutrition Technical Working Group endorsed up to three levels of nutrition data for each country:

- Data on contributing factors to acute malnutrition, such as levels of anaemia, share of households with adequate access to health and WASH services, information on Minimum Acceptable Diet, etc.
- Data on the prevalence of acute malnutrition (outcome level) stemming from nutrition surveys, such as SMART and MICS surveys.
- Data on the burden of malnutrition, which refer to the number of children and women suffering from acute malnutrition during a particular period of analysis. Such estimates are provided by IPC acute malnutrition analyses, HNOs and estimates by UNICEF and WFP.

<sup>1</sup> Acute malnutrition, or wasting, refers to low weight in relation to height/length or the presence of bilateral oedema.

<sup>2</sup> The acute malnutrition burden calculation method is not the same across countries and therefore the numbers are not directly comparable.

<sup>3</sup> The comparability of the number of children affected by acute malnutrition across countries is limited due to variations in the incident correction factors used for its estimation in each country. For further details, please refer to the *Technical Notes* on page 162.



## The underlying determinants of malnutrition

Malnutrition is multidimensional. Children's nutritional status is largely determined by the adequacy of their diets and care, which in turn are driven by the availability of and access to nutritious and affordable foods, essential nutrition and social services, and age-appropriate feeding and care practices, according to the UNICEF Conceptual Framework on the Determinants of Maternal and Child Nutrition (see figure 1.18).

The Framework emphasizes the need for year-round access to nutritious foods, essential services and positive practices to create environments that nurture children and women. Without these foundational supports, the risk of acute malnutrition in children and women rises, initiating a cascade of nutrition deprivation and poor survival, growth and development outcomes with intra- and inter-generational consequences (UNICEF, November 2021).

The associations between malnutrition and acute food insecurity are not linear but, as the GRFC illustrates, areas with high levels of acute food insecurity often tend to have high levels of acute malnutrition, which, when combined, create a major threat to the survival and development of populations in the short, medium and long term.


## Assessing the unseen: the need for holistic information systems

Out of 59 food-crisis countries/territories meeting GRFC 2024 technical requirements, 35 had estimates for the number of acutely malnourished children since 2021, and out of these 27 had data for all three data levels.

Twenty-four food-crisis countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024 did not have comprehensive burden or prevalence data between 2021 and 2023.

Some major food crises had target estimates rather than burden or prevalence data. These are instrumental in identifying and assisting children

**FIG. 1.16 The ten food crises with highest numbers of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023 (millions)**



\* These figures are not based on country-wide analyses.

Source: IPC TWGs; HRP/HNO (Ethiopia, Sudan).

most impacted by severe acute malnutrition, ensuring support where it is most needed.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, countries facing food crises such as Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras, and Ukraine in Europe, have historically shown low levels of acute malnutrition, as confirmed by screenings and admission data. This situation explains the absence of acute malnutrition burden and prevalence data at national levels. Investing in wider nutrition vulnerability analyses would better reflect the malnutrition situation and the potential intersectionality of malnutrition with food insecurity.

Data for pregnant and breastfeeding women in 2023 were available in only 22 out of 59 food-crisis countries/territories, indicating the difficulty of accessing data for these populations. In these countries, about 9.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished.

This concerning picture for maternal nutrition in food-crisis countries had Democratic Republic of the Congo at the forefront, with 2.2 million women affected. Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria, South Sudan and the Sudan each reported between half a million to nearly 1 million cases, reflecting poor maternal diets, high levels of acute food insecurity and protection issues that have a cascading effect on the wellbeing of mothers and their children.

Gathering nutrition data among forcibly displaced populations in food-crisis countries/territories is also an enormous challenge. Outcome-level and contributing factors data were available only for 18 of the 57 food-crisis countries with displaced populations. The data came from SENS surveys conducted by UNHCR in refugee camp settings. In addition, in Colombia, a WFP analysis provided key nutrition indicators for migrant populations.

Limited funding and monitoring capacity, coupled with heightened conflict and restricted access, have led to fragmented nutrition data. This was particularly the case for some conflict-driven food crises that lacked national coverage, notably Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria and Yemen.

Innovative data collection and analysis methods, exemplified by the recent nutrition vulnerability analysis for Palestine (Gaza Strip), offer expanded insights into nutrition situations. A concerted and intentional investment is essential to scale this approach for a holistic perspective on nutrition. This is especially important in hard-to-reach areas where large forcibly displaced populations, particularly IDPs, go largely unassessed.

## Conflict-affected countries had the highest numbers of children with acute malnutrition in 2023

Among the countries with data for 2023, about 60 percent of the estimated children with acute malnutrition were in the ten food crises with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. These countries experienced significant conflict, either through protracted situations or a notable intensification in 2023, compounded by climate shocks and extreme weather events and high prices of nutritious foods, exacerbating their food and nutrition crises.


Northeastern and northwestern Nigeria had the highest numbers of children with acute malnutrition, with over 5.9 million, of whom over 1.6 million were severely acutely malnourished, followed by Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Sudan (according to estimates from before the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023).

For the Sudan, a revised analysis after the start of the conflict projected a 30 percent increase in the number of children suffering from wasting in hotspot areas, an increase of 15 percent in states hosting large IDP populations and 10 percent elsewhere in the country.

The analysis for Yemen was only carried out in internationally recognised government (IRG)-controlled areas. There were no recent nutrition data for Myanmar, but the Nutrition Cluster indicated a continued deterioration of the situation amid worsening contributing factors.

Ascertaining the nutrition status of children in Palestine (Gaza Strip) was very challenging, due to the ongoing conflict. The deteriorating nutrition situation of women and children raised concerns that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition had likely been exceeded and mortality could breach Famine thresholds in northern governorates anytime between mid-March and May 2024 (IPC, March 2024). The second round of the Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis for the Gaza Strip revealed significant worsening

**FIG. 1.17 The ten food crises with the highest number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023 (millions)**



\* These figures are not based on country-wide analysis coverage.

Source: HNO/HRP; IPC TWGs (Afghanistan, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and South Sudan).

in the nutrition of children aged 6–23 months from January–March 2024, particularly in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates, where limited aid access led to acute malnutrition rates doubling to 31 percent, with 4 percent of them suffering from severe acute malnutrition. While aid efforts in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah governorates helped to some extent, the overall malnutrition levels still increased to around 6 percent, up from 1 percent before the conflict (GNC, March 2024).

In Latin America and the Caribbean, data available for Haiti showed a concerning and worsening nutrition crisis, with GAM prevalence in several locations of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area above the 10 percent WHO High threshold (SMART, 2023). While acute malnutrition is not a major issue among resident populations across the region, there are growing concerns of a progressive deterioration in the nutritional status of populations on the move, particularly among migrants, refugees and people requiring international protection (GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024).

## Extremely Critical and Critical levels of acute malnutrition in drought, flood and conflict-affected areas

According to the IPC acute malnutrition (AMN) analyses conducted in 18 countries/territories covering 2023, only Kenya had areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) (>30 percent) due to the multi-season drought.

In Yemen, where the coverage of the 2023 IPC AMN analysis was reduced due to conflict-related access constraints, areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) in 2022 were not analysed in 2023.

Fifteen of the 18 countries – Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, northern Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen – all had areas classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) (15–30 percent of children with acute malnutrition).


In only three countries was Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) the most severe classification: Burkina Faso, where the analysis did not cover northern areas severely affected by conflict, Burundi, and southern and southeastern Madagascar.

According to other nutrition sources on outcome levels, the prevalence of acute malnutrition for children under 5 years old was concerning in several countries.

In Ethiopia, SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in rural areas and IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Very High/Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition, with the highest prevalence among IDPs (26.5 percent). Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from acute malnutrition (MUAC < 23cm), indicating an Extremely Critical situation (SMART, August 2023).

In the Sudan, before the escalation of conflict in April 2023, 64 localities had a Very High acute malnutrition prevalence of 15 percent or more, including five localities with levels over 30 percent.

**FIG. 1.18 UNICEF's conceptual framework**



Source: UNICEF, 2021.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, it varied regionally, with the Northwest and parts of Damascus at 5 percent (considered Low/Medium), while some northeastern areas reached 12 percent, surpassing the WHO High threshold.

SMART surveys also indicated prevalence above the WHO Very High threshold of 15 percent in parts of Mauritania.

In Haiti, the Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) prevalence was estimated at 2.1 percent, reaching a highly concerning 3 percent in Port-au-Prince's metropolitan area.





© WFP/ARTE/ABDOL SAUD

# Spotlight | Displacement

Available data on acute food insecurity and malnutrition on displaced populations paint a dire picture. The situation will likely continue to deteriorate in 2024 without concerted action among governments and the international community to meet funding requirements as conflict, and economic and climate shocks drive increased displacement.

.....

Failing to meet global burden-sharing commitments can increase protection risks for displaced people, drive engagement in harmful coping strategies, trigger further displacement and amplify acute food insecurity.

.....

While tools are evolving to support robust, disaggregated and systematic data collection and analysis on displaced populations, more work needs to be done to harmonize indicators and methods of analysis.

.....


The vulnerabilities faced by displaced populations – protection risks, limited access to employment, livelihoods, food and shelter, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance – need to be captured in food security and nutrition analyses.

# Spotlight | Displacement

**New, escalating and protracted conflicts, extreme climatic events and economic shocks resulted in another year of increasing numbers of people forced to flee their homes in 2023. In 59 food-crisis countries/territories, the number of displaced people reached 90.2 million.<sup>1</sup>**


This *Spotlight* aims to highlight the link between acute food insecurity and displaced populations in food-crisis contexts globally and through four country-level case studies, two covering internally displaced populations (IDPs) and two refugee populations.

**FIG. 1.19 Number of forcibly displaced people in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2023**



Sources: IOM, 2023; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate December 2023; UNRWA, 2023.

**FIG. 1.20 New refugee, migrant and asylum-seeker flows in 59 food-crisis countries, 2013–2022**




The data in this figure refer to the 59 food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements for 2023.

Source: UNHCR.

<sup>1</sup> Globally there were 110 million forcibly displaced people by the end of 2022 (UNHCR Mid-Year Trends, October 2023).

**FIG. 1.21 Number (millions) of displaced people in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2013–2023**



The data in this figure refer to the 59 food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements for 2023.

Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimate, December 2023, IOM, UNRWA.

## Most forcibly displaced people remain in their country of origin as IDPs

Most displaced people in the 59 food-crisis countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements were displaced internally, amounting to 64.3 million IDPs (IOM, 2023). The remaining 26 million fled across international borders, mainly to neighbouring countries, and reside as refugees, asylum-seekers or others in need of international protection (UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023; UNRWA, 2023).

## Rapidly increasing numbers of displaced people in last decade

Conflict in many of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories – including Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Palestine, Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen – has contributed to rapidly increasing numbers of displaced people over the last ten years.

Climate disasters in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan, and economic hardship including in countries of South America, have also been contributing factors.

Refugee flows into food-crisis countries over the last decade reached over 3 million in 2017 (when 0.8 million refugees entered Türkiye and 0.7 million Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh) and in 2018 largely due to migrants entering Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Lower numbers were observed during 2020 and 2021 when COVID-19 movement restrictions were in place. Higher numbers in 2013 and 2014 were largely driven by the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, with refugees seeking safety in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Türkiye (see figure 1.21). The Sudan and Uganda have received continually high numbers of refugees, especially in 2016–2018.

## A sharp increase in IDPs in 2023

Of the people newly internally displaced in 2023, the largest numbers were in the Sudan followed by Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine (Gaza Strip), Somalia and Myanmar (UNHCR Mid-Year Trends, October 2023; IDMC, 2024).

The Sudan became the largest internal displacement crisis in the world in 2023 with millions of people internally displaced between the onset of hostilities in April and the end of the year, bringing the total number of IDPs to over 9 million (IOM, January 2024).

In Palestine, the Gaza Strip saw 85 percent of its population – or 1.9 million people – displaced between early October and December 2023, some multiple times (UNRWA, January 2024).

## Displacement and food crises are linked and mutually reinforcing

Disaggregated data reveal that high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition are particularly prevalent in displaced communities. This is linked to insecurity and protection risks, limited access to employment and livelihood opportunities, unreliable access to food and shelter, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs.

Failing to address these vulnerabilities can drive use of harmful coping strategies, leading to further displacement and amplifying acute food insecurity (see box on page 20).

## Who do the numbers in this Spotlight refer to?

The figures in this Spotlight refer to people who have been **forcibly displaced** by the end of 2023. Forced displacement is involuntary or coerced movement of people away from their home or home region as a result of or to avoid the effects of events or situations such as armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights abuses, or natural or human-made disasters (UNHCR).

The data include **refugees** (under UNHCR's and UNRWA's mandate); **asylum-seekers**; **internally displaced persons** (IDPs); and **"other people in need of international protection"** (OIPs), a category introduced by UNHCR in mid-2022 to refer to people forcibly displaced outside their country or territory of origin including for economic reasons.

This Spotlight uses the term **"displaced populations"** to cover all these population groups.



FIG. 1.22 Four-year trends in food-crisis countries with more than 5 million IDPs in 2023





FIG. 1.23 Four-year trends in food-crisis countries with 2–5 million IDPs in 2023



Colombia, with 6.9 million IDPs in 2023, is not included in this graphic because no data were available for 2020–2022.

Source: IOM; OCHA; UNHCR.

### IDP populations are experiencing dire food insecurity and malnutrition levels

Although food security data specifically on IDP populations are fairly scant, the data in the GRFC 2024 reveal a strong link between internal displacement and high levels of acute food insecurity.

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), where 75–85 percent of the population are displaced (UNRWA, January

2024), the entire IDP population are facing high levels of acute food insecurity, with 25 percent estimated to be facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, December 2023). Some 60 percent of IDPs in Burkina Faso, 67 percent in Somalia, and 100 percent of IDPs living in camps in northwest Syrian Arab Republic faced high levels of acute food insecurity (GRFC 2024) (see table 1.1 on page 24). Figures 1.22 and 1.23 above show the change over the last four years in the number of

## Displaced populations face particular vulnerabilities pertaining to the four pillars of food insecurity

**Food availability** Restrictive policies in some refugee-hosting countries might limit access to land for food production. Displaced populations are less likely to own livestock and farmland than residents, especially when they experience repeated displacements. Markets may be strained to respond to a sudden or sustained increased demand due to weak local food systems. Displaced people are therefore often heavily reliant on food assistance, yet severe underfunding has resulted in cuts – whether in quantity or a decreasing number of households receiving them – leading to a reduction in the quantity and quality of food received.

**Food access** While some countries have made significant progress in expanding legal access to work for refugees, the majority of refugees struggle to find decent employment or access livelihoods that allow them to generate a sustainable income, particularly those living in camp settings.

Restrictive policies prevent displaced populations from accessing livelihoods/generating income, including accessing credit and bank accounts and being permitted to open a business, which restricts entrepreneurship and engaging in business.

Displaced populations may face labour market competition in and with host communities. Employment tends to be unpredictable, high risk and low paid. Faced with low incomes, inflation, food price rises and volatility, they are often unable to meet their food and other basic needs without resorting to harmful coping strategies.

**Food utilization** Most displaced populations live in marginalized or high-risk areas, exposed to natural disasters or crowded into dense camps or poor urban centres with limited access to social or health services. Access to clean water, improved sanitation and cooking facilities can be limited, increasing the risk of disease and malnutrition, particularly among women and children. Displacement can break down social networks and disrupt – but sometimes strengthen – community support systems. The stressors associated with being displaced and finding oneself in unfamiliar places exposed to unfamiliar food sources can affect mental and physical health, and compromise infant and young child-feeding practices.

**Food stability** Lack of predictable and stable income, and poor access to livelihoods, shelter and basic services can make it difficult for displaced households to predictably or stably meet their food needs.

IDPs in the ten food-crisis countries that had at least 2 million IDPs in 2023. In most countries, rising levels of acute food insecurity go hand-in-hand with increasing IDPs. All ten countries/territories with more than 2 million IDPs in 2023 are among the ten worst food crises by number and/or share of people facing high acute food insecurity.

Assistance is often targeted to camp settings because vulnerable displaced populations

living outside camps are often difficult to locate and account for, but they also face significant challenges to economic and social integration with host communities, leading to higher levels of acute food insecurity compared with their host counterparts (IOM, 2023).

There is also a strong correlation between acute malnutrition and internal displacement. The highest number of children suffering from acute malnutrition were in countries with the largest

IDP populations – including northeastern and northwestern Nigeria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, the Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo. For the Sudan, a revised analysis after the April 2023 start of the conflict projected a 15 percent increase in the number of children suffering from wasting in states hosting large IDP populations. In Ethiopia, SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition among IDP children under 5 years old (26.5 percent) (SMART, August 2023).

### More than 60 percent of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants face high levels of acute food insecurity in multiple countries

Out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories with data in 2023, 44 host more than 5 000 refugees, asylum-seekers and migrant populations. These countries are themselves suffering structural vulnerabilities and repeated shocks.


In 2023, particularly high levels of acute food insecurity existed among refugee and migrant populations in Colombia, Congo, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan and South Sudan (GRFC 2024) (see table 1.2 on page 24).

Furthermore, High (10–15 percent) or Very High (above 15 percent) levels of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years old were found in refugee camps in Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Niger, South Sudan and Uganda, according to UNHCR SENS surveys carried out in these operations (GRFC 2024).

### “Returning home” may not mean safety or stability

Many returnees face extreme hardship, continued displacement and acute food insecurity. They are not always able to return to their place of origin or they find that their communities have changed, including loss of access to their homes, lands and livelihoods, which can also directly impact food insecurity.

**FIG. 1.24 Food-crisis countries hosting at least 1 million refugees, migrants or asylum-seekers, 2023**



Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, December 2023.

There are several illustrative examples of this in the GRFC. In 2023, the Government of Pakistan announced plans to repatriate “illegal foreigners”. Following this, many Afghans made the decision to leave Pakistan, although some deportations were also recorded. From mid-September to the end of 2023, 0.5 million returned. People arriving at the border were exhausted, requiring urgent assistance and psychosocial support. Many Afghan returnees, including women and children, are vulnerable, especially in harsh winter conditions if left without adequate shelter (UNHCR, January 2024). Many are returning to a situation of internal displacement, joining the country’s 5.7 million existing IDPs (IOM, December 2023).

In Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, a reduction in conflict allowed around 0.6 million IDPs to return to safe areas in 2023, but largely without access to land or the means to restart their subsistence activities (IPC, November 2023).

The South Sudanese refugees in the Sudan provide another example: by February 2024, the conflict had forced nearly 0.5 million refugees to return to South Sudan. Their coping strategies

to meet their food and other basic needs have been exhausted by repeated displacements, low ownership of assets and little engagement with subsistence livelihoods, with around 28 000 of them projected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in April–November 2024 (IPC, November 2023).

Out of the 7.3 million Ukrainians facing moderate or severe acute food insecurity in 2023, about 1 million were returning refugees and nearly 1 million were internally displaced (HNRP, January 2024).

### Funding shortfalls hit displaced populations hard

While the scale of both acute food insecurity and forced displacement continues to grow, resource constraints and other factors result in a reduction in the number of people assisted and/or the amount of assistance provided.

Over USD 57 billion in funds were required to meet the world’s humanitarian needs in 2023, but as of November 2023 about a third or USD 20 billion had been raised against this target (Global Humanitarian Overview 2024).

As a result of these shortfalls, exacerbated by rising commodity and logistics costs, as well as access and security challenges, life-saving food assistance to many of the world’s worst food crises is being reduced. This is contributing to increased adoption of negative coping strategies to ensure food consumption in the short term, and eventually, a deterioration in food consumption (WFP, forthcoming 2024).

Lack of investment in resilience, as well as limited employment and livelihood opportunities and high dependency on food assistance, have made displaced populations even more vulnerable to these reductions.

### Data challenges

Food security data on displaced populations are often difficult to compare across populations or aggregate because of the use of different indicators or methods of analysis. Specific vulnerabilities limiting access to food (including access to land and productive resources, freedom of movement, financial inclusion, etc.) for displaced populations are not always adequately captured.

Accurate assessment is hampered by displaced populations being in hard-to-access areas or because the dynamic nature of displacement means that populations may not be present at the time of food security assessments, which can lead to exclusion from assistance. Most data collection and analysis take place in the early stages of crises, and end soon after the most acute phase is over. This approach serves short-term response, but does not measure or help to understand the chronic dimensions of food insecurity in long-term displacement situations (GRID 2023, IDMC, May 2023).

Nutrition, food security and socioeconomic data on displaced populations are most often collected through household surveys. Complementing these surveys with community-wide analyses can indicate the degree of integration with host communities and the vulnerabilities that are unique to displaced populations, while informing programme design that is relevant to the needs of both (IOM PROGRESS, 2023).

Filling this gap is complex, and requires stakeholders working on food security and displacement to agree on common methodologies and sampling to better articulate the relationship and subsequent response between the two phenomena. There may be significant financial, logistical and methodological obstacles, but ensuring the inclusion of millions of displaced people who may be suffering disproportionately from food insecurity and malnutrition should be considered a priority (GRID 2023, IDMC, May 2023).

## Acute food insecurity and malnutrition in selected displacement settings

This section aims to provide evidence on acute food insecurity, and, where available, malnutrition, in displacement contexts through four case studies with acute food insecurity data available for displaced populations over the past three to four years.

Where data are available, the impact of funding shortfalls and funding prioritization on the food security of displaced populations is also analysed over the same time period. These countries present a range of security, legal and environmental challenges that impact the acute food insecurity of displaced populations. Two case studies focus on refugee populations (Bangladesh, and Lebanon), while two consider IDPs (Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic).

### Case study 1


#### Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

Bangladesh hosts the largest camp-based refugee population in the world. Over 750 000 Rohingya refugees fled from violence in Rakhine state in 2017 and joined a small existing population of Rohingya refugees in camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh (UNHCR, November 2023) with little prospect of safe return to Myanmar in the foreseeable future (UNHCR, August 2023).

As of 2023, more than 960 000 refugees lived in densely populated areas mainly in the Cox Bazar's region – home to the world's largest refugee camp (UNHCR, August 2023). The Government of Bangladesh does not issue formal work permits to Rohingya refugees. As a result, they are dependent on humanitarian assistance or finding informal work that can be exploitative (WFP REVA, June 2022).


Levels of acute food insecurity surged following the COVID-19 pandemic and remained at high levels due to a confluence of unemployment, high

FIG. 1.25 Share of Rohingya refugees facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023



Source: WFP Refugee Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA); WFP (assistance).

FIG. 1.26 Effects of 2023 rations cuts on Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar




Source: WFP, 2023.

inflation, heavy monsoon rainfall, humanitarian funding cuts and fires that destroyed refugee camp infrastructure (WFP REVA, June 2023).

A recent WFP study, based on WFP's preliminary results of REVA 7 in November 2023, showed that a 33 percent reduction in WFP's cash assistance in Cox's Bazar refugee camps in 2023 contributed to poorer food consumption, measured by the Food Consumption Score (FCS) (see figure 1.26).

Even more concerning, households were up to 70 percent more likely to resort to food-based

FIG. 1.27 Share of Syrian refugees in Lebanon facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2019–2023



Source: WFP-UNHCR-UNICEF VASyR 2019–2023; WFP (number of beneficiaries).

coping strategies, such as shifting diets, borrowing and reducing meals. The most vulnerable people had to increasingly resort to coping strategies such as selling assets, taking additional loans and begging, to maintain a substantially reduced consumption of food (WFP, forthcoming 2024). Ration cuts also contributed to high levels of acute malnutrition, which reached 12 percent among children under 5 years old in 2023 (UNICEF, August 2023).

### Case study 2

#### Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Lebanon hosts the largest refugee population per capita in the world. It hosts around 0.8 million registered refugees from Syrian Arab Republic, as nowcasted by UNHCR in December 2023, though the number is as high as 1.5 million when including unregistered refugees (IPC, December 2023).

Conditions in the Syrian Arab Republic will not likely be conducive to large-scale voluntary returns in safety and dignity in the foreseeable future (IPC, December 2023).

However, living conditions in Lebanon are not easy as most Syrian refugees lack legal residency, face work restrictions, have extremely limited resources

to access food and other basic needs, and are almost entirely reliant on humanitarian assistance (VASyR 2023, February 2024). Moreover, soaring prices and decreased wages in Lebanon have made staple food and other basic goods unaffordable. By 2023, some 90 percent of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon was in debt, borrowing money from friends and neighbours to cover their basic needs (3RP, January 2024).

The share of Syrian refugees facing high levels of acute food insecurity fluctuated during the analysed period (2019–2023), peaking at more than half in 2022 (VASyR 2023, February 2024). During the period, the 2020 Beirut port explosion and COVID-19 pandemic worsened refugees' existing economic vulnerabilities (VASyR 2021, January 2022). The end of the data period showed a slight improvement, down to 42 percent of refugees experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Recent data suggest a concerning nutritional situation, with 80 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving fewer than the recommended four food groups a day (VASyR 2023, February 2024).

### Case study 3


#### IDPs in Somalia

In Somalia, conflict has been displacing rural populations to major urban centres since 1991, but extreme weather is an increasingly prominent driver of displacement as droughts and flooding intensify, leading to herd reductions and loss of livelihoods that undermine the potential of returning to rural livelihoods (UNHCR, May 2023).

As of 2023, around 1.2 million people were internally displaced. Around 67 percent faced high levels of acute food insecurity in November 2023 amid rising food and water prices. Of particular concern were displaced populations in settlements around Mogadishu and Baidoa (IPC, April 2023).

The severity of the acute food insecurity crisis, driven mostly by conflict, has been exacerbated by rising food and water prices. The percentage of IDPs facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 38 percent in 2021 to 67 percent in 2023 (IPC, April 2023).

**FIG. 1.28 Share and number of IDPs in Somalia facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023**



Source: Somalia IPC TWG; WFP (number of beneficiaries).



The earthquakes that hit northern Syrian Arab Republic in February 2023 caused mass displacement among families that had already been displaced by conflict.

### Case study 4

#### IDPs in Syrian Arab Republic

More than 12 years of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic have resulted in widespread violence and displacement, with around 6.6 million Syrians internally displaced (HNAP, 2023). Around 2.8 million live in the Northwest region alone, in dire conditions. Access to essentials such as safe water, food, medicine, healthcare and livelihoods is limited (HNO 2024, December 2023).


IDPs are extremely likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity, having experienced prolonged displacement, repeated movements as frontlines shift, and complete loss of livelihoods. A dire economic crisis has seen the cost of the food basket quadruple during the 2021–2023 period (HNO 2024, December 2023). The number of IDPs experiencing high levels of acute food

insecurity increased from 3.9 million in 2021 to 4.7 million in 2023. Conditions are relatively better for IDPs outside camps, but their situation also deteriorated between 2021 and 2023 (HNO 2024, December 2023).

The humanitarian situation was expected to deteriorate further in 2024. The nutrition situation showed signs of deterioration in 2023 with acute malnutrition levels increasing across Idlib, Ar-Raqqa and Quneitra governorates (HNO 2024, December 2023).

While IDP returns to areas of origin are occurring, returnees make up a very small fraction of the total IDPs in a conflict that has no foreseeable resolution (HNO 2024, December 2023).

**FIG. 1.29 Share and number of IDPs in Syrian Arab Republic facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023**



Source: HNO Syrian Arab Republic; WFP (number of beneficiaries).




TABLE 1.1 Estimates of high levels of acute food insecurity among IDPs

Countries/territories	Population group	Source	During peak period of acute food insecurity or not	Total population of reference (millions)	Population analysed	Analysis period	High levels of acute food insecurity (millions)	High levels of acute food insecurity (percentage)
Nigeria	IDPs	CH	N	1.5	100%	Oct–Dec 2023	0.4	28%
Syrian Arab Republic	IDPs in camps	HNO	Y	2.1	100%	Jan 2023	2.1	100%
Syrian Arab Republic	IDPs out of camps	HNO	Y	0.5	100%	Jan 2023	2.6	51%
Burkina Faso	IDPs	CH	Y	1.0	100%	Jun–Aug 2023	0.6	60%
Palestine (Gaza Strip)	IDPs	IPC	Y	1.7	100%	Dec 2023–Feb 2024	1.7	100%
Somalia	IDPs	IPC	Y	3.7	100%	Apr–Jun 2023	2.5	67%

TABLE 1.2 Estimates of high levels of acute food insecurity among refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants

Countries/territories	Population group	Source	During peak period of acute food insecurity or not	Total population of reference (millions)	Population analysed	Analysis period	High levels of acute food insecurity (millions)	High levels of acute food insecurity (percentage)
Colombia	Migrants	WFP (CARI)	Y	4.6	100%	Jun–Aug 2022	2.9	62%
Ecuador	Migrants	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.5	100%	Jul–Aug 2022	0.3	60%
Algeria	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.2	67%	Jun 2023	0.04	28%
Bangladesh	Refugees	IPC	Y	1.0	100%	May–Sep 2023	0.6	65%
Congo	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.06	94%	Aug–Sep 2022	0.04	65%
Djibouti	Refugees	IPC	Y	0.03	100%	Jul–Dec 2023	0.01	46%
Egypt	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.3	100%	Jan–Mar 2023	0.2	69%
Iraq	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.3	97%	Aug–Sep 2023	0.02	7%
Jordan	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.7	100%	Jan–Mar 2023	0.5	62%
Lebanon	Syrian refugees	IPC	Y	1.5	100%	Jan–Apr 2023	0.8	53%
Lebanon	Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees in Lebanon, Palestine refugees from Syria	IPC	N	1.7	100%	Apr–Sep 2024	0.6	33%
South Sudan	Refugees	JPDM (CARI)	N	0.3	100%	Jan 2023	0.2	66%
Türkiye	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.05	100%	Sep–Dec 2023	0.004	8%
Uganda	Refugees	IPC	N	4.3	100%	Aug 2023–Jan 2024	0.9	19%



# Central and Southern Africa

Although some countries in the region experienced marginal improvements, levels of acute food insecurity remained extremely worrying and similar to 2022.

.....

The impacts of conflict disrupted food security and livelihoods in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and northern Mozambique, while weather extremes and economic shocks contributed to driving food crises throughout the region in 2023.

.....

Large numbers of people were newly displaced by conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo, which continued to have more than half of the region's total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

.....

Tropical storms, cyclones and severe drought, exacerbated by the El Niño weather phenomenon, contributed to disease outbreaks, exacerbating acute malnutrition levels in areas with already limited health services.

.....

The outlook for 2024 is concerning because of the impacts of El Niño-related drought, especially in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique and Namibia.



# Central and Southern Africa

**Widespread economic shocks characterized by soaring inflation and low purchasing power, the lingering impacts of tropical cyclone Freddy, drier-than-average conditions linked to El Niño, and continued conflict in three of the 13 countries drove continued high levels of acute food insecurity across the region in 2023 and into 2024.**

**49.6M** 

people or 21% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in 13 countries.

**10.1M** 

forcibly displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in 2023 – consisting of 8.9 million IDPs and 1.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

**3.9M** 

acutely malnourished children in five food-crisis countries with 1.2 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Angola | Central African Republic | Congo (refugees and residents) | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Eswatini | Lesotho | Madagascar | Malawi | Mozambique | Namibia | United Republic of Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe

MAP 2.1 Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 13 countries in 2023





FIG. 2.1 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



The total population was analysed in all countries, except: United Republic of Tanzania (17%), Madagascar (21%), Zambia (47%), Mozambique (49%), Lesotho (55%) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (94%). 94% of Congo's refugee population were analysed.

■ Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3+ or above or equivalent ■ Population analysed ■ Population not analysed

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

■ <1 million ■ 1-2.99 million ■ 3-4.99 million ■ 5-9.99 million ■ 10-14.99 million ■ ≥15 million ■ Not selected for analysis ■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed ■ Data gap

! Major food crisis ○ Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe and Angola); WFP CARI (Congo).

## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

The scale of the food crisis across the region remained similar to 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo remained the largest in terms of the number, and Central African Republic largest in terms of share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Some countries (Malawi and Zimbabwe) and localized areas of others (Mozambique and Zambia) experienced worsening acute food insecurity since 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia all saw slight improvements.

A regional-level year-on-year comparison in numbers is not possible due to a change in methodology for Angola, the inclusion of Congo for the first time and the fact that, for Central African Republic, Madagascar and United Republic of Tanzania, the peak period of acute food insecurity was the same as it straddled 2022 and 2023.

Considering the countries with data in both years, the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity can be considered stable, passing from 22 to 21 percent. As in previous years, the highest prevalence of high acute food insecurity was in Central African Republic, at 44 percent.


Out of the 13 countries with analyses, all except Lesotho were considered major food crises with at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their total country population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

### Severity of acute food insecurity

Out of 13 food crises in the region, ten had IPC analyses that provide data disaggregated by severity phase of acute food insecurity.

Seven of the ten are protracted major food crises – Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. No populations were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2023.

FIG. 2.2 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



### 4.9M people or 3% of the analysed population were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across nine countries in 2023

All ten countries with disaggregated data had populations in IPC Phase 4, except Lesotho. Conflict-affected countries continued to host most of the population in this phase – 3.4 million in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 0.6 million in Central African Republic and 0.2 million in Mozambique.

Severity was particularly high in Central African Republic where 11 percent of the population were in this phase. Compared with the previous year, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia all had fewer people in this phase.

### 37.9M people or 22% of the analysed population were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across ten countries in 2023

Across the region, the prevalence of people in IPC Phase 3 ranged from 10 percent in United Republic of Tanzania to 33 percent in Central African Republic. Overall, there is no significant change since last year in terms of number of people in this phase, with Malawi and Mozambique accounting for the slight regional increase.

### 72.4M people or 41% of the analysed population in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across ten countries in 2023

In each of the ten countries, at least 30 percent of analysed populations were in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), rising to 45 percent in Democratic Republic of the Congo and some areas of Madagascar, and 42 percent in parts of Zambia.

The additional 8 million people in this phase since 2022 is almost equivalent to the decrease in the number of people in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), indicating an overall deterioration of the situation. Without long-term support for disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection, these people risk slipping into IPC Phase 3, requiring urgent action, if they face an additional shock.

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

The increase year after year in the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in Central and Southern Africa from 2018 to 2023 reflects multiple interconnected shocks as well as increases in the size of the population analysed in Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The region's low level of economic development and reliance on agriculture – namely cereal crops and livestock – leave it highly susceptible to weather extremes. Disastrous weather events of the last eight years include the El Niño-related drought of 2016–2017, recurrent droughts in localized areas of several countries, including Angola, Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and tropical cyclones Idai and Kenneth in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2019, as well as cyclone Freddy in Mozambique, Malawi and Madagascar in early 2023.


Three countries in the region have experienced protracted conflicts and worsening insecurity: Democratic Republic of the Congo since at least the late 1990s, Central African Republic since 2013 and Mozambique since 2017.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in widespread income losses, currency depreciation in many countries was increasing the costs of servicing external debt, triggering an increase in prices of imported food and creating domestic inflationary pressures, especially in Zimbabwe.

Looking at the nine protracted food crises with data available throughout the eight GRFC editions Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe), the number of highly acutely food-insecure people more than doubled between 2016 and 2023.

Regarding prevalence, the sharpest increase was between 2018 (when 20 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food

FIG. 2.3 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe and Angola); WFP CARI (Congo).

insecurity) and 2019 (when it reached 27 percent). By 2020, the prevalence reached 29 percent before declining after 2021 to 22 percent in 2022.

Increased data availability played a major part in the rising numbers in these nine countries. The population analysed increased by 40 percent between 2016 and 2022. For instance, in Democratic Republic of the Congo, analysis coverage increased from 65–69 percent of the population in 2018–2020 to 91–96 percent since 2021.

All nine countries except Lesotho and Zambia have continuously faced major food crises over the past eight years. Projections available as of January 2024 point to a similar share (22 percent) of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across the nine countries as in 2022, with decreases in Madagascar, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

## Outlook for 2024

**Drier and hotter conditions associated with El Niño will significantly impact the April 2024 harvest in much of Southern Africa and lead to an earlier and deeper 2024/25 lean season from October 2024.**

Projections for 2024 indicate that 44.6 million people or 20 percent of the analysed population will face high levels of acute food insecurity in 12 countries in the region.

For six of the countries – Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia – the projections are the same as the 2023 peak since they refer to the typical lean period (October 2023–March 2024). The prevalence of high acute food insecurity was projected to decrease slightly in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar. It was projected to rise in Angola and remain at similarly high levels in Zimbabwe.

Overall, the impacts of El Niño pose a downside risk to yields, limiting crop production and poor households' ability to access sufficient food to meet their needs, especially in rural areas.

The projections may not have fully reflected the impact of extreme drought and low crop production in Zambia, parts of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, about which there was little evidence at the time the projections were made.

Areas of high concern include deficit-producing areas of southern and western Zimbabwe, southern Malawi, southern and central Mozambique, and southern Madagascar, which are likely to be worst affected by rainfall deficits and expected below-average 2024 harvests. They are expected to exhaust household food stocks earlier than usual.

Seasonal improvements in food security outcomes associated with the harvest in April/May 2024 are expected to be short-lived across much of the region, as household and locally produced market stocks will decline atypically early (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The exceptions include Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Madagascar, northern Mozambique, and central and northern Malawi, where average to above-average rainfall was anticipated to support normal crop production, livestock conditions and labour opportunities.

In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, conflict will likely continue to limit income-earning opportunities and agricultural production despite the forecast of favourable rainfall.



## Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in three countries where 31.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Intensified conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, ongoing insecurity in northern and southeastern areas of Central African Republic, and deteriorating security in parts of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, continued to displace households, reduce participation in agricultural activities, and disrupt trade and market access. Living costs were especially high in conflict-affected areas where employment opportunities were limited.

In the first 11 months of 2023, almost 2 million people were newly displaced in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri in Democratic Republic of the Congo, bringing the total of IDPs to more than 5.5 million in the three provinces alone. Over 85 percent of these displacements were due to armed attacks and clashes (OCHA, November 2023).

In Central African Republic, despite ongoing volatility with clashes between armed forces and non-state armed groups, the humanitarian situation was relatively better in 2023 compared with the last five years, with a 20 percent decrease in IDPs between 2022 and 2023 (UNICEF, February 2024).




**Weather extremes were considered the main driver in seven countries where a total of 12 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

In 2023, weather extremes continued to affect crop production and pastoralism, including excessive rainfall and waterlogging notably in Lesotho, northern Zimbabwe and Zambia, as well as erratic rainfall and dry spells (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023).

Dry conditions in localized areas of southern Angola and northern Namibia constrained food availability and reduced income-earning opportunities from crop sales. United Republic


FIG. 2.4 Persistently high food inflation in 2023 for most countries in the region



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.5 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

of Tanzania, southern Zimbabwe and Zambia experienced consecutive pest infestations (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023). In February and March 2023, cyclone Freddy caused extensive flooding and crop damage and losses in southern Malawi, as well as in Madagascar and Mozambique where localized flooding damaged crops (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

The various weather shocks during the 2022/23 agricultural season resulted in mixed harvests across the region, with a bumper harvest in the maize triangle of South Africa and poor harvests in parts of southern Zimbabwe, southern Mozambique and southern Malawi (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The prevailing El Niño climate event, which was forecast to reach peak intensity in late 2023 and dissipate by mid-2024, drove hotter and drier-than-normal conditions across much of Southern Africa during the October 2023–March 2024 cereal cropping cycle (FEWS NET, November 2023).

February 2024 has proved the driest February on record over parts of Zambia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique (OCHA, February 2024). In February 2024, a national drought disaster and emergency was declared in Zambia where the dry spell from mid-January affected most of the central and southern half of the country, destroying almost half of the country's maize cultivation (UN, March 2024).

Production downturns in maize, the region's key food staple, particularly in surplus-producing South Africa and Zambia, could trigger supply-related price spikes across the subregion and curb import availabilities. Given the high susceptibility of maize to drought stress and the high prevalence of rainfed agricultural systems, a poor rainy season is highly likely to lead to a poor harvest, with worrying consequences for household food availability and food access due to income losses for rural households (FAO, November 2023).

Poor pasture and water conditions from early 2024 were already leading to an atypically high number of livestock deaths in southern Angola, Namibia, southern Zambia and western Zimbabwe, ahead of the July–September 2024 dry season (OCHA, February 2024).

In Democratic Republic of the Congo, the October–November 2023 rains were delayed at the start of the agricultural season in the east-central and southeast of the country, which is likely to impact crop production (FEWS NET, November 2023).



**Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in three countries where a total of 5.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

In most countries, currency weakness with consequent increases in fuel and transport costs, pushed up food prices and limited the transmission of lower international cereal prices to domestic markets (FAO, November 2023). Despite

the recent easing of international fertilizer prices, farmers' access to agricultural inputs is being constrained by weak national currencies. This, in turn, is curbing yields and reducing the area under cultivation, contributing to lower agricultural work opportunities and wages, lower harvests and higher food prices (FAO, November 2023).

Most countries in the region experienced double-digit annual food inflation, with the highest rates in Zimbabwe and Malawi (WFP, December 2023).

In particular, maize prices, the main food staple in Southern Africa, climbed to new record highs in Malawi and Zambia (usually a maize exporter) in October 2023 due to currency weakness coupled with reduced domestic supply in Malawi and strong export demand for Zambian maize, while in Zimbabwe maize meal prices were more than four times higher in September compared with the year-earlier values (FAO, November 2023).

In the net-importing countries of Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia, retail prices of maize meal generally declined in the second and third quarter of 2023 – though still well above their year-earlier levels – mirroring earlier falling prices in South Africa, the main source of cereals for these countries. However, subsequent price increases in South Africa were expected to trigger upward movements later in the year (FAO, November 2023).

In Democratic Republic of the Congo, while currency stability kept commodity prices stable, fuel prices increased by 12 percent during October in the eastern area, which could cause food prices to rise (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The anticipated below-average cereal and cash crop harvests in 2024 will lead to an atypical increase in imported maize volumes from outside the region to meet consumer demand in 2024, exacerbating already-inflated maize prices. Staple food prices across the region are likely to be higher than both 2023 and the five-year average. The combination of high food prices and limited access to income are expected to keep household purchasing power low across the region (FEWS NET, November 2023).

## Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

**Persistently high levels of acute food insecurity across the region reflect structural factors such as high levels of poverty, government debt, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, gender and income inequality, and low levels of education that decrease households' and communities' ability to withstand and recover from shocks.**

Weak governance structures and high public debt burdens undermine governments' efforts to deliver social services, alleviate poverty and achieve zero hunger (WFP, 2023).

With debt levels already high and spending on interest payments rising, the fiscal space to borrow more to finance policy responses to a food shock is extremely limited. The latest IMF/WB debt sustainability analysis concluded that Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe are in debt distress (ADB, 2023).

Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique and United Republic of Tanzania received Very High or High INFORM risk scores, which are a composite indicator of a country's ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo rank eighth and tenth globally for weak institutional capacity according to the INFORM Risk Index (INFORM Risk, 2024).

All food-crisis countries in the region are in the lowest 50 of the 191 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI). Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Mozambique are in the lowest 20, a reflection of the compounding effects of poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes in these countries.

The region is particularly susceptible to erratic weather patterns, including prolonged droughts

TABLE 2.1 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%)	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	HDI global ranking (1–192)
ANGOLA	2.0	42.9	58.7	11.29	5.2	148th
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.4	N/A	68.5	2.93	8.7	188th
CONGO	2.1	96.2	36.1	6.63	5	153rd
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	2.0	19.8	55.3	1.61	7.7	179th
ESWATINI	2.5	61.2	12.4	13.05	3.3	144th
LESOTHO	1.7	100	30	16.15	3.6	168th
MADAGASCAR	2.4	19.6	73.9	13.48	5.5	173rd
MALAWI	1.7	4.4	61.9	11.1	4.4	169th
MOZAMBIQUE	1.4	45.9	70.3	10.1	6.7	185th
NAMIBIA	1.2	65.2	22.1	19.23	3.8	139th
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	2.6	2.6	64.3	16.15	5.1	160th
ZAMBIA	2.8	-0.1	58.7	8.43	3.9	154th
ZIMBABWE	3.2	60.3	61.6	17.67	4.1	146th

Source: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

and erratic rainfall, which disrupt traditional farming practices, diminish crop yields and contribute to food scarcity. Limited access to financial resources and reliance on rainfed agriculture in many parts of the region increase susceptibility to climate-related shocks.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing represented the main livelihoods for 78 million people across the region in 2021 – reaching more than half the total employment in most protracted food crises and around 70 percent in Central African Republic, Mozambique and Madagascar (FAO, 2023).

According to the ASAP system, Lesotho, Namibia, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe experience drought for more than 15 percent of the crop growing period on average.

Population growth places additional strain on existing resources. The rapid increase in population (the rates are above 2 percent in eight countries) outpaces improvements in agricultural productivity, leading to a growing gap between food supply and demand.

Many food-crisis countries in the region – particularly Congo, Lesotho, Namibia, Eswatini and Mozambique – have a high dependency on imports, exposing them to regional and/or global food price fluctuations.


## DISPLACEMENT | Nearly 90 percent of the region's forcibly displaced people are internally displaced by conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, and political violence in Central African Republic

### High vulnerability among IDPs

The increase in displacement since 2022 is largely driven by the escalating violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where the number of IDPs rose from 5.7 million in 2022 to a record 6.9 million in 2023. As the security situation, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri, deteriorated throughout 2023, humanitarian needs soared amid significant humanitarian funding constraints. From October to mid-December 2023, 0.7 million people were displaced by escalating violence across North Kivu alone (IOM, October 2023). Out of the country's 25.4 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the latter half of 2023, IDPs, returnees and host families were among the most affected (IPC, October 2023).


In Mozambique, around 0.7 million remained displaced by the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Although a reduction in violence in 2023 allowed about 0.6 million IDPs to return to their home

FIG. 2.6 Numbers of displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in the region (in millions), 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

FIG. 2.7 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

areas, they lacked the means to restart subsistence farming activities and produce their own food (IPC, November 2023). A deterioration of the security situation in February 2024 triggered a new wave of displacement (almost 70 000 people), further impacting agricultural production after the main planting season (IOM DTM, February 2024).

In Central African Republic, improved security in certain areas also allowed for some voluntary repatriation to stabilized areas (UNHCR, January 2024). Still 0.5 million IDPs were among the most acutely food-insecure population groups in the country (OCHA, January 2024).

The regional situation is further complicated by the growing impact of weather extremes, which had internally displaced over 1 million people in Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique as of January 2024 (UNHCR, January 2024).

### Refugees face increasing challenges

**More than 1 million people live as refugees in camps, settlements and urban areas across 12 food-crisis countries in the region, having fled conflict in neighbouring countries.**

The highest numbers are in Democratic Republic of the Congo (from Central African Republic and Rwanda), United Republic of Tanzania (mainly from Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Malawi (mainly from Democratic Republic of the Congo). Many of these refugee

populations have been displaced for decades (UNHCR, 2023).

The difficulties faced by forcibly displaced populations across the region continued to be aggravated by food ration reductions and cuts to other essential services in camps and settlements due to funding shortages. In March 2023, WFP was forced to reduce rations for more than 200 000 refugees in United Republic of Tanzania from 80 percent to 65 percent and to 50 percent by June, which was likely to have left thousands of refugees struggling to meet their nutritional needs just as food prices rose and more people sought refuge in the country from Democratic Republic of the Congo (WFP, May 2023).

### New arrivals prompt rising nutrition concerns


Throughout 2023 and into 2024, thousands of Chadians as well as Central African returnees fleeing violence and intercommunity tensions related to transhumance have been arriving in the northwestern Ouham prefecture of Central African Republic, one of the most food-insecure areas in the country. Staying with host families, themselves facing high levels of vulnerability, both population groups have very limited access to fields for food production. According to local authorities, the number of inhabitants in some villages has increased almost tenfold, straining infrastructure and access to basic services (OCHA, January 2024).

### Nutrition in refugee settlements and camps

Over the last two years, SENS surveys have collected nutrition data in refugee camps in Malawi (one camp), Congo (five camps), the United Republic of Tanzania (three camps), Zambia (three camps) and Zimbabwe (one camp).

The prevalence of acute malnutrition was above 5 percent, considered Medium, in one camp in Congo and in all three monitored camps in Zambia. Across the remaining nine monitored camps, the prevalence of acute malnutrition was Low. Micronutrient deficiencies led to high levels of anaemia among children under 5 years old in

MAP. 2.2 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

all countries except in Malawi and Zimbabwe, and to high levels of anaemia among women in all the monitored camps in Congo and Zambia. Exclusive breastfeeding targets of 75 percent for children under 6 months old were not met, except in Malawi and two camps in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Indeed, malnutrition in Mantapala camp in Zambia was very concerning. Around 2.6 percent of children aged under 5 were suffering severe acute malnutrition and around 27 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished (MUAC < 23cm). It had critically low rates of exclusive breastfeeding (20 percent) and a very high prevalence of poor food consumption (43 percent), measured by the FCS (UNHCR, October 2021).


**ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Five food crises in the region had data for acute malnutrition, with an estimated 3.9 million children under 5 years old acutely malnourished, of whom 1.2 million were severely malnourished.**

The majority of children and women with acute malnutrition were estimated in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the largest food crisis at global level.

Out of the five countries with IPC AMN analyses covering 2022 and 2023, the prevalence of acute malnutrition reached Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels in some analysed areas of Angola, Central African Republic, western Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar's Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est, and northern Mozambique.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo** had the highest number of acutely malnourished children under 5 years old, with 2.8 million children, of whom 0.9 million were severely malnourished, according to a partial IPC analysis (IPC AMN, December 2022). **Madagascar** had the next highest number (again according to a partial analysis of the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est), followed by **Central African Republic, northern Mozambique, Angola** and **Congo**.

**FIG. 2.8 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in five food crises, 2023**



Source: IPC TWG and UNICEF WCARO, 2023.

Data for acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were only available for six of the 13 countries, where a total of 2.5 million PBW were acutely malnourished in 2023, with 88 percent of them in Democratic Republic of the Congo (IPC AMN, December 2022).

In Central African Republic, over 162 000 PBW were affected by acute malnutrition with particularly high numbers in the northwest and southwest, and the capital Bangui (IPC AMN, January 2023).

The highest national prevalence of acute malnutrition among children aged under 5, based on SMART surveys conducted in 2021 and 2023, occurred in Mozambique (13 percent, considered High). However, the national prevalence can often mask a concerning local nutrition situation in these countries, specifically in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Mozambique. In Democratic Republic of the Congo, localized prevalence reached as high as 11 percent in areas of South Kivu (SMART 2023).


#### Drivers of acute malnutrition

**Lack of food** High levels of acute food insecurity – due to limited access and availability of nutritious foods, especially during the lean season – were identified as a major contributing factor to acute malnutrition in the five countries with IPC AMN analyses. Pockets of conflict/insecurity in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique led to high acute malnutrition among displaced populations.

**Inadequate practices** Low rates of exclusive breastfeeding and poor complementary feeding practices were considered major contributors to acute malnutrition in the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions of Madagascar (IPC AMN, October 2022).

Inadequate feeding practices were common across the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique, as evidenced by poor dietary diversity with fewer than 10 percent of children under 5 years old consuming a Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD)

**FIG. 2.9 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023**



Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, January 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, December 2022; Madagascar IPC TWG, October 2023; Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023; UNICEF WCARO, 2023 (Congo).


(IPC AMN, November 2023). In United Republic of Tanzania, exclusive breastfeeding of children under 6 months old has increased substantially over time to 64 percent in 2022, but only 8 percent of children aged 6–23 months received an MAD (DHS, October 2023).

Conversely, in eastern areas of Democratic Republic of the Congo, where conflicts and population displacements are the main drivers of acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition classifications are less severe than that of acute food insecurity thanks to protective practices such as high exclusive breastfeeding rates, consumption of non-wood forest products, and adults reducing their food intake in favour of children and other vulnerable household members, which seem to limit acute malnutrition among children (IPC AMN, June 2023).

In parts of Central African Republic, other factors mitigate the nutritional situation, including good exclusive breastfeeding rates (80 percent), and high coverage of measles vaccination and vitamin A supplementation (IPC AMN, January 2023).

**Inadequate services** In drought-affected areas, water scarcity had a deleterious effect on WASH services, while across Malawi and Mozambique, flooding and damage caused by cyclone Freddy destroyed infrastructure, while

**FIG. 2.10 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition by country, 2023**



Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, December 2022; Madagascar IPC TWG, August 2023; Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023; UNICEF, 2023 (Congo).

hampering access to health and other basic services. This exacerbated the cholera outbreaks the two countries were experiencing (UNICEF, March 2023).

About 188 000 cholera cases, including 3 000 related deaths have been reported in eight countries in Southern Africa since January 2023. Malawi reported 59 000 cases, the highest in the region. Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe reported between 10 000 and 50 000 cases (OCHA, January 2024).

A severely malnourished child is 11 times more likely to die from cholera than a well-nourished child (UNICEF, March 2023). Infectious diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea can exacerbate wasting among children and increase mortality risk, but also, acutely malnourished children are more likely to be affected by such diseases.

In western, central and southern areas of Democratic Republic of the Congo not affected by conflict and population displacements, acute malnutrition was worse than acute food insecurity. This may be attributable to high levels of isolation in certain areas of the country, poor hygiene conditions and poor access to health infrastructure leading to low coverage of measles vaccination and vitamin A supplementation (IPC AMN, December 2022).



# East Africa



The magnitude and severity of food crises in East Africa worsened in 2023, with the largest year-on-year deterioration in the Sudan following the onset of the conflict in April 2023.

.....

The return of rainfall to most areas of the Horn of Africa began to ease the impacts of the historic drought, but its lingering damage coupled with flooding in late 2023 impacted food access and availability.

.....

Conflict in the Sudan and armed clashes in parts of Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan deepened the region's highly complex displacement crisis. In Somalia and South Sudan, 0.1 million people faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

.....

Acute malnutrition levels continued to deteriorate, exacerbated by inadequate child-feeding and low access to basic WASH, health and nutrition services.

.....

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to decline in 2024. However, the situation in the Sudan is rapidly deteriorating. The risk of weather extremes and escalation of conflicts in areas of Ethiopia and South Sudan could also drive catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity.

# East Africa

The lingering impact of the unprecedented 2020–2023 drought, El Niño-driven floods, heightened conflicts and continued macroeconomic instability exacerbated already high levels of acute food insecurity in eight countries across East Africa. Households experienced limited food availability due to decreased agricultural production and constrained financial access to food. Huge numbers of displaced people from the conflict in the Sudan put additional strain on already meagre resources in areas within the country and at its borders.

**64.2M** 

people or 24% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in eight countries.

**20.7M** 


forcibly displaced people by 2023 – consisting of 15.9 million IDPs and 4.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

**12.1M** 


children were acutely malnourished with 3 million of them suffering the most severe form in eight countries.

Burundi | Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda

**FIG. 2.3 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in eight countries, 2023**




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.



Sources: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

**FIG. 2.11 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023**



The total population was analysed in all countries, except for Kenya (32%).



## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

The compounding nature of the climatic, economic and conflict-related shocks that the region has faced over the past three years drove an additional 7 million people to face high levels of acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023.

The share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 22 percent in 2022 to 24 percent in 2023, suggesting that households' capacity to cope has been severely eroded, leading more people to experience large consumption gaps, acute malnutrition and/or depleted livelihood assets.

The Sudan became the largest food crisis in the region in terms of numbers and recorded the largest year-on-year deterioration due to the onset of the conflict in April 2023.

Burundi, Djibouti, Somalia and comparable areas of Kenya also experienced significant deteriorations in their acute food insecurity situations.


In South Sudan, the situation remained persistently dire, with 63 percent of the population experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Only Uganda saw a slight decline in the number of people who urgently needed assistance from 5 percent to 4 percent of its analysed population, which equated to a decrease of 0.5 million people.

The analyses for Ethiopia are not directly comparable as two different methodologies are used to measure acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023.

All eight countries with data available in East Africa met the criteria for being defined as major food crises, with four of them – Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan – being protracted major food crises.

FIG. 2.12 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Sources: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

## Severity of acute food insecurity

For the six countries where data could be disaggregated by IPC phase (i.e. all countries except Ethiopia and Uganda in which FEWS NET analyses were used), there were large shifts in the severity of food insecurity outcomes.

**0.08 million people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) across Somalia and South Sudan**

Around 43 000 people were projected to face starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) during the lean season (April–July 2023) in the Akobo, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of South Sudan's Jonglei state, as well as Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity state. While there was no longer a Risk of Famine in Somalia, there remained 40 400 people across Bakool, Bay, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, Mudug and Togdheer states who were projected to experience the most extreme levels of acute food insecurity from April to June 2023 (lean season). Compared with the previous year, the overall

number declined from 301 100 in 2022 to 83 400 in 2023, mostly due to the positive impact of the early 2023 rains and sustained humanitarian assistance.

**12.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across six countries**

Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan all recorded increases in the populations experiencing large food consumption gaps and/or employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. The prevalence of these outcomes ranged from 1 percent of the analysed population in Burundi to as high as 23 percent in South Sudan. The largest increase was recorded in the Sudan, where the population in IPC Phase 4 doubled from 3.1 million in 2022 to 6.3 million in 2023.

**30.2 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across six countries**


The number of people urgently in need of assistance in this phase increased by over 38 percent from 21.8 million in 2022. The largest country increases were recorded in the Sudan followed by Burundi, Somalia and Kenya.

**35.2 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across six countries**

The 2.5 million person increase in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes from 32.7 million in 2022 happened in parallel to a decrease of nearly 2.5 million in the number of people in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), indicating a deteriorating situation. The largest increase was in Burundi – up from 3.6 to 5.5 million people, an increase of over 50 percent.



FIG. 2.13 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed    Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse or equivalent    Total population

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

**Levels of acute food insecurity in East Africa remained relatively stable through 2019, but, with the convergence of multiple shocks, the magnitude and severity of the region's food crises have since increased rapidly.**

The impact of COVID-19, consecutive years of drought, and conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan undermined people's already limited capacity to cope with shocks, particularly among pastoralist groups. The war in Ukraine had repercussions on food access and availability as many net food-importing East African countries rely on Ukraine and the Russian Federation for agricultural inputs as well as wheat and sunflower oil (WFP, November 2022).

The end of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 made it increasingly difficult and expensive to import and produce staple foods (IFPRI, August 2023).

Acute food insecurity in East Africa has historically been extremely severe, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) since 2016 in South

Sudan. In recent years, people have faced IPC Phase 5 in Somalia and Ethiopia (Tigray region).<sup>1</sup>

The increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity from 2019 onwards were also attributable to increased analysis coverage.

Some countries, such as Djibouti, were not included every year, while others (Ethiopia and Uganda) saw major changes in the geographic coverage of analyses and methodologies. Kenya, by contrast, saw increases in the analysed population in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs).

Many of the drought-affected areas in the Horn of Africa received adequate or above-average precipitation levels in early 2023, allowing for the regeneration of rangelands primarily used by pastoralists, and improved crop and livestock development. While it will take years for households to fully recover from the drought's toll, these improved weather conditions improved projected food security outcomes for 2024.

<sup>1</sup> The Government of Ethiopia did not endorse the May 2021 IPC analysis.

## Outlook for 2024

**Levels of acute food insecurity in East Africa are currently projected to decline to 47.6 million – or 19 percent of the analysed population – by July 2024. Nonetheless, these levels remain high by historical standards.**

This number is an aggregation of projections from the six countries where data are available: Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda. There were no projections available for Djibouti or Somalia as of January 2024.

Nearly all countries with data available are expected to see a decline in the number of people requiring urgent assistance, mostly due to the end of the drought in the Horn of Africa.

The severity of these food crises is also projected to diminish, as the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is set to decrease while the number of people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) will increase. However, the notable exception is in South Sudan where the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is likely to almost double to 79 000 (IPC, November 2023).

Levels of acute food insecurity could deteriorate further during the latter half of 2024 if conflicts intensify and/or weather patterns become severe. Both could exacerbate disruptions to agricultural production, which could pose a threat to food availability in parts of the region. High staple food prices in markets across the region are also likely to continue constraining food access and undermining households' purchasing power, but not to the same extent as in 2022 and 2023 (IPC, November 2023).

The ongoing conflict in the Sudan is unlikely to end in 2024 (ACLED, January 2024). The improvement in food availability from the February 2024 harvest is expected to be marginal compared with the 2023 lean season due to the negative impact of conflict on agricultural production and livelihoods, and as a result, the hostilities' widespread impacts on civilians will worsen. According to FEWS NET, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread,

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes exist in heavily impacted urban areas, and some households could deteriorate to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Omdurman of Khartoum and El Geneina of West Darfur during the lean season (FEWS NET, February 2024). Should the security situation further affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these areas, other populations could also face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes (IPC, December 2023).

The conflict has also been a major driver of displacement, as South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan are exacerbating already high levels of acute food insecurity in South Sudan, leading to the projection of populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the lean season (IPC, November 2023).

Strong El Niño conditions and a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), forecast to continue through early 2024, led to above-average rainfall in eastern parts of the region and below-average rainfall in western areas. This change in the weather pattern was expected to increase crop and livestock production in some areas, generating improved levels of food security. However, there was also a risk of widespread flooding contributing to displacement, crop and livestock losses, disruption to livelihood and trade activities, and disease outbreaks (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Ethiopia is experiencing both extremes of this shifting weather pattern: drought in the north, including in Afar and Amhara regions, and El Niño-induced flooding in the south, including Somali and Oromia regions. These weather extremes coupled with conflict, limited humanitarian assistance and persistent macroeconomic instability make Ethiopia a very critical hunger hotspot in 2024 (WFP/FAO, October 2023).

According to FEWS NET, in the Tigray region, Meher crop losses due to the El Niño-associated drought raised the risk of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes during the region's lean season in February–April 2024 (FEWS NET, December 2023; OCHA, December 2023).



## Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



**Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in five countries where 35.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Weather extremes were the primary driver of food consumption gaps and/or households' employment of negative coping strategies in the region, principally affecting **Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia** and **Uganda**.

Five seasons of below-average rainfall from late 2020 to early 2023 created the worst drought conditions that the Horn of Africa has experienced in nearly 40 years, affecting rangeland and water resources and, in turn, crop and livestock production.


The consecutive years of below-average harvests and a substantial reduction in herd numbers resulted in livelihood losses and increased displacement as people in the region searched for better livelihood and grazing resources. The drought also led to seasonal increases in food prices, which constrained household purchasing power (WFP, July 2023; OCHA, May 2023).

Livelihood recovery will take years and may not be possible for all households, also considering the increasing frequency of drought and floods due to climate change.

Households in pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia, northern and northeastern Kenya, and Somalia were among the hardest hit by this drought. There are roughly 13 different pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda, with a total population of approximately 4.5 million. These communities use transhumance as a strategy for managing rangeland and coping with the variable climate of the drylands. In doing so, they can come into conflict with other pastoralists and land users when competing for resources, particularly during times of drought (FAO/IGAD, November 2023).

Shifting weather patterns provided two periods of above-average rainfall in 2023. The first occurred

FIG. 2.14 Food inflation tended to be highest in the first quarter of 2023



Data were not available in Sudan after February 2023. This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

between March and May 2023 when tropical cyclone Freddy and the Madden–Julian oscillation over the Indian Ocean created the conditions for high levels of precipitation across nearly all of the Horn of Africa – except for in south-central Somalia and parts of southwest Kenya (WFP, July 2023).

The second happened during the latter half of 2023 when a strong El Niño event coupled with a positive Indian Ocean Dipole once again created wetter-than-normal conditions throughout East Africa.


This precipitation supported improvements in crop and livestock development, and the acute food insecurity situation in some areas improved. However, it also triggered flooding in others, as the soil was unable to absorb large quantities of water, leading to loss of lives, livestock and livelihoods as well as human displacement. More than 3.1 million people were estimated to be affected by the heavy rains and flooding between September and mid-November 2023, with at least 772 000 people being displaced in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Burundi,

and southern and southeastern Ethiopia (OCHA, November 2023).

The El Niño event also worsened drought conditions in Ethiopia's Tigray and Afar regions. In the Tigray region, one of Ethiopia's crop-producing areas, the dry conditions severely hindered Meher crop development, and in many instances, led to crop failure. The Meher harvest was assessed at being 65 percent below the regional average, and such losses are likely to have widespread impacts during Tigray's 2024 lean season (February–April) (FEWS NET, January 2024; OCHA, December 2023).

In the Afar region, where livestock rearing is the main livelihood activity, drought conditions affected rangeland resources and animal body conditions in an area where a significant number of animals were killed during the conflict in neighbouring Tigray from 2020 (FEWS NET, January 2024).

FIG. 2.15 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.



**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in the Sudan where a total of 20.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver of the largest year-on-year deterioration in acute food insecurity in East Africa. Hostilities in the Sudan escalated into a nationwide conflict in April 2023, exacerbating an already severe socioeconomic crisis, as well as contributing to mass internal and cross-border displacement. It is likely that this conflict will continue to have far-reaching and devastating regional repercussions in 2024.

Localized conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan also undermined acute food security and nutrition outcomes in the region. Clashes between armed groups in Ethiopia's northern Amhara and central Oromia regions are of high concern in 2024, as this conflict has already led to large numbers of forcibly displaced people, as well as market disruptions and livelihood losses (FEWS NET, December 2023).



**Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Djibouti and South Sudan, where 8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

The inflationary shock stemming from the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine led to elevated borrowing costs and debt burdens, depleted foreign reserves and depreciation of national currencies (IMF, October 2023). These impacts to East African economies have reduced vulnerable households' purchasing power while limiting governments' public policy response (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

Inflationary pressures receded slightly in 2023, but the cost of living in East Africa remained high, with the annual inflation rate across the region averaging 13 percent in September 2023 (WFP, November 2023). Similarly, food prices in the eight countries declined slightly but remained above pre-pandemic levels given the upward pressure from reduced food availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs of food and non-food items (WFP, November 2023). Double-digit inflation persisted throughout the year in Burundi and Ethiopia (see figure 2.14).

The current global economic climate has hampered governments' ability to address the ongoing cost-of-living crisis, particularly in Djibouti and South Sudan, leading economic shocks to be considered the primary driver of high levels of acute food insecurity in both countries. Djibouti's economy is reliant on foreign markets and was therefore vulnerable to price increases. Its economy began to recover in 2022 (IMF, January 2024), but the fiscal situation remained under strain due to diminished tax revenues, recent tax exemptions and mounting public debt servicing costs, which have translated into increases in consumer price indices (WB, December 2023).

In South Sudan, while economic shocks were identified as the primary driver, in reality it is the combination of the economic crisis (currency depreciation and high food prices) with frequent

climate-related shocks and conflict/insecurity – including the spillover effects of the conflict in the Sudan – that are equally contributing to the country's dire situation (IPC, November 2023). The economy's modest recovery from the civil war was undone by the COVID-19 pandemic and flooding (WB, September 2023). The economy relies on revenues from oil production, which became more costly in 2023 due to the conflict in the Sudan and production bottlenecks (IMF, December 2023). South Sudan saw a significant increase in staple food prices due to spikes in fuel prices (leading to high transportation costs), significant currency depreciation, and reduced trade volumes from the Sudan (WFP, July 2023).

### Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises







**East African countries have various underlying structural vulnerabilities that significantly impact their ability to address and cope with high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Not only do they face environmental vulnerabilities that increase their risk due to the intensification of recurrent shocks such as droughts and floods, but they are also faced with economic vulnerabilities that increase their exposure to shocks.

All the East African countries with major food crises, except for Kenya, are designated as Least Developed Countries by the United Nations (UNCTAD, January 2024), which means they are characterized by historically weak development capacity, low and unequally distributed income, and scarcity of domestic financial resources.

These vulnerabilities limit the capacity for human development, as evidenced by the low scores and rankings these countries receive on the Human Development Index (HDI). Kenya ranks slightly better than the other countries, but there are huge disparities between the country's different regions, as the ASALs have much lower HDI scores than urban areas such as Nairobi. This divide in urban and rural development outcomes is typical in sub-Saharan Africa where roughly 70 percent of people

TABLE 2.2 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%) 	Rangeland growing period affected by drought conditions (%) 	INFORM Risk Index (0–10) 	HDI global ranking (1–192) 
BURUNDI	22.9	85.9	7.4	8.5	5.6	187th
DJIBOUTI	98.8	1.2	N/A	15.6	4.9	171st
ERITREA	N/A	62.4	19.2	16.5	6	176th
ETHIOPIA	6.6	63.7	14.6	19.6	7	175th
KENYA	41.1	33	12.6	17.6	6.6	152nd
RWANDA	34.0	54.7	8.8	16.3	4.2	165th
SOMALIA	N/A	26.3	21.1	16.1	8.5	N/A
SOUTH SUDAN	N/A	62.1	13.5	18.1	8.5	191st
SUDAN	33.5	40.6	18.6	18.6	7.3	172nd
UGANDA	8.9	62.9	7.1	10.6	7	166th

Sources: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought conditions); EC-JRC (Rangelands growing period affected by drought conditions); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

living in rural areas are multidimensionally poor, while in urban areas that percentage decreases to just over a quarter (OPHI/UNDP, 2022). Poverty is particularly concentrated in East Africa, as 38 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's poor live in the region (OPHI, 2020). The highest incidences of poverty (where data are available) in the region are in South Sudan and Ethiopia, where 9 out of 10 and 8 out of 10 people are poor, respectively (OPHI, 2020). High levels of poverty and dependence on imports to meet domestic food demand make it difficult for vulnerable populations to afford food in a context of high food prices.

Households are also typically reliant on agriculture for livelihoods and subsistence. Around 68 million people depend on agriculture, fishing and forestry for their employment and livelihoods across East Africa, making up over half the employment opportunities in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. It reaches as high as 86 percent in Burundi (FAO, 2023). Djibouti has the lowest share at around 2 percent, as the country's economy relies primarily on providing port services due to

its strategic location on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Less than 1 percent of the country is made up of arable land, which makes it almost entirely reliant on imports to meet its food demand (WB, December 2023).

When limited coping capacities combine with higher risks and exposure to shocks, households in the region become more vulnerable to crises. East African countries ranked highly on the global INFORM Risk Index, with most countries landing in the top 20. Somalia and South Sudan tied for being the second most vulnerable countries in the world.

Somalia also ranked second on the list of countries with the highest exposure to hazards, especially drought. The 21 percent frequency for crop-growing period affected by drought in table 2.2 can be interpreted as severe drought affecting one season in every five over the period 2003–2023. Observation of drought frequency shows that over the last seven years, one season in two has been affected by severe drought (EC-JRC).

## DISPLACEMENT | A complex and escalating regional displacement crisis driven by conflict and weather extremes

East Africa has more forcibly displaced people than any other geographical region in the GRFC with a total of 20.7 million, most of them internally displaced in the Sudan and Ethiopia followed by South Sudan and Somalia.

There are interconnected and compounding factors that lead people to move frequently throughout the region, causing this displacement crisis to be complex and dynamic in nature.

While conflict and insecurity forced a high proportion of displacements in 2023, climate and natural disasters also figured prominently in people's motivations to relocate. Displaced people typically moved to places with only marginally better conditions, where host populations also faced a multitude of challenges that ranged from conflict and frequent population movements to chronic poverty and weather extremes.


These challenges hindered the host communities' capacities to support and integrate displaced populations, often resulting in temporary stays and onward movements to seek refuge and opportunities. They often led to tensions over competition for resources and livelihood opportunities (Joint Statement, June 2023).

The acute food insecurity and malnutrition data that are available for displaced populations in 2023 show a bleak picture.

### The Sudan experienced the region's largest displacement crisis

The conflict in the Sudan triggered the latest wave of widespread displacement in the region, with over 6 million people internally displaced between April 2023 and the end of the year, totalling 9.1 million IDPs overall. Prior to the start

FIG. 2.16 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in 8 countries in the region, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

of hostilities, the Sudan hosted over 1 million refugees, making it one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world and the second largest in Africa (Joint Statement, June 2023) (see *Focus on the Sudan*, page 53).

### Drought and conflict perpetuated extensive displacement in Ethiopia

Prior to the conflict in the Sudan, Ethiopia had the largest number of forcibly displaced people in the region, with 3.5 million people internally displaced across 24 sites and camps, primarily due to conflict (65 percent of IDPs) followed by drought (18 percent). The Somali region hosted the highest number of IDPs who were displaced by drought, while the Tigray region hosted the highest number displaced by conflict (IOM, October 2023). Ethiopia's refugee population of around 1 million people is predominantly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.

IDPs and refugees experienced large food consumption gaps and lacked access to services, leading to disease outbreaks, as well as acute food insecurity and malnutrition levels that were similar to those of the host population (UNHCR, February 2024).

### Very concerning acute malnutrition levels in refugee camps in seven countries


Uganda is Africa's largest host of refugees, with over 1.6 million people, primarily from South Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo, living

across 13 settlements (UNHCR, December 2023). Inflation, sluggish recovery from COVID-19 and reduced humanitarian funding have resulted in a deteriorating nutrition situation for refugees and host families in 2023. According to the IPC acute malnutrition analysis, two settlements were classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) and six in IPC AMN Phase 2 (Alert) from April to September 2023 (IPC, November 2023). The situation could deteriorate further in 2024 with diminished international funding (European Commission, October 2023).

Nearly half of the SENS nutrition assessments conducted across 66 refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda found High (>10%) or Very High (>15%) levels of acute malnutrition among children under the age of 5 years (UNHCR, 2023).

The situation was most concerning in Ethiopia where the levels were High or Very High in 14 out of 21 camps, in South Sudan (High or Very High


FIG. 2.17 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

in four out of eight camps), in the Sudan (seven out of nine camps) and in Djibouti (all three camps). High levels of anaemia among children under 5 years old and women of reproductive age were widespread in refugee camps. Refugees in all assessed camps had inadequate food consumption (according to the FCS indicator). In some camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan, more than 70 percent of refugees had a poor FCS (see *Technical Notes*, page 165) (UNHCR, 2021–2023).

MAP 2.4 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Inadequate health and WASH services, disease outbreaks, and poor infant and young child-feeding practices exacerbated by years of drought conditions, inflation and conflict-related displacement drove high levels of acute malnutrition, particularly in Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan and Kenya.

More than 12 million children under 5 years old were acutely malnourished in the eight food-crisis countries in East Africa, 3 million severely so.

The severity of acute malnutrition varied throughout the region in 2023, with countries such as Burundi and Uganda primarily experiencing Acceptable and Alert (IPC AMN Phase 1 and 2) situations while Djibouti, Somalia and South Sudan predominantly faced Serious and Critical (IPC AMN Phase 3 and 4) outcomes.

In early 2023, acute malnutrition in Kenya's drought-stricken ASALs was Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) or Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in many counties and even worse than in 2022. A July 2023 IPC AMN analysis showed an improving but still critical situation.

At over 4 million, Ethiopia was the country with the highest GAM burden in the region, with the total number of SAM cases reaching over 1 million (HRP 2023 Ethiopia, February 2023). SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in rural areas and IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Very High/Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition, with the highest prevalence among IDPs (26.5 percent). Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from acute malnutrition (MUAC < 23cm), indicating an Extremely Critical situation (SMART, August 2023).

In the Sudan, sharply escalating conflict since April 2023 has led to increased vulnerability to malnutrition, due to high inflation, reduced access to food, lack of water, poor hygiene and increased risk of infections and communicable diseases, such as measles, especially among the millions of displaced people.


According to the revised HRP, the number of children with acute malnutrition increased by an estimated 30 percent in areas with active hostilities, by 15 percent in IDP-hosting states and by 10 percent elsewhere. However, the interruption in nutrition monitoring and reporting impacted the understanding of the evolving nutrition situation in most parts of the country, particularly in the hotspot areas (OCHA, May 2023).

### Drivers of acute malnutrition

**Lack of food** A deterioration in acute food insecurity due to weather extremes, continued macroeconomic instabilities, escalating conflicts and mass displacement, particularly in the Sudan, led to poor dietary intake by women and children in terms of quantity and quality. In pastoral communities such as in northern Kenya, Somalia and southern Ethiopia, low livestock production resulted in limited availability of milk for children's diets, which was a leading contributor to their poor nutritional status. Limited food access during the temporary halt of humanitarian distribution and the onset of the lean season in Ethiopia were likely to have impacted children's nutritional status (SMART, August 2023).

**Inadequate services** Poor access to improved drinking water and sanitation as well as limited access to health services increased the risk of disease. Many of the drought-affected areas of the region had limited water (IPC, February 2023). In the Tigray region of Ethiopia, most households (82 percent) lack improved sanitation facilities, rising to 92 percent in the Central zone (SMART 2023). Major disease outbreaks including cholera, measles, malaria and other diseases across the region were worsened by the rise in El Niño-induced flooding and fragile

FIG. 2.18 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in eight food crises, 2023




Source: IPC and HNO.

health systems. As of 31 January 2024, Ethiopia had around 32 000 cholera cases and Kenya 12 000 (WHO, February 2024). Some disease outbreaks are vaccine preventable, but routine immunization services along with maternal and childcare programmes have been disrupted for several years due to COVID-19 and lack of accessibility in remote, rural areas.

Ongoing conflicts in the region also affected service delivery at health facilities, exposing vulnerable populations, including women and children, to increased risks (WHO, March 2023). In the Sudan, critical civilian infrastructure including water systems and hospitals have been destroyed. Repairs to damaged infrastructure typically cannot be undertaken due to issues of access and security (OCHA, May 2023).

**Inadequate practices** Inadequate feeding practices of infants and young children, were another high-risk contributing factor to acute malnutrition. All countries in the region had suboptimal levels of exclusive breastfeeding. The percentage of children aged 6-23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet was low across the region and at Extremely Critical/Catastrophe levels in Burundi (4 percent), Somalia (8.7 percent), South Sudan (5 percent), the Karamoja region of Uganda (2.9 percent) and Tigray region of Ethiopia (0-6 percent) (SMART 2023).

FIG. 2.19 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023




\* HNO Estimates prior to the conflict in April 2023.

Source: Ethiopia HRP 2023, February 2023; Burundi IPC TWG, September 2022; Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023; Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023; Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023; South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023; Sudan HNO 2023, November 2022; Uganda IPC TWG, June and November 2023.

## 3.4M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in eight food crises, 2023

Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

FIG. 2.20 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Source: Burundi IPC TWG, September 2022; Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023; Ethiopia HRP 2023, February 2023; Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023; Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023; South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023; Sudan HNO 2023, November 2022; Uganda IPC TWG, June and November 2023.



# Focus | Conflict in the Sudan

**Heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023 has had devastating consequences across the Sudan and in the neighbouring countries of Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan.**

The humanitarian situation is dire. Millions of people among the displaced and host communities, especially women and children, are experiencing severe access constraints to basic goods and services, including food, water and shelter, with profound and prolonged impacts on their food security and nutrition.


## The Sudan became East Africa's largest food crisis

In 2023, during the June–September lean season, around 20.3 million people, or 42 percent of the total population, experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, 74 percent more than during the 2022 lean season (IPC, August 2023). Seasonal improvements in food access and availability from October 2023 to February 2024 following the main harvest were expected to be limited by the severity of the conflict's impact in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Khartoum and Gezira. Around 17.7 million people were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during this post-harvest period (IPC, December 2023).

## Major impact on the country's agriculture sector

The conflict has severely restricted access to land for cultivation, livestock movement and seasonal activities, making it extremely difficult for households to produce food. Major infrastructure for food production and storage has been destroyed, including in southeastern areas – the country's breadbasket. Supply chain disruptions further limited the availability and distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural finance. Irrigation

MAP 2.5 Number of forcibly displaced people between mid-April 2023 and February 2024



Source: IOM, OCHA, UNHCR and COR, February 2024.

canals cannot be maintained. Violence is reducing access to water and pasture for livestock and disrupting seasonal migrations in many areas (IPC, December 2023). The sorghum and millet harvests in Gezira, Sennar, White Nile and South Kordofan were significantly disrupted. In 2024, the conflict affected key production areas, including the Gezira irrigation scheme, which produces 40–50 percent of the national wheat output and where critical irrigation infrastructure was damaged (FEWS NET, February 2024).

According to the findings of a 2023 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission, cereal production is estimated at well below average levels (FAO, March 2024). In this context, food import requirements

– which covered 80–85 percent of countrywide wheat consumption needs before the conflict – are expected to increase further. Lower food availability is expected to have a compounding impact on already widespread and high levels of acute food insecurity across the country (FEWS NET, February 2024).

## The world's largest internal displacement crisis

By the end of 2023, about 7.7 million people had been displaced since the onset of hostilities in April 2023, including about 6 million IDPs, 1.5 million refugees, and nearly 200 000 self-relocated refugees internally displaced in the Sudan (UNHCR, December 2023; IOM, December

2023). When added to the millions of people internally displaced by conflict over two decades, there were an estimated 9.1 million IDPs by the end of 2023, including 3 million children – the largest internal displacement crisis worldwide (IOM, January 2024).

As Map 2.5 shows, the number of displaced people continued to increase rapidly in early 2024, reaching a total of 8.2 million by February, consisting mainly of IDPs/self-relocated refugees followed by Sudanese refugees/asylum-seekers and refugee returnees of other nationalities (UNHCR, February 2024).

The limited humanitarian access to conflict hotspots due to recurring telecommunications issues, security concerns and high fuel costs hindered domestic travel to conduct reverification exercises, undermining the provision of assistance and support to affected populations, thereby contributing to rising numbers of IDPs (IOM, January 2024) and acutely food-insecure populations.

## Alarming levels of acute malnutrition threaten the lives of children and women

The Sudan is among the food crises with the highest prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) among children under 5 years old, at an estimated 13.6 percent, a High severity according to WHO thresholds (OCHA, December 2023) even before the outbreak of the conflict. Massive displacement – resulting in lack of water and poor hygiene, increasing risk of infections, and limited access and availability to basic health and nutrition services – worsened malnutrition among children and women since April 2023. About 76 percent of the 3 million acutely malnourished children under 5 years old and 0.9 million acutely malnourished pregnant and breastfeeding women (OCHA, May 2023) were in areas most affected

by conflict. In these areas, the GAM prevalence was above the Very High threshold of 15 percent (OCHA, December 2023).

Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread, evidenced by the fact that 48 percent of children aged under 5 suffer from anaemia due to iron deficiency. Only 25 percent of children aged under 5 achieve Minimum Dietary Diversity, a situation worsened by extensive displacement limiting access to nutritious foods and disrupting regular feeding and caregiving practices (OCHA, December 2023).

The nutrition outlook is expected to deteriorate in 2024, particularly during the June–September lean season, due to ongoing conflict, worsening food insecurity, compromised health, WASH and nutrition services, prolonged displacement and extremely high food prices. More than 3.5 million children are projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024, of whom more than 0.7 million are expected to be severely affected – and at increased risk of death without timely treatment (UNICEF, HAC, December 2023).

### A crisis beyond the country's borders

The ongoing conflict in the Sudan has had a profound impact on border regions in neighbouring countries, where refugees, asylum-seekers and returnees are gathering in significant numbers. These areas, including parts of **Central African Republic, Chad** and **South Sudan**, were already grappling with severe acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition before the conflict (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

The increased influx of refugees is intensifying competition for limited resources, raising the potential for tensions between displaced and local communities, while stretching already scarce resources.

By the end of 2023, among the 1.5 million people who fled the Sudan, including Sudanese nationals and refugees from neighbouring countries who were hosted in the Sudan, 0.5 million were in both South Sudan and Chad, 0.4 million in Egypt,



Many of those crossing the border are South Sudanese refugee returnees travelling on boats to reach their communities of origin where they face extreme levels of economic hardship and hunger.

43 700 in Ethiopia and nearly 26 000 in Central African Republic. Most of the cross-border displacements into South Sudan were refugee returnees (UNHCR, January 2024).

In **Chad**, the arrival of new refugees added to the over 0.4 million Sudanese refugees who had been living in camps there for over a decade (ACAPS, January 2024), putting more pressure on the limited resources of host communities, with the number of refugees and returnees approximately four times greater than the local population in places such as Adré town (Ouaddaï province) (ACAPS, January 2024). A Cadre Harmonisé special protocol activated to assess the acute food insecurity situation of these affected populations found that 24 percent of nearly 315 000 refugees analysed in two eastern provinces (Sila and Wadi Fira) faced high levels of acute food insecurity in October–December 2023 (CILSS, November 2023).


Humanitarian needs among **South Sudanese** refugee returnees, who have been displaced

several times, are dire. Around 28 000 or 10 percent of the returnee population are expected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in April–July 2024 (IPC, November 2023).

Following the RSF attacks on Wad Madani in the heavily populated Sudanese state of Gezira in December 2023, the number of Sudanese refugees arriving in South Sudan also increased considerably, spiking in the first half of January. Average daily arrivals fluctuated between about 1 500 and 2 500 per day and were expected at similar levels in 2024 as the conflict continues (FEWS NET, January 2024).

In **Central African Republic**, many refugees were hesitant to travel far from the border and stayed in the Amdafock area in the rainy season instead of moving to Korsi, a refugee reception centre in the city of Birao. As conflict continued in South Darfur, by the end of 2023 many had relocated to Korsi to seek protection. As of January, the data cut-off date for the GRFC, no data were available on the

**FIG. 2.18 Prevalence of acute malnutrition among refugees at border crossings, 2023**



food security conditions of Sudanese refugees in these areas. A report by IOM indicated that about 40 percent of them said they crossed the border seeking humanitarian assistance (IOM, July 2023).

### Levels of acute malnutrition surpassed Very High thresholds among those fleeing the Sudan

Regarding nutrition, refugee and returnee populations who have sought refuge in Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan had MUAC measurements indicating levels of wasting above the 15 percent Very High WHO threshold for all countries, except Ethiopia.

The situation was the most severe in border points in South Sudan, with screenings between May and November, indicating that 30 percent of children under 5 years old and a staggering 58 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were acutely malnourished.

This situation was also extremely concerning in Chad, where MUAC screening at border points indicated 29 percent of children aged under 5, and 11 percent of PBW were acutely malnourished. In border crossing points of Central African Republic, the prevalence was 17 percent among children under 5 years (see figure 2.18). In Ethiopia, the acute malnutrition situation is relatively better but still above the High WHO threshold, at 12 percent for children and 13 percent for PBW.



# West Africa and the Sahel

Escalating conflicts mostly in Sahelian countries together with economic shocks sustained high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

.....

Chad, Liberia and Senegal experienced worsening acute food insecurity since 2022, while other countries, such as Mauritania and Guinea, saw significant improvements, thanks to favourable agricultural outputs and the impacts of humanitarian assistance.

.....

Populations in severely conflict-affected areas of Burkina Faso and Mali faced Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

.....

The region experienced a major displacement crisis driven by worsening conflicts, with hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in eastern Chad from the Sudan.

.....

The region is facing a worrying child and maternal nutrition situation, fuelled by food insecurity, limited access to basic services and poor nutritional practices.

# West Africa and the Sahel

Escalating conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel and neighbouring the Sudan have sustained high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023. Weather extremes also remained significant drivers of food crises in many countries.

High levels of displacement and acute malnutrition heighten the complexity of the food crises. In some countries, favourable agricultural outputs led to improvements, tempering the negative effects of sustained inflation, market disruptions and livelihood losses.

## 44.3M



people or 11% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in 14 countries.

## 9.7M



forcibly displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in 2023 – consisting of 7.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.


## 14.0M



acutely malnourished children in 14 food-crisis countries with 3.9 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Benin | Burkina Faso | Cameroon | Chad | Côte d'Ivoire | Guinea | Liberia | Mali | Mauritania | Niger | Nigeria | Senegal | Sierra Leone | Togo

MAP 2.6 Number of people and share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 14 countries in 2023



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, 2023.

The discrepancy between the number of people facing acute food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel, as reported by CILSS in March 2023 for June–August 2023, and the GRFC estimates arises because not all countries with Cadre Harmonisé (CH) data were classified as facing food crises. This includes Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. Additionally, Benin and Cameroon had their peak estimates in March–June 2023, whereas the peak for the other 12 countries was during June–August 2023.



## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

**Escalating conflict/insecurity, mostly in Sahelian countries, coupled with persisting economic shocks that have affected countries across the region, were the primary drivers sustaining high levels of acute food insecurity.**


The overall share of population facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreased slightly since 2022 when it was the highest in CH history, at 12.5 percent of the population analysed.

Expanded analysis coverage largely explain the increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity since 2022 in two countries: in Chad, coverage expanded from 94 percent to 100 percent of the population, while in Nigeria it increased from 72 percent to 91 percent. Worsening insecurity conditions and economic shocks also contributed to increases in Chad, Liberia and Senegal.

Conversely, Mauritania and Guinea saw over 40 percent reductions in the number of highly acutely food-insecure people, followed by Mali, Sierra Leone, the Niger and Cameroon, mostly due to overall favourable crop and pastoral production. Burkina Faso and Togo saw marginal year-on-year improvements but maintained high levels of acute food insecurity. Year-on-year comparisons were not feasible in Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, as neither country was included in the GRFC 2023, as well as in Chad due to an increase in the population analysed with the notable inclusion of the capital city in the analysis in July 2023.

Nine countries were classified as major food crises, with Nigeria having by far the largest population facing high acute food insecurity, followed by Burkina Faso, the Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, each surpassing 1 million people in these phases.

FIG. 2.20 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, 2023.

## Severity of acute food insecurity

**All 14 food crises in the region had CH analyses with data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.**

**45 200 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) across two countries**

Around 42 700 of them were in the Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun regions in Burkina Faso between June and August 2023, where worsening conflict and insecurity severely impeded the functioning of markets and prevented populations from adequately accessing basic foods, with some areas under security blockade. This number of people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) represented the highest on record for the CH in Burkina Faso, nearly doubling from 22 500 people during March–May 2023.

The remaining 2 500 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) were in the Ménaka region in Mali during June–August 2023, with conflict and high population displacement at the root of these conditions. This represents the first time in CH history that people have faced this most severe form of acute food insecurity in Mali.

Compared with 2022, this situation marks an improvement in Nigeria, from 3 000 people estimated in this phase in October–December 2022 to none in 2023.

**2.7 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across 13 countries**


Out of the 14 countries with disaggregated data, all had populations in CH Phase 4 except Côte d'Ivoire. The severity of acute food insecurity was higher among Sahelian countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Niger

and Mali, reflecting the effects of protracted conflict/insecurity. Nigeria had the largest number of people in CH Phase 4, mostly in northern states, while Burkina Faso had the highest share of people in this phase at nearly 3 percent.

Cameroon, Chad, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo experienced increases in the number of people in CH Phase 4 since 2022, indicating more severe conditions. Conversely, Guinea, Mauritania and the Niger saw significant reductions, suggesting improvements in food access and availability, particularly in remote conflict-affected areas.

In Burkina Faso and Mali, a reduction in the population in CH Phase 4 occurred in tandem with increases in the population in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) – indicating a deterioration in severity for populations in areas severely affected by conflicts.

FIG. 2.21 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: Cadre Harmonisé.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed    Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse    Total population

### 41.5 million people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) across all 14 countries

In most conflict-affected countries with high numbers of displaced people – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and the Niger – 10–12 percent of the analysed population were in Crisis (CH Phase 3), while in Mali the prevalence of people in this phase stood at 5 percent. Among countries mostly affected by economic shocks, Sierra Leone had the highest prevalence (15 percent) followed by Mauritania and Liberia. Since 2022, the share of analysed population in Crisis (CH Phase 3) slightly increased from 10 to 11 percent.

### 109.4 million people in Stressed (CH Phase 2) across all 14 countries

Compared with 2022, the number of people in Stressed (CH Phase 2) significantly increased in the region. This reflected worsening conditions as the increasing share of population in this phase (up from 26 percent to 29 percent) corresponded to a decrease in the share of population in Minimal (CH Phase 1), from 62 percent to 59 percent.

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

**The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the region has increased almost every year since 2016, except for 2018.**

Between 2016 and 2023, it almost quadrupled from around 11.6 million to 44.3 million. The prevalence of acute food insecurity grew from 5 percent in 2016, peaked at 12.5 percent in 2022, and remained at 11 percent in 2023.

The overall increase in the absolute numbers partly reflects an expansion of the coverage of CH analyses. The population analysed in the region saw a 30 percent increase from 2016 to 2022, with Nigeria contributing significantly to this rise since 2021.

The population analysed in Nigeria increased from 49 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2023, expanding from 16 states in 2020, to 21 states in 2021 and reaching 26 states in 2023, in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

Out of the 14 countries selected in the GRFC 2024, 11 are protracted food crises, having been

consistently identified as food crises since 2016, and four are protracted major food crises: Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria (in 2017, 2018 and 2019, they were included as part of the Lake Chad Basin regional crisis). Other countries in the region move in and out of food crisis as they face varying shocks.

## Outlook for 2024

**Persistent conflicts, with further associated displacement movements, and lingering economic shocks are expected to maintain high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024.**

This situation is likely to be exacerbated by localized climate shocks during the 2023 agricultural season in certain countries, despite average seasonal rainfall leading to overall favourable agricultural and pastoral conditions (PREGEC, November 2023).

All the selected 14 countries except Liberia have projections for the period June–August 2024 from the CH analysis cycle of November 2023.<sup>1</sup> At the regional level, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected at 44.4 million in the 13 countries with CH data in both 2023 and 2024, which represents an additional 670 000 people compared with 2023.

This increase is largely attributable to increased analysis coverage. The population analysed increased by 18 million people in 12 out of the 13 countries with data for 2023 (mostly in Nigeria, Guinea and Mauritania). This includes about 2 million people in Emergency, a significant decline compared with 2.7 million in 2023.

As of the January cut-off date for data inclusion, no populations were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5). This implied a decline in severity based on increased humanitarian

assistance and assumptions of slightly improved security conditions in some heavily conflict-affected areas for the projected period. However, the CH analyses of March 2024 updated several projections for the June–August 2024 lean season and estimated 2 600 people would be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali (CH, March 2024).

At the country level, the share of population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to increase in Chad (4 percentage points), Sierra Leone (3 percentage points) and to a lesser extent Mali (0.3 percentage points). For Chad, this reflected ongoing displacement from the Sudan, conflicts in western border areas and reduced cereal production. In Sierra Leone, this mostly reflected rampant inflation.

The other ten countries were projected to experience decreases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, mostly based on improved food supplies from favourable 2023 season outputs and subdued inflation. The prevalence in Nigeria is projected to marginally decline from 12.8 percent to 12.6 percent of the analysed population. However, the number of people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to increase.

## Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024


**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in six countries where a total of 38 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity**

Conflict and civil insecurity, identified as the primary drivers of acute food insecurity, significantly impacted six countries, affecting 38 million people. In regions with long-standing issues, such as the Liptako–Gourma area, the Lake Chad Basin and parts of Cameroon, these conditions persisted and even intensified in 2023.

The resulting insecurity led to widespread internal and cross-border displacements, disrupting traditional agricultural practices, pastoral transhumance, and the functioning of markets

<sup>1</sup> Since the cut-off date for data inclusion in the GRFC 2024 was 7 January 2024, this analysis did not take into account the CH estimates released in March 2024. The updated projections from the March 2024 CH analyses will be included in the forthcoming FSIN CILSS report to be published in June 2024.


FIG. 2.22 Very high food inflation throughout 2023 in several coastal countries of the region



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 15 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.23 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

and trade. The countries most affected included Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria, encompassing 26 states and the FCT.

As 2023 progressed, the number of violent incidents generally increased in these countries, with Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mali experiencing a significant increase in instability, as reported by ACLED in November 2023. Escalating insecurity was a key factor in driving populations in Burkina Faso and Mali towards Catastrophe (CH Phase 5). Communities in these areas faced extreme challenges in accessing markets, maintaining their livelihoods, and receiving humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the insecurity crisis in the Central Sahel continued to spread to northern regions of coastal countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. Previously considered a risk, this expansion had an increasingly adverse effect on food security due to cross-border population movements and the deterioration of local economic activities.

In Chad, the continuous influx of refugees and returnees fleeing the Sudan compounded acute food insecurity challenges in the eastern border regions, with the arrival of 0.7 million people by the end of 2023. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict and insecurity in western Cameroon and northern Nigeria persistently disrupted market activities and livelihoods, exacerbating the food security situation.

The situation led to a significant increase in regional displacement, with 9.7 million people displaced by mid-2023. This figure included 7.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, December 2023; GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). The extensive displacement, coupled with the severe disruption of agricultural and pastoral activities and trade, underlined the critical and interconnected nature of the food security and displacement crises in these regions.



### Economic shocks were the primary driver in eight countries where 6.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Unsustainable debt and slow growth, amid uncertainty due to rising geopolitical tensions and the lingering effects of COVID-19, contributed to currency depreciation, high inflation, reduced fiscal capacity to provide assistance as well as low income-generating opportunities for households. Economic and political sanctions in certain countries of the region, spurred by coups d'état, contributed to market disruptions, resulting in shortages of goods, adding inflationary pressure to food prices and the cost of humanitarian assistance as well as restricting mobility of people and pastoral transhumance (PREGEC, November 2023).

Coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea were the most affected by economic shocks, but conflict-

affected countries were also impacted. Inflation was persistently high in several countries in the region, notably in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Guinea, underpinned by significant depreciation of national currencies against the US dollar, elevated prices of fertilizers and a high dependency on imports of essential goods. The unification of the exchange rates and the removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria in mid-June further drove inflation beyond its borders, as the country is a key supplier of essential commodities in the region, including fuel and food (Trading Economics, 2024).



### Weather extremes were not the primary driver in any country but still impacted food security in certain areas.

Although weather conditions were favourable in most parts of the region, localized erratic rains, floods and cumulative rainfall deficits affected crops in certain countries, notably in Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. These weather extremes also

affected pastoral resource availability, resulting in an early start to the pastoral lean season. Floods impacted several countries of the region, including Chad, Nigeria and Mali. In Nigeria, the largest affected area was registered peaking at nearly 1.5 million hectares of land, including over 400 000 hectares of croplands (FAO, November 2023). Elsewhere in the region, weather conditions were conducive for agricultural production, boosting food access and availability.

## Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

**Structural inequalities and vulnerabilities in West Africa have been exacerbated by multiple crises in recent years.**

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and the war in Ukraine have led to a reversal of years of growth and development progress, including in key areas such as poverty eradication, nutrition, health, education and gender equality.







As these countries try to get back on track, 11 out of the 14 West African countries selected for inclusion in the GRFC (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) are currently considered Least Developed Countries by the United Nations (UN, January 2024).

Many countries are resource-rich and export commodities such as oil (Nigeria), cocoa (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana) and cotton (Benin, Burkina Faso).

The agriculture and food sector remains central to most countries' economies (WB, January 2024), with agriculture providing between 22 and 73 percent of employment in each country in 2021. In total, around 67 million people were employed in agriculture, fishing and forestry across the 14 countries (FAO, 2023).

In 2023, growth was uneven, with countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU – Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Mali and the Niger) set to grow

TABLE 2.3 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%) 	Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition (%) 	INFORM Risk Index (0–10) 	HDI global ranking (1–192) 
BURKINA FASO	6.4	15.8	15.8	17.1	7	184th
CAMEROON	31.4	9.6	9.6	4.9	6.6	151st
CHAD	3.8	14.8	14.8	21.4	7.8	190th
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	45.0	10.2	10.2	10.0	4.6	159th
GHANA	36.2	12.3	12.3	12.0	3.5	133rd
GUINEA	25.5	5.7	5.7	5.1	4.5	182nd
LIBERIA	60.7	10.3	10.3	4.1	4.5	178th
MALI	4.3	10.5	10.5	15.0	6.8	186th
MAURITANIA	58.6	14.2	14.2	20.1	4.3	158th
NIGER	13.7	18.5	18.5	15.8	6.6	189th
NIGERIA	17.6	15.6	15.6	18.9	6.6	163rd
SENEGAL	43.3	N/A	N/A	7.1	4.2	170th
SIERRA LEONE	N/A	19.1	19.1	21.5	4.1	181st
TOGO	21.2	11.9	11.9	N/A	4.3	162nd

Source: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

by 5.1 percent while those in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC – Cameroon and Chad) and Nigeria underperformed (WB, October 2023). Chad and Ghana initiated debt restructuring efforts in 2023.

Rapid population growth and urbanization pose a challenge to improving socioeconomic indicators. The population is mostly concentrated in coastal areas, while landlocked countries generally experience lower density (WB, January 2024). The Niger's population is rising at the fastest rate of the 14 countries. There is a mix of HDI ratings throughout with Cameroon being classified

as a medium development country based on having scores above 0.55, while the remaining countries are all considered to have low human development.

Chad, Guinea, Mali and the Niger are among the lowest ten countries in the HDI rankings.

**DISPLACEMENT | The situation of displaced populations in West Africa and the Sahel has been increasingly challenging due to escalating conflict, deteriorating security and environmental factors, including climate change.**

**This fragile context was compounded by deteriorating political, security and economic conditions, characterized by coups d'état, armed conflict, increased criminality and extreme poverty in 2023.**


Insecurity crises continued to be concentrated in border areas, notably the Central Sahel (or Liptako–Gourma region), the Lake Chad Basin, northwestern and north-central Nigeria, and western Cameroon (PREGEC, November 2023; ACLED, 2023). New areas of concern due to conflicts in neighbouring countries were the northern borders of coastal countries, notably Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo, and the eastern border of Chad.

The region faced a growing internal displacement crisis with 7.5 million IDPs in seven countries by mid-2023, about half a million more than by the end of 2022, mostly due to conflict and insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin (UNHCR, December 2023). The biggest increases were in northern Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Cameroon. Together these three countries had about 86 percent of the region's IDPs (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). In Togo, about 18 000 new IDPs were reported.

Out of the 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, about 80 percent were hosted in Chad (primarily from the Sudan, and to a lesser extent from Central African Republic), Cameroon (mainly from Central African Republic, Nigeria and Chad) and the Niger (mainly from Nigeria and Mali). Countries with long-term refugee populations include Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania



**FIG. 2.24 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, 2023**



Source: UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, December 2023.

and the Niger, reflecting lack of opportunities to return to their countries of origin (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024).

### Food insecurity among displaced populations

**Analyses on the acute food insecurity situation were available for IDPs in Burkina Faso and Nigeria and for refugees in Chad and Mauritania. An assessment in the Niger covered both IDPs and refugees in parts of the country.**

According to CH analyses, across the Sahel, Est and Centre-Nord regions of Burkina Faso, 60 percent of IDPs (about 0.6 million people) faced high levels of acute food insecurity in June–August, including 0.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 28 000 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

In Nigeria's northern Sokoto and Zamfara states, nearly 18 000 IDPs or 30 percent of the analysed IDP population were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the peak period of June–August. A later CH analysis outside of the 2023 peak, covering October–December, and also covering Borno State, where 1.4 million IDPs were analysed, indicated that about 0.4 million IDPs or 28 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 86 000 people facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CILSS, CH March 2023; CILSS, CH November 2023).

A CH special protocol was activated to assess the acute food insecurity situation of refugees


and returnees fleeing the conflict in the Sudan in eastern areas of Chad. About 74 000 or 24 percent of nearly 315 000 refugees analysed in two eastern provinces, Sila and Wadi Fira, were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during October–December 2023, including 28 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

In Mauritania, in October 2023, Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) was carried out among 105 000 Malian refugees primarily located in M'bera camp, where they are heavily dependent on WFP food aid. About 54 percent of households did not have an income-generating activity while 7 percent engaged in daily labour or petty trade, and the rest were involved in livestock, domestic work or handicraft production (WFP, July 2023).

In the Niger, a joint assessment by WFP and UNHCR indicated significant food security challenges among refugees, IDPs and host populations. Based on the FCS indicator, around 16 percent of refugees, 17 percent of IDPs and 10 percent of host communities had unacceptable food consumption.


Significant variations in unacceptable food consumption levels were observed among refugees, with those in Tillabéri's urban and non-urban areas experiencing higher rates (42 percent and 33 percent respectively) compared with 5 percent in Tahoua's non-urban areas and

**FIG. 2.25 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023**



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

**MAP 2.7 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023**



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

8 percent in Diffa's non-camp areas. Some 47 percent of refugees and 41 percent of IDPs have a very low capacity to meet their essential needs, compared with 27 percent of hosts (WFP-UNHCR, 2023).

### Malnutrition among refugee populations

**Data from UNHCR Standardised Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS) were available from 34 refugee sites in Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria.**

In Cameroon, the prevalence of GAM among children aged under 5 years ranged from Medium to High in five out of six sites, with the highest prevalence observed in sites hosting Central African Republic refugees in Adamaoua and Est regions. Chronic malnutrition prevalence was over 40 percent in all sites, ranking as Very High. Acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), based on MUAC measurements, was particularly high, at over 27 percent in sites in the Adamaoua and Est regions (UNHCR, 2023).

In Chad, the GAM prevalence was Very High in ten sites, High in eight and Medium in one. Stunting levels were also very high, indicating long-term nutritional deficits. Anaemia levels among children under 5 and PBW were mostly Medium to High (UNHCR, 2023).

In the Niger, Medium to High GAM levels across the five sites analysed indicated concerning levels of acute malnutrition in refugee children, notably in the Abala and Ayerou sites. Stunting rates were Very High in all sites while the prevalence of anaemia among children aged under 5 years and among women were mostly High, underscoring widespread acute and chronic malnutrition challenges (UNHCR, 2023).

In five refugee sites in Nigeria, acute malnutrition was classified as Low while stunting prevalence was Very High. Household food consumption scores across all five sites ranked as unacceptable, demonstrating low quality diets (UNHCR, 2023).


**ACUTE MALNUTRITION | The nutritional situation is precarious across food crises in the region and has deteriorated in a number of countries, especially in the Sahel where worsening conflicts have disrupted services or even led to the closure of health centres and nutritional care facilities.**

**All countries affected by food crises in the region had recent (2021–2023) estimates of the number of acutely malnourished children.**

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and (northern) Nigeria had IPC AMN analyses. While Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania and Sierra Leone had recent prevalence data, the remaining five countries lacked data, partly reflecting better-off nutritional outcomes as the latest data indicated a prevalence below the Low WHO threshold. However, concerns remain, mostly in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, amid increasing acute food insecurity levels.


Data collection was hampered by insecurity preventing regular nutrition surveys in some areas, such as in Burkina Faso, where the nutritional surveys of 2021 and 2022 only covered 11 out of 13 regions. Some countries have reduced the geographical coverage of their nutrition surveys and/or their frequency because of reduced humanitarian funding.

**FIG. 2.26 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, in 14 food crises, 2023**



Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

**FIG. 2.27 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023**



Sources: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, January 2024; Chad IPC TWG, February 2023; Mali IPC TWG, November 2022; Niger IPC TWG, March 2023; Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2022; WICARO Database 2023 (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Togo), WFP Food Security and Nutrition Hotspot Analysis, April 2023 (Mauritania, Senegal); UNICEF 2023 (Cameroon, Guinea, Sierra Leone).

### A high burden of acute malnutrition among children and pregnant women

In the 14 food-crisis countries in 2023, about 14 million children under 5 years old were estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition, with 3.9 million of them severely malnourished. Sahelian countries severely affected by conflicts were at the forefront of this crisis, with Nigeria's northeastern and northwestern states accounting for nearly 6 million acutely malnourished children, of whom over 1.6 million were severely affected.

Data for acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women were only available for seven out of 14 countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – where a total of 1.5 million PBW were acutely malnourished.

### Severity of the nutrition crises

IPC AMN analyses reported a concerning nutrition situation across conflict-affected areas of Sahelian countries. Chad, Mali, the Niger, and northeast and northwest Nigeria all had areas classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), with 15–30 percent of children under 5 years old acutely malnourished. According to recent nutritional surveys, Mauritania had High levels of acute malnutrition (13.5 percent), while levels were lower in Cameroon's Extrême-Nord (8 percent), Adamaoua (7 percent), Nord (6 percent) and Est (4 percent) regions (SMART, December 2022). The conflict-affected Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest regions did not have recent data. The national prevalence was Medium in Guinea at 6.7 percent (SMART, 2022) and Sierra Leone at 5 percent (SLNNS, 2021).


### Drivers of acute malnutrition

**Lack of food** Increasing levels of acute food insecurity were primary contributors, mostly linked to the escalation of conflicts in border areas in the Sahel and high food prices across the region. In zones where humanitarian access was limited and in those seeing major influxes of displaced populations, children and women experienced limited nutrient intake while loss of livelihoods, reduced income-generating opportunities and high food prices made basic foods inaccessible for vulnerable populations.

A nutritious and healthy diet was about three times more expensive than a calorie-sufficient diet, making it unaffordable for more than half of the households in the region, particularly in nine countries that conducted cost of diet analyses between 2019 and 2022 (Bouscarat, Heinrigs and Zougbedé, 2023).

**Inadequate services** Access to health care and nutrition interventions is limited, especially in conflict-affected areas/countries. Many health centres in rural areas are no longer functional or operate at a minimum. In Burkina Faso, about 500 health facilities in provinces with limited humanitarian access have been closed. Massive population displacements have put

**FIG. 2.28 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023**



\* Data covering 2022.

Sources: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, January 2024; Chad IPC TWG, February 2023; Mali IPC TWG, November 2023; Niger IPC TWG, March 2023; Nigeria IPC TWG, October 2023; UNICEF 2023 (Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone).

pressure on the provision of health care in accessible areas (IPC, January 2024). In Mali, coverage of integrated child disease management programmes was low in all regions classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 or above, except in Taoudéni (IPC, November 2022).

According to IPC AMN analyses, poor access to WASH services and a high prevalence of infectious diseases such as diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, malaria, fever and measles were a major driver of acute malnutrition in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria.

**Inadequate practices** Some areas had Extremely Critical levels of children receiving a Minimally Acceptable Diet (MAD), including the northeastern states of Nigeria, where fewer than 10 percent of children received an MAD (IPC AMN, November 2022). Other countries with critically low levels were the Niger at 7 percent, Sierra Leone at 4.9 percent, Mali at 4.2 percent, and Guinea at 4 percent.

Inadequate feeding practices were mirrored in the high rates of anaemia in the region, with Mali and Burkina Faso recording anaemia in over 75 percent of children under 5 years old and in more than 50 percent of women of reproductive age.



# Asia



© WFP/PHASIB HAZIVAR

Macroeconomic crises characterized by low incomes and rising food and agricultural input costs as well as the impacts of widespread weather extremes and the escalating conflict in Myanmar drove almost 60 million people across five countries to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Improvements were observed in Afghanistan but it remained an extremely concerning food crisis with 46 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

With little prospect of safe return to Myanmar, the majority of the nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees in camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, face high levels of acute food insecurity and rely on humanitarian aid that is susceptible to funding cuts.

The outlook for 2024 is mixed. Should economic stability hold in Afghanistan, acute food insecurity was projected to make gradual improvements – though dryness in late 2023 may impact spring and summer crops. Escalating violence in Myanmar threatens to drive more displacement and acute food insecurity.

# Asia

Nearly one-third of the total analysed population across five countries in the region faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 due to sustained economic crises driving high unemployment and food prices, rising insecurity and displacement in Myanmar, and widespread destructive weather extremes and natural disasters.

**59.8M** 

people or 30% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in five countries.

**11.8M** 


forcibly displaced people in four countries by 2023 – consisting of 8.7 million IDPs and 3.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

**5.4M** 

acutely malnourished children in two countries with 1.5 million of them suffering the most severe form.

Afghanistan | Bangladesh | Myanmar | Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh) | Sri Lanka

**MAP 2.8** Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in five countries, 2023



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

 <1.0 million 
  1–2.99 million 
  3–4.99 million 
  5–9.99 million 
  10–14.99 million 
  ≥15 million 
  Not selected for analysis 
  Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed 
  Data gap

 Major food crisis 
  Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: IPC TWGs; WFP CARI (Sri Lanka); Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP.



## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

**Out of the five food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements, only Afghanistan and Sri Lanka had analyses for 2023 that were directly comparable with 2022.**

Afghanistan was again Asia's largest food crisis, accounting for 33 percent of the region's population in the highest phases of acute food insecurity. During the November 2022–March 2023 lean season, 46 percent of its population faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), down from 55 percent during the same period the previous year (IPC, January 2023; IPC, October 2021).

The 2023 IPC analysis for Bangladesh, which covered 23 percent of the population, including Rohingya refugees, found 31 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This is not directly comparable with the previous year's data from the Joint Response Plan, which only covered Rohingya refugees (IPC, June 2023). In Pakistan, a significantly expanded 2023 IPC analysis showed an improvement in the food security situation in areas covered by the 2022 post-flood analysis (IPC, October 2023).

In Myanmar's conflict-driven food crisis, the situation remained of great concern with 19 percent of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity though the analysis is not comparable with that of 2022 (OCHA, December 2023).

Sri Lanka has experienced improvements in food security since 2022 attributable to better food supplies, lower prices and increased capacity to import food, although 24 percent of its population still faced high levels of acute food insecurity compared with 28 percent the previous year (WFP, December 2023).

All five countries are considered major food crises, each with over 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Only Afghanistan is considered a protracted major food crisis.

FIG. 2.30 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: IPC TWGs; WFP CARI (Sri Lanka); Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP.

### Severity of acute food insecurity

**Disaggregated data by phase were available for four out of five countries in the region, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. Data for Sri Lanka were derived from the WFP CARI methodology and therefore no breakdown by IPC phase of acute food insecurity was available.**

No populations faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2023, down from over 20 000 people (in Afghanistan) in March–May 2022.



**11.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across four countries**

More than half of the region's total population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) were in Afghanistan. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan had 2.2 million people in this phase each, and Myanmar had 1.4 million people. Afghanistan also had the highest proportion of population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at 14 percent.



**42.4 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across four countries**


Afghanistan had 13.8 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of acute food insecurity, while each of the other countries with disaggregated data had just under 10 million people in this phase. Afghanistan had the highest proportion of its analysed population in this phase (32 percent).



**57.1 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across four countries**

All countries in the region have at least 30 percent of their analysed population in this phase, representing 13–17 million people in each country. Pakistan had the highest proportion of its analysed population in this phase (at 36 percent).

FIG. 2.31 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed    Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse    Total population

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

**Afghanistan and the Rohingya refugees in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh have been consistently included as major food crises in each edition of the GRFC.**

Pakistan has been a major food crisis since GRFC 2018 with analyses varying in geographical coverage of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces.

Afghanistan has been classified as one of the ten worst food crises in every edition of the GRFC, with over 40 percent of the analysed population in the highest levels of acute food insecurity from 2020 to 2023. While Afghanistan has remained

among the ten largest food crises in the GRFC over the past eight years, it has experienced a gradual improvement since 2021.

In Bangladesh, changing methodological approaches and coverage challenge year-on-year comparisons. Myanmar and Sri Lanka were classified as major food crises for the first time in the GRFC 2023.

A lack of systematic and consistent data limits a more thorough regional analysis over time, as the number of countries selected for analysis and with acute food insecurity data available significantly varied year-on-year in the eight editions of the GRFC.

## Outlook for 2024

**Around 40.5 million people or 30 percent of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Pakistan, including 8.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).**

The high cost of fuel and fertilizer – coupled with currency devaluations and supply chain disruptions – will continue to burden producers and drive high food prices and inflation that directly impact the food insecurity of households.

Flooding and extreme weather from monsoons and cyclones are a perennial concern for the region, while the potential for conflict to escalate in Myanmar or Afghanistan poses a major risk.

In Afghanistan, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to be 21 percent lower in the November 2023–March 2024 lean season period than the previous lean season. This improvement is driven predominantly by the extensive delivery of humanitarian food and agriculture assistance (IPC, December 2023). However, the improvement may be tempered by the negative impact of poor rainfall in late 2023 on 2024 wheat production.

In Myanmar, the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to increase to 12.9 million people in the June–August 2024 period, corresponding with the lean season, due to protracted conflict and escalating displacement and a further rise in food prices with decreasing job and income opportunities depressing household purchasing power (OCHA, December 2023). Acute food insecurity projection data are not available for Sri Lanka, but the economic situation is expected to continue to improve throughout 2024, according to the IMF and World Bank, as the country should see modest GDP growth, the effects of recent debt restructuring, and a recovery in the tourism and manufacturing sectors (WFP and FAO, May 2023; WB, January 2024; WB, October 2023).

Additional analysis projecting beyond January 2024 is not available for Pakistan, but indications

suggest that flooding will once again pose a risk to food security due to above-normal snowfall and rainfall in the winter season into early 2024 (IPC, October 2023). The area planted with wheat is forecast at a level well above the five-year average, driven by record prices, while good supplies of quality seeds, fertilizers and herbicides augur well for yields (FAO, November 2023). However, if the economic crisis, militant attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan and civil unrest escalate, acute food insecurity could further deteriorate.

Acute food insecurity projection data are not available for Bangladesh, but the country is forecast to see a slowing in GDP growth in 2024 in part due to low foreign exchange reserves and import restrictions impacting private investment ((UN DESA, January 2024; WB, January 2024). In addition, more than 20 percent of the country's population experience high levels of chronic food insecurity (IPC Chronic Food Insecurity analysis, June 2022), which means they normally experience ongoing or seasonal food consumption gaps even in non-exceptional conditions.

## Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



**Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka**

where 37.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.


Macroeconomic shifts that led to decreases in foreign exchange reserves (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and currency depreciations (Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan) drove rising food costs for households and rising input costs for agricultural producers, in part due to a high reliance on imports. Headline inflation was persistently high in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, while Afghanistan and Sri Lanka experienced deflationary trends by the end of 2023 (WFP, December 2023; WB, December 2023).

The food-crisis countries in the region are particularly reliant on imports from the Russian Federation for the domestic commercial agriculture sector, with Bangladesh importing 75 percent of the potash it uses to make fertilizer from there, but supply chain challenges and global restrictions on the Russian market have posed challenges (IPC, June 2023). Even countries that do not rely on the Russian Federation for fertilizer inputs, such as Pakistan, continued to experience rising prices due to supply chain disruptions (IPC, October 2023).

Economic shocks – characterized by stagnant wages, widespread unemployment, reduced public spending, the effects of women being banned from the workplace and decreased remittances – were the primary drivers of acute food insecurity in Afghanistan (IPC, December 2023).

More positive conditions prevailed in Sri Lanka as the country rebounded slightly from the worst of its 2020 economic crisis with a gradual increase in foreign reserves and currency appreciation that helped the country import food to meet its 1.8 million tonne cereal import requirement (WFP and FAO, May 2023).

**FIG. 2.32 While Pakistan and Bangladesh experienced high food inflation during 2023, Sri Lanka saw a vast reduction despite an uptick at the end of the year**



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.



**Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Pakistan where 11.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Weather extremes were an additional driver in all the other food-crisis countries in Asia. The region is susceptible to increasingly powerful cyclones and heavy monsoon seasons that cause displacement, destroy croplands and damage infrastructure, limiting the income-generating opportunities of vulnerable populations. Heavy monsoons trigger periods of food insecurity that extend beyond the monsoon season as households face long recovery times to regain assets, as was the case in 2023 in Bangladesh's Haor region and Sindh province of Pakistan following severe monsoon flooding in 2022 (IPC, June 2023; IPC, October 2023).


While 2023 did not see the scale of destruction caused by historic floods in 2022, Pakistan again experienced record-breaking rainfall that triggered flooding and damage to crops, shelters and water supply infrastructure, including in June which was the second rainiest June in the past 63 years (IRC, August 2023). In addition to disrupting food production, consumption and the livelihoods

of flood-affected people, flooding drove mass displacements in 2023 in Myanmar and in Sri Lanka following extreme weather in October (OCHA, December 2023; IFRC, November 2023).

Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Bangladesh and Myanmar in May and caused widespread destruction of farmlands and crop losses and damage to IDP camps in Myanmar and camps in Cox's Bazar (ACAPS, May 2023). The cyclone impacted 3 million people in Myanmar as well as 327 000 hectares of agricultural land and an estimated 2.3 million people in Bangladesh (OCHA, December 2023; ACAPS, May 2023). Flash floods in mid-August 2023 affected an estimated 1.3 million people in four hilly districts of Chattogram. Some of them were still recovering from cyclone Mocha and were later impacted by cyclones Hamoon and Midhili (UNICEF, December 2023).

Afghanistan continued to feel the effects of a third year of drought, which contributed to a 30–35 percent deficit in wheat production, with western provinces in particular seeing lower-than-average harvests (WFP, June 2023).

**FIG. 2.33 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023**



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.



**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Myanmar where 10.7 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

The security situation in Myanmar deteriorated throughout 2023 with a serious escalation in violence since the end of October 2023 when a coalition of armed organizations launched renewed attacks on military positions and captured several towns in the process (ACAPS, November 2023). This conflict precipitated an increase in displacements and further limited humanitarian access to communities, particularly in Shan, Sagaing and Rakhine states (UNHCR, November 2023; ACAPS, November 2023).

Despite prioritizing the eventual reintegration in Myanmar of the over 900 000 Rohingya refugees based in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, the security and political situation suggests there is no prospect of safe return in the foreseeable future (JRP, March 2023).

Political instability in Pakistan had regional implications for acute food insecurity in 2023. Pakistan forcibly deported over

500 000 undocumented Afghans, while the demand for seasonal migrant labour from Afghanistan to Pakistan is expected to decrease, leading to greater competition for agricultural wage work in Afghanistan and decreased remittance flows into Afghanistan (IPC, December 2023; IOM Pakistan, January 2024).

While the presence of active conflict has dwindled in Afghanistan following the consolidation of control by the de facto authorities (DFA) in August 2021, the DFA continue to issue new decrees and directives that change the operating environment for humanitarian workers and disrupt the delivery of food assistance (ACAPS, June 2023).



### Natural disasters – Afghanistan was hit by three powerful earthquakes in October.

The earthquakes caused widespread destruction in Herat province and affected about 275 000 people as a result of lost livestock and food stock and damage to homes and critical water and sanitation infrastructure (IPC, December 2023).

## Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

### The persistence of acute food insecurity and continual inclusion of these countries as major food crises reflect structural factors.

High levels of poverty, government debt, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, gender and income inequality, and low levels of education all decrease households' and communities' abilities to withstand and recover from shocks.

Food-crisis countries in the Asia region have a particularly high dependency on imports, with Afghanistan and Sri Lanka both relying on imports for over 30 percent of their required national caloric intake. Asia also has three countries in the bottom quartile globally for HDI – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar – a reflection of the compounding effects of poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes in these countries.

The same three countries also received Very High or High INFORM Risk scores based on the risk of humanitarian crises and disasters, while Bangladesh was considered the country most vulnerable in the world to river flooding (European Commission, September 2023).

Gendered views of women's roles in society limit employment opportunities for women in Afghanistan, a situation that has become institutionalized since the August 2021 takeover by the de-facto authorities (DFA), and has created a particularly precarious situation for women-headed households (CARE, November 2022). Further, mobility restrictions outside the home implemented by the DFA have discouraged women from travelling to markets as frequently, leading to negative impacts on food accessibility (CARE, November 2022).

In Pakistan, 75 percent of rural women and girls are engaged in agricultural work but the majority of this work remains unpaid and informal, limiting the potential of women to participate in markets, gain access to credit, and diversify their food sources (FAO Pakistan, December 2023).

Agriculture, forestry and fishing employed around 69 million people across the five countries affected by food crises in the region and represented up to 46 percent of total employment in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Food production is therefore key for the food security and livelihoods of vulnerable populations in the region.

TABLE 2.4 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	GDP ranking	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%)	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	HDI global ranking (1–192)
AFGHANISTAN	138	31.8	46	19.51	8.1	180th
BANGLADESH	34	11.2	37.1	15.57	5.7	129th
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA	N/A	17.8	43.5	9.86	4.1	N/A
KYRGYZSTAN	148	18.5	18.5	20.98	3.1	118th
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	133	-3.2	2.9	15.19	3.5	140th
MYANMAR	86	-2.7	12.5	14.86	7.1	149th
PAKISTAN	41	-18.6	20.2	20.99	6.1	161st
SRI LANKA	76	30.5	20.9	7.22	3.1	73rd
TAJIKISTAN	149	47.5	50.4	16.44	4.4	122nd
VANUATU	196	87.2	100.00	N/A	4.2	140th

Source: WB (GDP ranking); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).




**DISPLACEMENT | The 11.8 million forcibly displaced people in Asia face a growing number of threats and vulnerabilities due to sustained conflict, climate change, social and economic isolation in their host communities, and political instability.**

The prospect of a safe and dignified return to countries of origin remains a challenge for population groups such as the Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh (JRP, March 2023). Weak public service infrastructures and lack of funding are straining the humanitarian response in countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan (WFP, May 2023).

Of the total displaced population in four countries in the region, 8.7 million people or 73 percent are internally displaced. Afghanistan has the region's highest number of IDPs with 5.7 million, followed by Myanmar, Pakistan and Bangladesh.


While a recent decrease in active conflict in Afghanistan following decades of instability that drove displacement has allowed for modest returns, with 1.6 million displaced Afghans returning to their areas of origin, nearly 1 in 7 Afghans remains displaced (OCHA Afghanistan, December 2023). In Myanmar, an escalation of

**FIG. 2.34 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in four food-crisis countries, 2023**



Source: UNHCR, IOM, 2023 and 2024.

**FIG. 2.9 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023**



violence has led to over 1 million new IDPs year-on-year (OCHA Myanmar, December 2023). The nearly 600 000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar face movement restrictions, reduced access to basic services and no pathway to formal citizenship, which drives food insecurity (OCHA Myanmar, December 2023). Pakistan was still recovering from devastating 2022 floods that triggered its largest displacement event in a decade, when localized flooding as well as spates of violence in 2023 causing new displacements (IDMC, April 2023).

The Asia region is home to large, long-standing refugee populations residing in countries bordering two of the region's most intractable conflicts – Afghanistan and Myanmar. Nearly 3.2 million registered refugees are hosted in four countries in the region. Pakistan hosts nearly 2 in 3 of the refugees in the region at 2.1 million, followed by Bangladesh and Afghanistan (UNHCR, December 2023). Pakistan (Afghan refugees) and Bangladesh (Rohingya refugees) are among the ten countries hosting the largest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR, December 2023).

Nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees who escaped violence in Myanmar live in congested camps in

Cox's Bazar and Bhasan Char Island in Bangladesh (UNHCR, December 2023). Personal safety concerns limit the ability of vulnerable populations to access humanitarian assistance and sanitation and health services (IPC, June 2023).

The tenuous legal status of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh prevents formal employment within host communities in Cox's Bazar, increases dependence on humanitarian assistance, and often forces refugees into informal work that increases their risk of exploitation (IPC, June 2023).

The food rations that refugees rely upon were reduced at the beginning of 2023 due to funding cuts at WFP, but were increased slightly to USD 10 per person per month from January 2024, although this is still below the USD 12 per person per month ration amount before March 2023 (WFP, December 2023).


The IPC analysis classified the Rohingya refugee camps in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in May–September 2023 with around 0.6 million refugees or 65 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, June 2023). Acute food insecurity in camps increases protection risks among Rohingya refugees since

it makes them more likely to risk exploitative livelihood opportunities or face exploitation by traffickers as they attempt to leave camps (UN, June 2023).

The massive influx of refugees into the crowded camps of Cox's Bazar is having a deleterious effect on livelihood opportunities for host communities. Deforestation to construct the camps and for firewood has cleared 1.67 percent of all forest area in Cox's Bazar and caused erosion, while dependence on groundwater has reduced the water table by 4 metres, making it more difficult to access water for agricultural and household needs (IPC, June 2023). The increased risk of erosion raises the prospect for deadly and destructive landslides in this cyclone-prone coastal region (JRP, March 2023). Around 40 percent of the host community or 0.1 million people also faced high acute food insecurity in May–September 2023 (IPC, June 2023).

Pakistan has hosted large refugee populations from Afghanistan for four decades as a result of prolonged conflict and instability. They face high levels of food insecurity and economic and social marginalization. However, 2023 saw a shift in government policy towards refugees, with over 500 000 Afghans forcibly returned in September 2023 (IOM Pakistan, January 2024).

**FIG. 2.35 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023**



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION | A national-level IPC analysis for Afghanistan and a partial analysis for Pakistan showed widespread Critical levels of acute malnutrition across the two countries.

In Afghanistan, 17 provinces were classified in IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical) during the winter lean season of November 2022–April 2023 as the crisis deteriorated due to higher risk of diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection.

Pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) in Afghanistan also faced a concerning malnutrition situation with 804 000 experiencing acute malnutrition (IPC AMN, January 2023).

Acute malnutrition levels were Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in 23 out of 32 analysed districts in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces in Pakistan, between March and September 2023. In four districts, primarily in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the situation was expected to worsen in October 2023–January 2024 (IPC AMN Pakistan, October 2023).

While no recent data were available for the resident population of Bangladesh, the 2023 SENS results indicated a deteriorating acute malnutrition situation among Rohingya refugee populations, with Very High levels in mega camps (15.4 percent) in Cox's Bazar and Medium levels in registered camps (9.6 percent) (UNHCR, December 2023).

No recent nutrition data were available for Myanmar, but the Nutrition Cluster indicated a progressive deterioration of the situation amid worsening contributing factors (OCHA, January 2023).

### Drivers of acute malnutrition

**Inadequate practices** The low proportion of children aged 6–23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD) was a very high risk factor associated with child acute malnutrition in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, only 16 percent of children received an MAD, which is considered Critical, with lower levels in rural areas than urban (IPC AMN, January 2023)

**Inadequate services** In Afghanistan, the late 2021 suspension of direct international development assistance, which previously accounted for 75 percent of public expenditure, further weakened the already-fragile public health system.


Most health facilities have poor infrastructure and there are fewer qualified healthcare workers due to emigration, restrictions on women's movement and employment, and reduced funds to pay salaries and keep facilities open. Access to health services is also very limited by long distances to travel and the cost of transport, medicines and treatment in a context of severely eroded purchasing power (OCHA, December 2023).

The decree that women must travel accompanied by a male has limited access to what health services remain. As women cannot be treated by male health workers, the limitation on female employment is a further obstacle to them receiving treatment (UN Women, June 2022).

The expected early 2023 winter season deterioration in child nutrition in Afghanistan was partly linked to challenges accessing health and nutrition services to treat infectious disease outbreaks, including measles, acute watery diarrhoea and fever that are overwhelming the increasingly strained health system (IPC, January 2023).

Due to drought and water crisis, 79 percent of households do not have enough safe water for drinking, cooking and bathing (IPC Afghanistan, January 2023), and 28 percent of rural households reported using unimproved sanitation facilities in

FIG. 2.36 Number of children under 5 with acute malnutrition in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2023



Sources: SMART (2021 and 2023); DHS 2021.


2023 with WASH needs expected to deteriorate in 2024 (OCHA, December 2023). Lack of supplies, including chlorine, fuel, spare parts and equipment, and repair capacity following the cessation of direct international development funding significantly hampered water supplies in major urban areas (OCHA, December 2023).

In Pakistan, flooding disrupted access to essential healthcare services, while also damaging sanitation and safe drinking water infrastructure, contributing to disease outbreaks (IPC AMN Pakistan, October 2023).

In the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, only 45 percent of the waste is properly processed and latrines often overflow. Health services in the camps are under enormous pressure as they struggle to keep pace with the medical outcomes of dire living conditions, including frequent outbreaks of scabies, dengue fever and cholera (MSF, March 2023).


In Myanmar, conflict has led to the politicization of care and severely constrained the availability of healthcare services with a growing reliance on private facilities and local civil society organizations (OCHA, January 2023). The lack of affordability of private services is a major constraint, with marginalized minorities, rural areas and displaced populations facing the highest barriers to accessing services. Some 40 percent of IDPs reported impediments to accessing health services (OCHA, December 2023).

FIG. 2.37 Number of children under 5 years with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Sources: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2022; Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

FIG. 2.38 Number of PBW with acute malnutrition by country



Sources: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2022; Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

**Lack of food** Acute food insecurity driven by inadequate quality and quantity of food continued to contribute to acute malnutrition, especially during the winter lean seasons in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

An escalation in fighting in Myanmar in the last quarter of 2023 created new access blockages that increased incidence of malnutrition (OCHA, December 2023).

WFP's 33 percent General Food Assistance (GFA) ration reduction in 2023 for Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, made households 80 percent more likely to adopt food-based coping strategies and was expected to reduce caloric intake and put young children and PBW at increased risk of malnutrition and anaemia (MSF, March 2023).



# Europe

Over 7 million people in Ukraine faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, which represents an improvement since 2022.

.....

The Ukrainian economy stabilized somewhat in 2023, with positive shifts in real GDP growth and inflation, but unemployment levels were the highest in over a decade and lack of livelihood opportunities hindered financial access to food and other necessities.

.....

Ukraine's agrifood sector has suffered massive losses that have negatively impacted crop and livestock activities within the country, as well as global markets.

.....

The displacement crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine, with 3.7 million IDPs, is the largest Europe has experienced since the Second World War.



# Focus | The far-reaching impact of the war in Ukraine

**Damages and losses to Ukraine's agriculture sector as a result of the war are having significant repercussions at the domestic, regional and international levels, with impacts on acute food insecurity and malnutrition.**

Prior to the war, agriculture contributed 11 percent of Ukraine's GDP, accounted for over 40 percent of exports, and employed 15 percent of the population (FAOSTAT, January 2024). In 2021, Ukraine was among the world's top ten producers and exporters of wheat and oilseeds, especially sunflower (USDA, April 2022). However, as the war continues unabated, Ukraine's position as a major agricultural producer and exporter is coming under increasing pressure.

In 2023, the number of air strikes increased, primarily targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. These attacks, as well as the subsequent disruptions to economic flows and production, have been particularly severe on Ukraine's agriculture sector, causing an estimated USD 10 billion in damages and USD 70 billion in losses (RDNA3, February 2024).

## **Huge damage to agricultural infrastructure and abandonment of cropland**

Grain storage facilities, irrigation systems, farms and agricultural machinery have either been stolen, damaged or destroyed, exacerbating issues with supply chains and export logistics (including


lack of sea access in the early months of the war and then frequent delays in processing of vessels) and increasing production costs. Arable land has been contaminated by mines. The June 2023 attack that destroyed the Kakhovka Dam impacted agriculture, fisheries, commerce and industry, with consequences for the economy of the region. Irrigation damage from the dam breach led to USD 377 million of crop losses (PDNA, October 2023).

The damages and losses to Ukraine's agriculture sector are changing the nature and scale of the country's agricultural activities. The total planted area decreased in 2023, with 7 percent of Ukraine's total cropland – mostly along the

frontlines – being abandoned. This now-fallow land is primarily located in the southern and eastern oblasts where the majority of Ukraine's two largest crops for export were harvested and produced: wheat and sunflower seed. This land would have been worth USD 2 billion in wheat and oilseeds in 2023 (NASA Harvest, December 2023). Frontline oblasts (Kharkivska, Khersonska and Zaporizka) experienced the largest losses. The Vinnytska oblast in central Ukraine also experienced large losses without being directly affected by ground battles (RDNA3, February 2024).


Small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises reported a 9 percent reduction in the cultivated area for grain and oilseed crops compared with

MAP 2.10 Average wheat and sunflower seed production, 2016–2020



Source: US Department of Agriculture/State Statistics of Ukraine.

MAP 2.11 Spatial evolution of the war, February 2022–31 December 2023



Source: Map based on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), considering average monthly conflict events.



before the war, rising to a 20 percent reduction for those in frontline areas (FAO, April 2023). The total planted area of wheat declined by over 750 000 hectares while that of sunflower declined by 90 000 hectares between 2022 and 2023. There was a concomitant drop in the area harvested, but favourable weather conditions throughout 2023 allowed for an increase in yields and production relative to 2022 for both wheat and sunflower (NASA Harvest, December 2023).

However, remote sensing indicated that almost 30 percent of the 2023 wheat output was produced in the occupied eastern oblasts, meaning that Ukraine's overall agricultural production remained below 2021 levels and the five-year average (NASA Harvest, December 2023). Reductions in productivity coupled with high input costs (namely for fertilizers and fuel) led to significant reductions in farm gate prices, limiting farmers' profits and liquidity (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

The effect of the war on Ukraine's agriculture sector is obstructing the production of export-oriented commodities critical to Ukraine's economy and livelihoods (RDNA2, March 2023). If these damages and losses continue to accumulate it could dramatically impact Ukraine's agricultural production outlook for years to come, and may,

in the worst-case scenario, lead to agricultural production being unable to meet domestic and export demand (UN, November 2023). This concern is particularly apt for wheat as farmers are adapting to the war context by altering which crops are produced. In the occupied oblasts, farmers primarily sowed winter crops (wheat), and those in the government-controlled areas shifted towards sunflower seed and rapeseed, which require fewer inputs and therefore have lower production costs than wheat or other cereals (NASA Harvest, December 2023).

### Limitations on Ukraine's export capacity affected food-crisis countries

Both Ukraine and global markets were forced to adjust to Ukraine's constrained export capacity.

The blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports following the full-scale invasion in February 2022 severely limited Ukrainian farmers' ability to export agricultural products to their intended markets. With limited access to efficient export routes, many Ukrainian farmers have been unable to sell already-harvested crops, reducing their incomes and curbing their capacity to pay debts and invest in future activities.

Ukraine's limited maritime export capacity has caused its export patterns to shift towards Europe, sometimes at the expense of markets in low-income countries. In 2023, more than half of Ukrainian wheat and maize exports were destined for European markets, which posed a food security risk for people living in Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs from Ukraine, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa and Southeast Asia. Many of these countries saw their imports of Ukrainian wheat halved between 2021 and 2023 (IFPRI, February 2024).

In early 2023, the limited supply of wheat and sunflower seed increased the cost of importing those goods, pushing up retail food prices (FAO, July 2023), although in many cases those countries managed to switch to alternative suppliers.

### Ukrainian exporters sought alternative safe export routes

The EU introduced solidarity lanes in May 2022 to facilitate the movement of Ukrainian goods through rivers and over land via rail and roadways instead of the maritime shipping routes in the Black Sea, which at the time were not viable. Between March 2022 and January 2024, over 61 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain, oilseeds and related products were transported through the lanes, enabling the export of around 60 percent of Ukraine's grain since the start of the war (EU, February 2024).

While the solidarity lanes have facilitated the export of Ukrainian cereals and oilseeds (among other goods), they are a rather imperfect solution. Onward transport and storage infrastructure in the countries that border Ukraine (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) has been unable to absorb the additional volume of goods, increasing the cost of Ukrainian exports. As a result, significant quantities of Ukrainian products remained in these bordering countries' domestic markets rather than being transported to third countries, which contributed to prices in those markets decreasing (IFPRI, April 2024).


Farmers in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia began protesting against Ukrainian goods flooding their domestic markets, filling up storage facilities and putting local producers at a disadvantage in 2023. Governments imposed temporary import bans on Ukrainian grains and oilseeds. This further pushed down prices in Ukraine and reduced producers' profitability (IFPRI, April 2024). The EU and Ukraine collaborated to alleviate the market distortions in these countries and stabilize the situation through diplomatic means, and it was agreed that the solidarity lanes would remain open with provisions to safeguard against import surges (European Commission, September 2023; IFPRI, February 2024).

The lack of safe maritime shipping routes for Ukrainian products through the Black Sea since the onset of the war has impacted global food markets. From July 2022 to July 2023, the shipments facilitated by the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye, eased pressure on international supplies, and most importantly, on humanitarian food aid. Nearly 33 million tonnes of grains, maize and other agricultural commodities were exported from Ukraine through this agreement, with over half going to low and middle-income countries and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Somalia (UN, July 2023).

The Russian Federation's termination of the BSGI led Ukraine to create a "humanitarian corridor" that hugs the western coast of the Black Sea beside Bulgaria and Romania in August 2023. The corridor, as of November 2023, had allowed 151 ships carrying a total of 4.4 million tonnes of cargo, including 3.2 million tonnes of grain, to pass through safely (Reuters, November 2023).


Despite these efforts, export volumes have been limited throughout 2023, which could have longer-term implications for domestic production. It could also negatively impact availability in global food markets and contribute to price volatility should there be any unforeseen shocks (WFP/FAO, November 2023).

FIG. 2.39 Wheat: planted areas, yield and production, 2022 versus 2023



Source: NASA Harvest, December 2023.

FIG. 2.40 Sunflower seeds: planted areas, yield and production, 2022 versus 2023



Source: NASA Harvest, December 2023.

## Is the war in Ukraine still impacting food inflation in food-crisis countries?

The supply disruptions caused by the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves through global food markets as they magnified pre-existing international market vulnerabilities created by the COVID-19 pandemic. This led to high inflation that exacerbated macroeconomic instabilities and aggravated already-elevated levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in food-crisis countries/territories (GRFC 2023).

After peaking in March 2022, global food prices on aggregate declined thereafter with strong agricultural production and reductions in the cost of energy, fertilizers and shipping (FAO, January 2024; IMF, October 2023). Nonetheless, they remained high by historical standards, with large differences also prevailing across different commodity groups, and rice and sugar particularly elevated.


Price declines did not transmit to domestic markets at the same rate, particularly in low-income countries. Domestic food prices measured in national currencies – the prices that matter to consumers – continued to increase, feeding a cost-of-living crisis for many low-income households (IFPRI, December 2023).

Domestic market distortions, currency depreciations, weather extremes and/or conflicts as well as limited food storage capacity contributed to high prices (IMF, October 2023).

This slow price transmission was mirrored in the GRFC food-crisis countries/territories: over half (56 percent) started 2023 with double-digit domestic food inflation, dropping to 25 percent by the end of the year. These reductions often were not linear and tended to exhibit volatility (WFP, February 2024) (see map 2.12).

Several GRFC countries/territories without official food inflation figures saw evidence of increasing prices. For example, in Myanmar, the cost of a food basket increased by 80 percent over the last year (WFP, December 2023).

MAP 2.12 Annual food Inflation rates by end 2023 in GRFC-qualifying countries/territories




Source: Trading Economics and other relevant sources, 2023.


### Multiple factors likely to influence food prices throughout 2024

Global suppliers will need to continue to make up for shortfalls in Ukrainian production and exports, which will keep markets tight and vulnerable to large production shortfalls elsewhere in the world (IFPRI, February 2024).


In the same context, any disturbance to the Black Sea shipping routes, including attacks on infrastructure or vessels, could result in higher insurance premiums. This increase would make the routes commercially unviable and put an upward pressure on both the level and volatility of food prices (FAO, December 2023).


In addition, other supply shocks could put upward pressure on or introduce additional volatility to international food prices in 2024.

 There will likely be production losses from El Niño conditions, resulting in lower global food availability and, in turn, higher prices. During a typical El Niño event, global declines in the production of major staple crops (wheat, rice and maize) and associated increases in their prices are observed (GRFC Mid-Year Update, September 2023).

 As of the first quarter of 2024, higher prices for crude oil could negatively affect production costs by making agricultural inputs more expensive. Brent crude oil prices were forecast to rise to over USD 80 per barrel through

the first half of 2024 due to uncertainty around shipping routes through the Red Sea, and then the price per barrel is expected to decline during the latter half of the year (EIA, February 2024).

 Shipping disruptions driven by insecurity in the Red Sea and reduced water flows in the Panama Canal due to drought could upend supply chains and increase shipping costs, with increased costs passed down to consumers (IFPRI, January 2024).

 Export restrictions imposed on important commodities, such as rice, could create additional upward pressure on food prices (IFPRI, February 2024).



# Latin America and the Caribbean

The share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity declined across countries included in both years – from 27.3 percent in 2022 to 26.5 percent in 2023, but availability of 2023 data for Colombia (residents) and migrant and refugee populations in Peru contributed to a regional increase in numbers since 2022.

.....

Haiti was the most severe food crisis in the region, driven by insecurity, gang violence and sustained economic difficulties.

.....

Weather extremes were a more prominent driver than in 2022 due to El Niño, which resulted in erratic and reduced rainfall across the region.

.....

Compared with 2022, Guatemala Honduras and El Salvador saw a moderate decrease in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity despite localized crop losses.

.....

The region is experiencing a substantial displacement crisis with 12 million people forcibly displaced.



# Latin America and the Caribbean

Weather extremes associated with El Niño and persistent economic shocks, with high though overall declining food inflation rates in 2023, were the main drivers sustaining high levels of acute food insecurity.

The inclusion of two additional food crises – due to the availability of evidence meeting GRFC technical requirements for residents in Colombia for the first time as well as migrants and refugees in Peru – led to an increase in people facing high levels of acute food insecurity regionally.

## 19.7M



people or 17% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in nine countries.

## 12.0M



people forcibly displaced in five countries by 2023 – consisting of 7.3 million IDPs and 4.8 million migrants and refugees.

## 0.3M




children were acutely malnourished in Haiti, 0.1 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Colombia (residents and migrants) | Dominican Republic | Ecuador (migrants and refugees) | El Salvador | Guatemala | Haiti | Honduras | Nicaragua | Peru (migrants and refugees)

MAP 2.13 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in nine countries in 2023



FIG. 2.41 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



In all countries/migrant and refugee populations, the total population was analysed, except for Haiti (91%).

Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 + above or equivalent | Population analysed | Population not analysed

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

<1.0 million | 1-2.99 million | 3-4.99 million | 5-9.99 million | 10-14.99 million | ≥15 million | Not selected for analysis | Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed | Data gap

! Major food crisis | ○ Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Sources: FEWS NET (Nicaragua); IPC TWGs (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras); HRP (El Salvador); WFP CARI (migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and resident populations in Colombia).



## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Overall, the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in food-crisis countries in the region increased from 17.8 million in 2022 to 19.7 million in 2023 due to the inclusion of two additional population groups – residents in Colombia and migrants and refugees in Peru.


Across the countries with comparable data for 2022 and 2023, around 425 000 fewer people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The prevalence declined from 27.3 percent to 26.5 percent. This was attributable to moderate declines in **Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador**, reflecting subdued inflation and near-average crop production, despite localized weather-related crop losses.

Conversely, **Haiti**, the most severe food crisis in the region, experienced an increase of approximately 166 000 people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, underpinned by persisting insecurity and gang violence, coupled with high food prices, poor economic activity and reduced agricultural production due to weather extremes.

For the migrant and refugee populations in Colombia and Ecuador, the same assessment as last year was used, indicating severe acute food insecurity challenges (WFP, 2023). FEWS NET estimates for Nicaragua indicated a stable situation between the two years. Peak estimates for the Dominican Republic occurred during October 2022–February 2023 and therefore a year-on-year comparison cannot be made.

Colombia (residents), Colombia (migrants and refugees), the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras were classified as major food crises, each surpassing 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Haiti is the only country of the region considered a protracted major food crisis.

FIG. 2.42 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Sources: FEWS NET (Nicaragua); IPC TWGs (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras); HNO 2024 and HRP 2024 (Colombia); HRP (El Salvador); WFP CARI (migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).

## Severity of acute food insecurity

**Five of the nine food-crisis countries in the region – the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras – had data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.**

**No populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the peak period of acute food insecurity in 2023**

Prior to the peak period of acute food insecurity in 2023, Haiti had around 19 200 people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the Cité Soleil commune of the capital Port-au-Prince from September 2022 to February 2023. Concerns were mainly focused on vulnerable communities facing acute constraints to access essential services, reduced food and fuel supply in markets, and limited income-generating activities. An improvement in the security situation enabled better food access and availability by March–June 2023 (IPC, March 2023).

**3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the five countries with IPC data**

All five countries with disaggregated data had populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Haiti had the highest numbers with 1.8 million people or 18 percent of the analysed population. Reflecting the severity of its food crisis, 15 out of 32 analysed areas were classified in IPC Phase 4. Guatemala and Honduras had over 600 000 and 350 000 people respectively in this phase, mostly due to the severe impacts of reduced rains in drought-prone areas. Compared with 2022, the number of people in IPC Phase 4 remained virtually unchanged in Haiti and Honduras and increased in Guatemala and El Salvador, reflecting the severe impacts of weather extremes on household livelihoods and food access.


**11 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across the five countries with IPC data**

In 2023, four out of the five countries with disaggregated data had over 1 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Guatemala had the highest number at 3.7 million people followed by Haiti, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. El Salvador was the only country with fewer than 1 million people in this phase.

**15.7 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across four countries with IPC data**

The prevalence of analysed population in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) exceeded 20 percent in four countries, reaching over 30 percent in Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and 27 percent for Haiti. No disaggregated data for this phase were available for El Salvador.

FIG. 2.43 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed    Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse or equivalent    Total population

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

### Levels of acute food insecurity have been overall increasing since 2016.

In the five food-crisis countries consistently included in the GRFC with data between 2017 and 2023 – El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua – the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased steadily between 2020 and 2022, from 11.8 million to 13.1 million, before slightly decreasing to 12.7 million in 2023.

The main increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity during this period occurred in Haiti, passing from 4.1 million in 2020 to 4.9 million in 2023. In terms of prevalence, the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 17 percent in 2018 to 25 percent in 2023 in these five countries. At the same time the analysed population increased from 46 percent in 2018 to 98 percent in 2023. The other four food-crisis countries included in this edition have not qualified as food crises in every edition of the GRFC, depending on the occurrence of shocks

and data availability. The Dominican Republic has been included twice, in the GRFC 2023 and 2024, while migrant and refugee populations in Colombia and Ecuador have been included in four editions (2019, 2020, 2023 and 2024). Migrant and refugee populations in Peru have been included twice, in the GRFC 2019 and 2024.

### Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024

**Weather extremes were the primary driver in five countries, where 12.2 million people faced high acute food insecurity.**

Weather extremes were a more prominent driver in 2023 than 2022 due to the El Niño event which resulted in erratic and reduced rainfall across the region. They were the main driver in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua but also affected food security in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Cereal production in 2023 was expected to be below the five-year average in Haiti, due to constrained access and availability of agricultural

inputs, including shortages of seeds and unfavourable weather conditions, leading to low plantings and yields. Favourable rainfall during the third maize crop was expected to be countered by high production costs and seed shortages from prior low harvests limiting the planted area, resulting in a reduced national cereal output.

In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, average to above-average production of staple crops (maize and beans) is expected at the national level. However, erratic rainfall reduced crop yields, resulted in crop damage in some areas, affecting subsistence farmers.


In El Salvador and Nicaragua's Dry Corridor, insufficient rainfall and higher-than-normal temperatures, a pattern often linked to the El Niño phenomenon, contributed to below-average yields in some areas. Meanwhile, Honduras experienced generally good conditions, except for some northern areas, predominantly cultivating cash crops such as sugar cane and bananas and with less staple cereal production (FAO, December 2023).

**Economic shocks were the primary driver in three food crises where 2.6 million people faced high acute food insecurity**

Resident populations in the Dominican Republic and migrants and refugees in Ecuador and Peru were mainly affected by challenging economic conditions, notably reduced income opportunities and increasing food prices, exacerbated by macroeconomic difficulties and uncertainty in international markets. The combination of these factors eroded households' purchasing power (IPC, December 2023; WFP, April 2023; WFP, 2023).

Migrant and refugee households, typically facing higher integration challenges, relied on daily wages from the informal sector. Even though in Colombia the main driver of acute food insecurity was weather extremes, migrants and refugees in the country were significantly affected by economic shocks (WFP, May 2023). The prevalence of acute food insecurity among migrant populations was

FIG. 2.44 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: WFP, 2024.


generally higher than resident populations across the region and was estimated at between 50 and 60 percent.

For some countries economic shocks were not the primary driver but still significantly affected acute food insecurity. These included El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua (OCHA, January 2023; IPC, June 2023; IPC, September 2023; IPC, May 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023).

A high reliance on imports of food, fertilizers and fuel combined with currency depreciation, mainly in Haiti, have added further upward pressure on food prices. According to the latest data, food inflation rates declined but remained high across the nine countries of the region in 2023 (WB, 2024).

As of December 2023, annual food inflation was particularly high in Haiti at 28 percent, while in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua it ranged between 4 and 9 percent (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).







FIG. 2.45 Food inflation broadly declined across eight countries in 2023



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

TABLE 2.5 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	HDI global ranking (1–192) 	GDP ranking 	INFORM Risk Index (0–10) 	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%) 
COLOMBIA	63.6	15.9	118th	43	5.3	5.9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	65.8	8.3	80th	64	4.1	5.6
ECUADOR	34.7	32.2	95th	62	4.7	16.8
EL SALVADOR	53.5	15.2	125th	101	4	5.3
GUATEMALA	52.9	29.2	135th	69	5.1	2.8
HAITI	82.5	45.6	163rd	119	7.2	11.7
HONDURAS	60.2	24.8	137th	102	4.8	4.3
NICARAGUA	40.6	28.7	126th	132	4.1	6.7
PERU	54.2	27.9	84th	51	4.8	15.5

Sources: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); UNDP (HDI Global Index); World Bank (GDP ranking); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought conditions).



**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in Haiti, where 4.9 million people faced high acute food insecurity.**

Increasing insecurity and political instability as well as economic hardship and reduced agricultural production led to the deterioration of the acute food insecurity situation in Haiti. In 2022 and 2023, gang violence reached extremely high levels especially in urban areas, disrupting markets and the movement of people and goods, severely hindering economic activity and the provision of basic services (IPC, September 2023). This resulted in poor market supplies and shortages of essential commodities, including fuel, which contributed to sharp increases in food prices.

### Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crisis

**Structural factors in Latin America and the Caribbean inhibit the ability to effectively address acute food insecurity and further explain why three countries in the region – Haiti, Guatemala and Honduras – have been considered major food crises in at least five editions of the GRFC.**

Haiti is the only low-income country of the region, while Honduras and Nicaragua are lower-middle income; all the other countries of the region included in this edition of the GRFC are upper-middle income, which allow them to have better capacities to absorb shocks.

The included countries in the region exhibit high cereal import dependency, with 62 percent of cereals imported in Colombia and 60 percent in Haiti, which heightens their susceptibility to food price fluctuations.

Despite a significant reliance on imports for food, a large share of employment in the domestic economy is in the agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors, with the higher rates observed in Haiti at 45 percent, Ecuador at 32 percent and Guatemala at 29 percent. The most recent data used to

calculate the Gini coefficient show that the region has high rates of economic inequality that can limit available resources reaching those with the most needs, including migrants and refugees, with Colombia and Ecuador both among the 25 countries with the highest level of inequality globally.

Poverty levels vary and composite scores measuring disaster and climate resilience suggest that countries in the region are in a precarious position. In Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, over 30 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line, with 3–6.6 percent falling under the international poverty line. Migrants intending to remain face many barriers to economic integration, including low levels of education and lack of legal status to work (WFP, May 2023).

Haiti received Very High INFORM Risk scores, which reflects its highly limited ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Colombia and Guatemala, upper-middle income countries, also received High INFORM Risk scores.

Peru and Ecuador face the highest index risk for crop growing period affected by drought conditions in the region, indicating the high potential of crop and grazing land anomalies inducing food insecurity.



**DISPLACEMENT | Despite efforts to integrate migrants and refugees into host countries across Latin America by granting stay and work permits, millions faced significant difficulties in accessing basic needs such as food, shelter, health care, education and formal employment.**

The challenges faced by migrants and refugees were compounded by the global and regional cost-of-living crisis, which further eroded their purchasing power, and by high levels of vulnerability that place them at increased risk of falling victim to human trafficking, forced recruitment and gender-based violence.

The lack of stable livelihood opportunities hampers the ability of migrants and refugees to integrate effectively and contribute to their host communities. Furthermore, while a significant share of refugees and migrants have documentation, this has not guaranteed them a dignified life or adequate access to basic rights (WFP, May 2023; WFP, April 2023).

Conflict/insecurity was the main driver of internal displacement in Colombia and Haiti. Decades of

conflict and civil insecurity in Colombia led to the internal displacement of about 6.9 million people as of November 2023, of whom 1.1 million were displaced since the 2016 Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Colombia and one of the main insurgent groups. According to official figures, nearly 290 000 people were displaced in 2022 and an additional 163 000 in 2023, reflecting continued conflict and insecurity (UNHCR, 2024).

In Haiti, widespread insecurity and gang violence, predominantly in the Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince (ZMPP) and extending to other departments such as Ouest, resulted in the internal displacement of 314 000 people (IOM, December 2023).

Natural disasters, conflicts, insecurity and challenging economic conditions have driven cross-border displacement from Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). About 4.8 million migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and other people requiring international protection are seeking refuge, across eight countries included in this edition of the GRFC (UNHCR, December 2023).

### Food insecurity among displaced populations

Analyses on the acute food insecurity situation were available for populations on the move in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and for IDPs in Colombia.

In Colombia, home to a high number of migrants and refugees, acute food insecurity among this population was alarmingly high. During the peak of 2022 (June–August), 2.88 million people, or 62 percent of the analysed migrant and refugee population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The situation was particularly dire for pendular and in-transit migrants and refugees, with 73 percent experiencing high acute food insecurity levels, compared with about 52 percent of those intending to settle (WFP, May 2023). This is above the prevalence of 55 percent assessed among these populations during the last analysis in 2019 (GRFC 2020, April 2020).


In Ecuador, during the peak period of July–August 2022, 0.3 million people or 60 percent of the analysed migrant and refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Challenges such as marginalized legal status and complex regularization processes hinder migrants and refugees' ability to obtain formal employment and access basic services, pushing many into the informal sector. Weather extremes, including El Niño-induced heavy rainfall, have compounded these challenges, affecting key paddy-producing areas. These include Guayas and Los Ríos provinces, which host large refugee and migrant populations (ACAPS, September 2023). The impacts on paddy production translated into an upsurge in rice prices in the third quarter of 2023 (FAO, December 2023).

### Acute malnutrition among displaced populations

Acute malnutrition data were only available for migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, notably for children aged under 5 years old and pregnant women. Over 70 percent of children with acute malnutrition live in food-insecure households, underscoring the interrelations with food insecurity and their increased risk of illness because of their precarious situation (WFP, May 2023).

Migrants and refugees face considerable nutritional challenges linked to various forms of malnutrition, including acute malnutrition,

**MAP 2.14 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023**




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

■ IDPs ■ Refugees and asylum-seekers


Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

**FIG. 2.46 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, 2023**



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

**FIG. 2.47 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023**



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

anaemia and stunting, with girls under the age of 5 from in-transit migrant and refugee households being the most vulnerable. As of 2022, 5.2 percent of children under 5 years old in the in-transit migrant and refugee group and 2.8 percent of children under 5 in the migrants and refugees with intention to stay group were estimated to be acutely malnourished. These levels are considered Medium and Low respectively (WFP, May 2023). High levels of anaemia, which limits physical and cognitive development and is caused by poor diet quality, were of particular concern for migrant and refugee children, with between 44 and 55 percent of migrant and refugee children under 5 affected across subgroups, while levels were slightly lower at 37 percent for pregnant women (WFP, May 2023). About 43 percent of children under 6 months were exclusively breastfed and only 24 percent of children aged 6–23 months were estimated to consume a Minimum Acceptable Diet (WFP, May 2023).

**ACUTE MALNUTRITION |** In Latin America and the Caribbean, levels of acute malnutrition are lower compared with other regions analysed in the GRFC, reflecting a lower severity of the food crises and better coping capacities of governments to support the nutritional situation of vulnerable children and women.


**Comprehensive data on acute malnutrition were available for Haiti while data for migrants and refugees were only available in Colombia.**

Historically low levels of acute malnutrition confirmed by screenings and data on admissions elsewhere in the region are the main reason associated with the absence of prevalence and burden data at the national level for resident populations.

Concerns remain regarding the lack of assessments on the nutrition situation for migrant and refugee populations. In Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, more than half of the analysed migrant and refugee populations faced high levels of acute food insecurity, experienced challenges caring for young children and had limited access to health services, which are all contributing factors to child wasting and maternal malnutrition.

In Haiti, the most severe food crisis in the region with nearly half of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, about 260 000 children suffered from acute malnutrition, around 100 000 of them severely so. More than half a million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished (HNO 2023, March 2023). The prevalence of child acute malnutrition was 5.1 percent at the national level. However, in metropolitan areas it reached High and Very High levels, estimated at 19.2 percent in Croix-des-Bouquets and 11.7 percent in Delmas (SMART, 2023).

**FIG. 2.48** Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in Haiti in 2023



No malnutrition data were available for the other countries in the region.

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.



**0.5M** pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in Haiti in 2023

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.

There were increased cases of acutely malnourished children among migrants and refugees in Colombia due to elevated levels of acute food insecurity, challenges in caring for young children, and limited access to health services.



# Middle East and North Africa

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), acute food insecurity reached catastrophic levels in late 2023. The risk of Famine increased each day that the situation of intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted.

Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic, were still the largest food crises in the region in terms of numbers of people facing high acute food insecurity.

Thirteen years since the start of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic acute food insecurity among more than 12 million Syrians displaced internally and across borders is persisting or worsening amid deteriorating economic conditions and humanitarian funding shortfalls.

Conflict and financing shortfalls are undermining the delivery of WASH and health services, exacerbating diseases and contributing to high levels of acute malnutrition.

The outlook for 2024 is extremely concerning because of the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access in the Gaza Strip, and risk of intensifying macroeconomic crises in the region, especially in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

# Middle East and North Africa

More than half of the total analysed population across nine countries/territories in the MENA region faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 as the region grappled with increasing insecurity and instability, growing poverty, high unemployment, soaring food prices, widespread forced displacement and emerging crises – notably the devastating escalation of hostilities in Palestine (Gaza Strip) from early October 2023.

## 36.7M



people or 54% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in nine countries/territories.

## 22.2M



people forcibly displaced in nine countries/territories by 2023 – consisting of 12.3 million IDPs and 9.9 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

## 0.8M



acutely malnourished children under 5 years old in two countries, with 0.2 million of them suffering the most severe form of acute malnutrition.

Algeria (refugees) | Egypt (refugees) | Iraq (refugees) | Jordan (refugees) | Lebanon | Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) | Syrian Arab Republic | Türkiye (refugees) | Yemen

MAP 2.15 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in nine countries/territories, 2023





FIG. 2.49 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



In all countries/migrant and refugee populations, the total population was analysed, except Algeria's Sahrawi refugee population (67%), Lebanon's resident and refugee population (92%) and Iraq's refugee population (97%).

■ Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 + above or equivalent ■ Population analysed ■ Population not analysed

■ <1.0 million ■ 1–2.99 million ■ 3–4.99 million ■ 5–9.99 million ■ 10–14.99 million ■ ≥15 million ■ Not selected for analysis

■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed ■ Data gap ■ Major food crisis ○ Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: IPC TWGs; IPC Global Initiative; WFP CARL.



## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Between 8 December 2023 and 7 February 2024, the entire population of Palestine (Gaza Strip) (about 2.2 million people) faced high levels of acute food insecurity – the highest share in IPC history (IPC, December 2023). The situation is projected to continue through July 2024. Palestine (West Bank) experienced a dramatic deterioration in acute food insecurity since 2022 linked to heightened violence, economic shocks and rising unemployment (HNO 2024, December 2023).


Yemen remained the largest food crisis in the region with 18 million people or 56 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (FEWS NET, June 2023).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, the food crisis remained as critical as 2022, particularly for the country's 6.6 million IDPs as the economic situation continued to deteriorate amid a surge in conflict that led to more displacement (HNO 2024, December 2023).

In early 2023, Lebanon faced a worsening food crisis compared with 2022, with 42 percent of its analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in January–April, up from 37 percent in September–December 2022 due to the worsening financial crisis and food inflation (IPC, December 2023).

Funding shortfalls for aid organizations limited the aid available for refugee populations. According to analyses of Syrian refugee populations, 69 percent in Egypt, 62 percent in Jordan and 53 percent in Lebanon faced high levels of acute food insecurity amid worsening socioeconomic crises in these host countries (WFP, 2023; IPC, December 2022). Around 28 percent of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The acute food insecurity situation was less severe for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and Iraq.

FIG. 2.50 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: IPC Global Initiative (Palestine Gaza Strip); IPC TWG (Lebanon); FEWS NET (Yemen); HNO (Syrian Arab Republic and Palestine West Bank); WFP CARI (refugees).

## Severity of acute food insecurity

**Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Lebanon were the only territories/countries in the region that had countrywide IPC analyses with data disaggregated by phase. Around 4.5 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in these two territories/countries with 2.2 million in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and 2.3 million in Lebanon.**

**Palestine (Gaza Strip) faced a risk of Famine with 0.6 million people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), representing 26 percent of its population, the highest number and share recorded in this phase for any country in IPC history**

These people were experiencing an extreme lack of food, starvation and exhaustion of coping capacities from December 2023–February 2024. The Famine Review Committee concluded that the actual numbers were likely to be even higher than these estimates. The risk of Famine was expected

to increase each day that the situation of intense hostilities and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened.

**1.5 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across two countries/territories**

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), around half the population or 1.2 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from December 2023 to February 2024, the highest share ever recorded for any country in IPC history. In Lebanon, 0.4 million people (7 percent) were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Of them 0.1 million were Syrian refugees. In Akkar and Marjaayoun, around 20 percent and 15 percent of the Syrian refugee population respectively were in Emergency.

**2.4 million people were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across two countries/territories**

This consisted of 0.5 million people in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and 1.9 million in Lebanon. These populations are either facing large food consumption gaps and rising acute malnutrition levels or depleting essential livelihood assets and resorting to crisis-coping strategies to continue accessing food.

**2.1 million people were in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in one country**

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), only 2 500 people were in this phase in December 2023–February 2024, representing less than 1 percent of the population. In Lebanon, 2.1 million people were in this phase, requiring support to reduce risks related to shocks and to protect their livelihoods.

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

**The Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen have been among the world's worst food crises each year since the inception of the GRFC, while Palestine has been a major food crisis in seven out of eight editions. In 2023, Palestine (Gaza Strip) became the world's most severe food crisis.**

For eight consecutive years, Yemen has been one of the ten countries with the largest populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, and from 2016 to 2019, it had the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the report. For nearly a decade, more than half of the population has consistently been in IPC Phase 3 or above, driven by structural instability aggravated by the protracted conflict and other human-induced factors, and weather extremes (IPC, November 2022). It had populations in, or projected to be in, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) each year from 2018 to 2022.

The Syrian Arab Republic has also been a major food crisis in all eight editions and has always been among the ten countries with the highest number of people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. Since 2020, more than half of the population has been highly acutely food insecure due to the continuation of hostilities and compounding effects of the pandemic, adverse weather events, regional fragility and macroeconomic instability.

This is only the second year that Lebanon is included following the first IPC analysis carried out in September 2022. Before that food security analyses had focused on the country's Syrian refugee population. The country's financial crisis since 2019 has had grave consequences for the food security of resident and refugee populations.

Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) has been included as a major crisis in seven out of eight editions of the report but changes in data sources limit comparability. Across the region, a lack of systematic and consistent data limits a more thorough analysis over time.

## Outlook for 2024

**The 2024 outlook depends on whether geopolitical tensions in the region escalate and on the dynamic of hostilities in Palestine. At the time of publication, the humanitarian space to deliver multisectoral assistance and services had not been restored and hostilities were ongoing.**

Only three countries/territories in the region had projections for 2024 – Palestine (Gaza Strip), Lebanon and Yemen – with up to 22.37 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

An IPC analysis for Palestine (Gaza Strip) published on 18 March 2024, showed that the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – had not been met. Famine was projected to occur any time between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza, with a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024.

The devastation brought by relentless hostilities, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access drove half of the population (over 1.1 million people) into catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in March–July 2024, reaching 70 percent of the population in the northern governorates (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

The IPC projection for April–September 2024 in Lebanon indicated an improvement compared with the 2023 peak in January–April for the country's Lebanese residents, and Syrian and Palestine refugees, despite the persisting economic and financial crisis characterized by soaring inflation, currency depreciation and income losses. When the IPC analysis was carried out in early October 2023, it was assumed that tensions at the southern border would not escalate into a wider conflict.

Given Lebanon's heavy dependence on imports and tourism, its already-failing infrastructures and fragile value chains, and its dependence on

remittances, any further escalation of the conflict would have harsh consequences (IPC, December 2023).

In Yemen, up to 19 million people or 60 percent of the population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity through June 2024. WFP's pause in General Food Assistance (GFA) from December 2023 in areas under Sana'a-based Authorities (SBA) was likely to increase severe deprivation among nearly 9.5 million beneficiaries in the north.

If geopolitical tensions continue to escalate in the region, shipping and insurance rates along the Red Sea route could continue to rise and fuel and food imports via Red Sea ports could continue falling. These developments could manifest in increasing prices of basic goods, including food and medicines, for consumers already facing high poverty levels and depleted capacities to cope. Some key traders anticipated shortages in food supply if tensions escalate further in the region.

Although no projection data were available, the alarming food crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and among so many of its 6.7 million refugees dispersed in five neighbouring countries shows no sign of abating. The HNO 2024 for the Syrian Arab Republic reported that erosion of basic service capacity was set to continue, with water and sanitation systems and public health services under immense strain, in a context of barely any development investment.

High inflation, the February 2023 earthquake, climate shocks and regional conflicts are increasing poverty and reliance on humanitarian assistance. Active conflict and military operations still impede humanitarian partners' ability to reach those in need and affected populations' ability to reach basic services and humanitarian assistance (HNO 2024). Reductions in assistance levels to populations that are dependent on it are likely to lead to negative coping strategies and could have implications for food security.

## Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024




**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in seven countries/territories where 21.5 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Rising geopolitical tensions in the region fuelled conflicts, leading to mass displacements, strained resources and widespread acute food insecurity. Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in Palestine and Yemen, as well as four countries hosting Syrian refugees (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Türkiye) as a result of the 12-year conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and Algeria, which has hosted Sahrawi refugees for over 45 years since the Western Sahara conflict. Although conflict was still a significant driver of acute food insecurity in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon hosts the highest per capita share of Syrian refugees in the world, economic shocks were considered the primary driver in both countries.

The continued hostilities in the Gaza Strip and the escalating situation in the West Bank have posed immense difficulties for humanitarian responses (GHO 2024, December 2023), and threaten regional security and economic conditions (3RP, March 2024). The loss of agricultural, livestock and fishing production, widespread damage to farmland, greenhouses, bakeries and warehouses, as well as restrictions on commercial traffic have created catastrophic food shortages in the Gaza Strip (OCHA, January 2024) (*see Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip), page 133*).

Relative stability between the internationally recognized government (IRG) and Sana'a-based authorities (SBA) in Yemen continued throughout 2023 after a truce formally ended in October 2022, but active fighting continued in the frontline districts, leading to displacement and disruption to provision and access to basic services. In November and December 2023, SBA forces' activities in the Red Sea threatened to destabilize the uncertain truce and induce reprisal attacks on Yemen by international coalition forces (FEWS NET, December 2023).


FIG. 2.51 Annual food inflation exceeded 50 percent each month in Lebanon, Türkiye and Egypt throughout 2023



This graph only includes countries/territories where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.52 Highest annual food inflation rate by country/territory, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, following the non-renewal of UN Security Council Resolution 2672 (2023), humanitarian access to northwestern areas remained highly constrained. The March 2020 ceasefire continued to be violated on an almost daily basis (ECHO, January 2024). In October 2023, northern Syria and Deir-ez-Zor Governorate witnessed the most significant escalation of hostilities since 2019, resulting in the displacement of over 120 000 people (OCHA, December 2023).

As hostilities escalated from early October in Palestine (Gaza Strip), violent cross-border incidents along Lebanon's southern border increased in number and intensity, causing displacement and shutting down economic activity. This was expected to have a significant impact on key economic sectors in Lebanon, particularly tourism and services (UNDP, December 2023).



**Economic shocks were the primary driver in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic where 15.1 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Widespread unemployment, high inflation and economic instability have left vulnerable

populations across all countries in the region struggling to meet basic needs, including food.

Lebanon remained mired in a deep financial crisis, mitigated to a small extent by increased tourism and remittances. Record high depreciation of the local currency in early 2023 continued to lead to soaring inflation – due to Lebanon's high import dependency – and especially impacted households with limited access to US dollars.

Food inflation reached 352 percent in March 2023 with the greatest impact on vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugee households dependent on local currency incomes (IPC, December 2023).

Battered by years of conflict and the spillover effects from the financial crisis in Lebanon that, until 2019, used to act as a financial intermediary, the national economy in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to weaken. Accelerating currency depreciation throughout 2023, coupled with fuel scarcity, fuel price increases and rising transportation and freight charges, contributed to rising prices of both imported and domestically produced food (FAO-GIEWS, January 2023; WB, Summer 2023).

By October 2023, the cost of the food basket in the Syrian Arab Republic had doubled compared with January and had quadrupled in two years (HNO 2024, December 2023). The government's almost complete removal of fuel and agricultural production input subsidies, especially for fertilizers, was expected to add to the cost-of-living crisis, especially during the winter (FAO & WFP, October 2023). The rising costs of agricultural inputs have significantly reduced their use and the yield of the area planted (FAO, 2023).

In southern IRG-controlled areas of Yemen, the SBA's ongoing blockade of oil exports significantly exacerbated pre-existing shortages of government revenue and foreign exchange. By December, fuel and food prices in these areas remained high, primarily due to continuous currency depreciation. But in northern areas under the SBA, fuel and food prices were more stable mainly due to currency appreciation (WFP, January 2024). Several rounds of reductions to humanitarian food assistance since 2022 have stretched households' resources (FEWS NET, January 2024; WFP, January 2024).



**Natural disaster was not a primary driver but a significant one in Northwest Syrian Arab Republic and for Syrian refugees in Türkiye.**

In February 2023, the earthquakes in southeastern Türkiye and Northwest Syrian Arab Republic uprooted hundreds of thousands of families, and severely damaged infrastructure. Many families lost their main breadwinner due to death or injury, at a time when the economic situation was already dire, increasing the vulnerability of millions of people previously unable to meet their basic needs. The five most severely affected governorates – Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, Latakia and Tartous – account for roughly 42 percent of the country's total population (HNO 2024, December 2023).

The earthquake displaced an estimated 0.7 million people, more than 98 percent of them in Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia governorates, the same area where more than half of all IDPs in the country are living (IDMC, August 2023). It caused temporary but widespread economic and trade disruptions, and delays in delivering humanitarian assistance. The pre-existing vulnerability of Syrian households has left many ill-equipped to cope with its lingering economic impact (WB, Summer 2023).

## Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

**Poverty and inequality, including gender and power dynamics, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, and low levels of education magnify the negative effects of conflict, weather extremes and economic shocks on food security.**

Several countries of the region are also dealing with crippling budget deficits and high levels of public debt, meaning that governments are unable to provide the much-needed development investments or social safety nets (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 2023). Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen received Very High or High INFORM risk scores, which is a



TABLE 2.6 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%)	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	HDI global ranking (1–192)
ALGERIA	2.8	70.8	10.3	25.06	3.6	91th
EGYPT	2.1	47.4	19.8	7.1	4.9	97th
IRAQ	2.1	50.0	19.8	14.87	6.7	121st
JORDAN	6.8	100.0	3.2	15.62	3.8	102nd
LEBANON	2.8	97	3.8	23.15	4.1	112th
PALESTINE	0.9	N/A	N/A	14.51*	3.7	106th
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	2.1	29.2	12.5	13.52	7.2	150th
TÜRKIYE	2.5	11.3	17.1	N/A	4.8	48th
YEMEN	1.4	9.8	28.1	14.75	7.5	183rd

\* West Bank

Source: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

composite indicator of a country's ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Yemen and Syrian Arab Republic are in the lowest 40 of the 191 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), a reflection of their poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes.

The region is characterized by arid climates and limited freshwater resources, making agriculture heavily reliant on irrigation. Poor water management practices, coupled with the impacts of climate change, lead to dwindling water supplies for agriculture, reducing crop yields and jeopardizing food production. Eleven MENA countries are among the 17 most water-stressed countries in the world. The ASAP index shows that for all countries in the region, both crop and rangelands growing seasons are significantly affected by drought conditions affecting more than 25 percent of their total area. For Egypt, this is less problematic than for the other countries in the region due to its high share of irrigated crop land.

Despite the difficulties of producing food in the region, 20 percent of total employment in Egypt and Iraq, and 28 percent in Yemen, is in agriculture (FAO 2023).

The region also has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, meaning demand for food will keep growing while resources are being depleted. The rates are highest in Jordan at 6.8 percent (UNDESA).

With modest local food production and high population growth, the region heavily relies on other parts of the world to meet its food needs. An overreliance on food imports rather than domestic production, combined with weak, distorted and non-resilient supply chains, make the region more vulnerable to rising global prices and external shocks (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 2023).


**DISPLACEMENT | Across the ten food crises, 22.2 million people were displaced within their own countries/territories or as refugees across borders, many of them for years and/or repeated times, leading to overcrowded camps and strained host communities.**

For IDPs and refugees, the consequences of protracted displacement were aggravated by worsening socioeconomic conditions in host countries, pushing these already-vulnerable populations further into poverty. In the past year, new conflicts as well as natural disasters have shaken the region, generating yet more challenges.

### Alarming levels of acute food insecurity among IDPs in Palestine (Gaza Strip), the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen

By the end of 2023, most of the Gaza Strip's population were internally displaced. In the southern governorates, almost all IDPs (91 percent) reported having no food to eat because of lack of resources to get food in the four weeks before the assessment and a similar proportion reported going to sleep at night hungry for lack of food. Half were going entire days and nights without

FIG. 2.54 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region, 2013–2023



The decrease between 2022 and 2023 could be explained by a change in methodology.


Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates, December 2023, IOM, UNRWA.

eating. With limited access to safe water, health, sanitation and other basic services, the risk of a large infectious disease outbreak was growing (IPC, December 2023) (see *Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip)*, page 133).

The Syrian Arab Republic has one of the largest populations of IDPs globally, with around 6.6 million mainly displaced by conflict and violence. Around two-thirds of them are in the Northwest, most since the intensifying violence of 2013 and 2014 (IDMC, 2024). Some 2.1 million live in 1 500 often-overcrowded IDP sites with insufficient shelter, infrastructure and basic services. All IDPs living in camps and half of those living out of camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 (HNO 2024, December 2023).


In February 2023, the earthquakes that struck the region severely compounded their hardship. Of the reported 0.7 million people displaced by the earthquakes in Northwest Syrian Arab Republic – mainly in Aleppo, Idleb and Latakia governorates – 90 percent had already been forced to flee their homes due to conflict in previous years. Many could not access emergency/humanitarian aid, and even after six months, this remained a challenge with more than 114 000 people still displaced, most in camps. Limited data collection hampered comprehensive situation assessments, which also hindered response efforts (IDMC, August 2023).

FIG. 2.53 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region (in millions), 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

MAP 2.16 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country/territory, 2023



Source: IOM, UNHCR and UNRWA, 2023.

Yemen remained among the ten countries with the highest number of IDPs in the world. Following nine years of conflict, sustained economic deterioration and diminished public services, IDPs face high levels of vulnerability. Most have been displaced for years, many more than once. About 1.6 million live in 2 400 camp-like hosting sites where competition over access to and use of land and water resources results in disputes with host communities, hampering the provision of shelter, health and WASH services, as well as humanitarian assistance. The remaining 2.9 million live in rental accommodation or hosting arrangements, most without rental agreements, exposing them to arbitrary price increases (HNO 2023, December 2022). Levels of wasting are higher among IDP children (12.3 percent) than among host community children (9.8 percent) (SMART 2022).

### Acute food insecurity among refugee populations

The lives of refugees and those in host communities have become more challenging, exacerbated by high inflation rates and limited access to social services and economic opportunities.

Thirteen years since the start of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, 6.7 million Syrian refugees are still hosted by neighbouring countries – in Egypt, which has also received an influx of refugees from the Sudan since April 2023, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye.

The socioeconomic crises in host countries and rising poverty among host communities, coupled with declines in funding for the Syrian crisis, pose a significant risk of exacerbating tensions in several

countries, potentially undermining socioeconomic stability. The February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and the Syrian Arab Republic exacerbated this already-dire situation (3RP, January 2024). The prevalence of high acute food insecurity reached particularly high levels among Syrian refugee populations in Jordan at 62 percent (WFP, July 2023) and Lebanon (53 percent) (IPC, September 2022), and among all refugees in Egypt (69 percent) (see pages 136–141 for country-level overviews).

Lebanon hosts 1.3 million registered refugees and asylum-seekers, consisting of 0.8 million (mainly from Syrian Arab Republic), as nowcasted by UNHCR in December 2023, and 0.5 million Palestine refugees (UNRWA, September 2023). The number of Syrian refugees is as high as 1.5 million when including unregistered refugees (IPC, December 2023). Structural marginalization

(including employment and property ownership restrictions) compounded by 74 years of forced displacement, coupled with the deepening socioeconomic crisis in Lebanon, have pushed many Palestine refugees deeper into poverty (3RP, January 2024).

From October 2023 to March 2024, 26 percent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon and 35 percent of the Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic living in Lebanon were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, December 2023).

The majority of the population of the Gaza Strip have been refugees since the 1967 war. Even before the escalation of conflict in October 2023, poverty rates among refugees residing inside and outside the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip had reached 82 percent (UNRWA & PCBS, November 2021). As of the second quarter of 2022, 47 percent of Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip were unemployed (HNO 2023, January 2023).

Algeria has hosted Sahrawi refugees for over 45 years. In 2023, 173 600 lived in isolated camps near Tindouf in the Sahara Desert where they face limited livelihood opportunities and harsh environmental conditions. Due to the critical shortage of funding, minimum humanitarian standards cannot be met in most sectors, and most refugees are believed to live below the poverty line (UNHCR, 2023). Around 28 percent of the analysed population of 133 700 people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in June 2023, according to CARI methodology (WFP, June 2023).

Nearly 100 000 refugees in Yemen, mainly from Somalia, endure overcrowded spaces without access to water or sanitation, particularly in urban areas. The collapse of the economy and public services, and legal barriers to formal employment, have severely affected their capacity to be self-reliant. They often suffer high levels of stigma, discrimination and exclusion from local systems of support and community-based protection mechanisms and frequently lack access to health care, shelter or cash (HNO 2023, December 2022).

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Only two of the nine food-crisis countries/territories had data on the burden of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years old in 2023 – the Syrian Arab Republic and a partial analysis for Yemen.


### Reports from Palestine (Gaza Strip) confirm an escalating acute malnutrition crisis (see *Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip)*, page 133).

In Yemen, in June–September 2023, all 16 analysed zones in IRG-controlled areas were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Of them, seven were in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in the lowlands of Abyan, Shabwah, Hodeidah Southern Lowlands, Ta'iz Lowland, Ta'iz City, Ad Dhalī' and Lahj Lowland (IPC AMN, June 2023). Around 14 percent of women of reproductive age (15–49 years) were acutely malnourished. Prevalence was even higher among PWB (25 percent) and among IDP women (16 percent) (SMART 2021–2022).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, according to a 2022 SMART survey conducted in nine northwestern districts in Aleppo and Idleb governorates near the Turkish border, the prevalence of GAM increased from 2.5 percent in 2021 to 3.3 percent in 2022, and the prevalence of SAM from 0.4 percent to 0.9 percent. This GAM prevalence is considered Low by WHO thresholds in spite of very high levels of acute food insecurity. Acute malnutrition appears to be far more concerning among pregnant and breastfeeding women than children. Nationally around 13 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished due to poor diets and suboptimal treatment programmes (SMART 2022).

Among Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf camp in Algeria, 11 percent of children under 5 years old were acutely malnourished, which is considered a high prevalence (UNHCR, September 2022).

FIG. 2.55 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in two food crises, 2023



Source: Syrian Arab Republic HNO/HRP 2023; Yemen IPC TWG, June 2023.


### Drivers of acute malnutrition

**Lack of food** In Palestine (Gaza Strip), the latest data show that virtually all households are skipping meals every day. In four out of five households in the northern governorates and half the displaced households in the southern governorates, people go entire days and nights without eating. Many adults go hungry so children can eat (IPC, December 2023). Women and girls are expected to be hit the hardest by the unprecedented levels of acute food insecurity levels as women tend to vastly deprioritize their food intake when access to food is restricted. This puts pregnant and breastfeeding women at even higher health and malnutrition risks, not only to themselves but to their babies (UN Women, January 2024).

In Lebanon, more than one in every four children under the age of 5 (among Lebanese and refugee population) – or 85 000 children – live in and suffer from extreme food poverty, being fed extremely poor diets consisting of at most two food groups, often cereal and possibly some milk (UNICEF, 2023).

**Inadequate practices** Across the conflict-affected countries in the region, high levels of displacement diminish the capacity of mothers to care for their children. In Yemen, around 20 percent of children under 6 months old are exclusively breastfed in the first six months of life

FIG. 2.56 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023 (millions)



Source: Syrian Arab Republic HNO/HRP 2023; Yemen IPC TWG, June 2023.

in two-thirds of analysed areas, which is classified as Critical by UNICEF. About 11.5 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet with prevalence below 6 percent in Shabwa, Al-Jawf and Al-Baidha (IPC, June 2023). In Syrian Arab Republic, only 4.6 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive an MAD, down from 11 percent in 2021 (SMART 2022). Child-feeding practices are extremely concerning in Lebanon with an Extremely Critical 6 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving an MAD (SMART 2022).

**Inadequate services** Conflict and severe government and humanitarian financing shortfalls are devastating the provision of WASH and health services, exacerbating communicable diseases.

The availability of water in the Gaza Strip stands at a fraction of pre-crisis levels. Lack of hygiene is leading to escalating numbers of communicable diseases – acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea and hepatitis A – while the conflict's devastating impact on health care is severely limiting the capacity to respond (OCHA, January 2024).

In Yemen, eight years of conflict and economic collapse have devastated health, nutrition, WASH and other child and maternal health support services. These factors, coupled with low immunization coverage, have led to the high prevalence of diseases and elevated acute

malnutrition levels (IPC, June 2023). Between July and December 2023, Yemen had the highest number of reported measles cases in the world (18 500) (CDC, February 2024).

Water shortages in many regions of the Syrian Arab Republic due to reduced flow of the Euphrates River and lower rainfall have led to dangerously low water levels in dams, forcing people to rely more on well water, which is also in short supply and becoming more saline and polluted, posing a health risk. In the northeast, where small communities and informal sites are cut off from water networks, populations often rely on untreated water sources and inadequate sewage systems, increasing the risk of waterborne disease, especially cholera (REACH, November 2023).

When the earthquakes hit Northwest Syrian Arab Republic in February 2023, communities were already experiencing a cholera outbreak, overwhelmed health facilities and harsh winter weather (Nutrition Cluster, Save the Children, UNICEF, February 2023).

In Lebanon, the exodus of doctors and nurses is severely undermining service delivery. The increasing cost of medicines following the removal of subsidies has pushed them out of the reach of vulnerable families. Many wastewater treatment facilities are not functional or ceased operations due to electricity cuts and budget shortages, leading to increasingly severe sanitation issues (OCHA, 2023).




# Focus | Palestine (Gaza Strip)

**By late 2023, the Gaza Strip had become the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history, with 100 percent of its population (about 2.2 million people) facing high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Between early December and early February, 0.6 million or 26 percent of the population were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and 1.2 million, or 50 percent of the population, in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, the people of the Gaza Strip faced a risk of Famine through May 2024 with the risk increasing each day that hostilities continued or intensified, and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened (IPC Global Initiative, December 2023).

FIG. 2.57 Impacts of the conflict since October 2023



Source: WB, February 2024; UNRWA, February 2024.

An IPC analysis published on 18 March 2024, showed that the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – had not been met.

Famine was projected to occur any time between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza, with a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024 (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).


The devastation brought by relentless hostilities, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access drove half of the population (over 1.1 million people) into catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in March–July 2024, reaching 70 percent of the population in northern governorates (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

As of 20 January 2024, an estimated 1.7 million people or over 80 percent of the population were internally displaced (UNRWA, February 2024) due to continued air, land and sea operations, destruction of shelter, military evacuation orders, and lack of access to food, basic services and humanitarian assistance. Many were displaced multiple times in search of safety. More than half the population of the Gaza Strip was living in displacement in Rafah governorate, raising the already extremely high population density to four times pre-conflict levels (OCHA, January 2024). The high population concentration, inadequate shelter and lack of access to basic services were major factors increasing the risk of Famine (IPC Global Initiative, December 2023).

## A devastating escalation of an anthropogenic, protracted food crisis

Palestine – consisting of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – has been identified as a major food

MAP 2.17 IPC acute food insecurity situation, December 2023–February 2024 and March–July 2024




crisis in the last seven editions of the GRFC. The escalation of violence since 7 October 2023 drastically worsened the pre-existing and protracted crisis. Although the source of analysis changed, limiting data comparability, in 2022, 53 percent of the Gaza Strip's population, totalling 1.2 million people, faced high levels of acute food insecurity and required assistance (HNO 2023, January 2023).

Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the ensuing economic blockade and restrictions imposed by Israel profoundly impacted daily living conditions, livelihoods and the local economy, resulting in high unemployment, food insecurity and dependency on aid (UNRWA, August 2023). During this 17-year-long economic blockade, Israel has also designated Access Restricted

Areas (ARAs) on both land and at sea, with up to 35 percent of the Gaza Strip's agricultural land and as much as 85 percent of its fishing waters affected at various points between 2007 and 2017 (UNSCO, July 2017). Between 2006 and 2022, real GDP per capita shrank by 37 percent, while the Gaza Strip's share in the Palestinian economy contracted from 31 percent to 17.4 percent (UNCTAD, October 2023).

High levels of debt, incurred primarily to meet basic needs, exacerbated households' financial precariousness: 79 percent of households had taken on debt in 2022 (MSNA, July 2022). During the second quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip exceeded 45 percent, soaring to over 73 percent for 19–29 year-old graduates with a diploma certificate or higher (PCBS, February 2023). In the same year, the percentage of the

FIG. 2.58 Daily truckloads of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, October 2023–March 2024



Source: UNRWA.

population living below the national poverty line stood at 53 percent (IMF, September 2023).

Even before early October 2023's rapidly escalating hostilities, the Gaza Strip had been among the world's top recipients of aid per capita with around 80 percent of Gazans dependent on international aid (UNCTAD, October 2023).

### A multifaceted food crisis affecting all pillars of food security since October 2023

**Food availability:** Availability of food decreased due to the complete disruption of markets and commercial activities, extremely limited flows of humanitarian aid, and severe damage to agriculture and livestock production resulting from conflict and displacement. Between the beginning of the conflict in October 2023 and February 2024,

about 42.6 percent (6 700 hectares) of cropland in the Gaza Strip was damaged, with the Gaza governorate accounting for the most damage (1 900 hectares) (FAO, 2024). The port of Gaza City was damaged to the point of being non-operational (FAO, December 2023).

Considering the restrictions and the impossibility for the private sector to restart commercial activities, only minimal quantities of food items, primarily rice and vegetable oil, were available and household food stocks were limited/non-existent, particularly in central and northern governorates. In November 2023, no bakeries were operational in the northern governorates, and the supply of wheat flour had stopped (WFP Gaza Food Security Assessment, December 2023). Before the escalation, an average of 150–180 food trucks

entered the Gaza Strip daily. After the end of the humanitarian pause on 30 November 2023, an average of 30 food trucks entered daily with almost none reaching the northern governorates (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023) (see figure 2.58). Between 1 and 25 January 2024, eight of the 51 planned deliveries of food, medicines, water and other life-saving items reached northern governorates and 25 percent of humanitarian missions to Deir al-Balah governorate were denied access (OCHA, January 2024).

Agriculture was an important contributor to food availability before the conflict and the Gaza Strip's food production allowed self-sufficiency in most fruits and vegetables (FAO-CIRAD-EU, 2023). Agricultural production will likely collapse in the northern governorates by May 2024, due to the displacement of farmers and breeders and the destruction of fields and other assets (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023).

**Access to food:** The few supplies of food that do exist are largely inaccessible. Prevailing insecurity and unclear safe zones (MSF, December 2023) limit physical access to food, whether from markets, solidarity networks or food distribution points. The economic repercussions of the conflict have left most residents without income, with the unemployment rate reaching 79 percent in December 2023 (UNCTAD, January 2023).


Finally, the scarcity of food commodities in markets led to soaring prices, with wheat flour prices increasing by approximately 50 percent between September and December 2023, vegetables by 200 percent, rice by 45 percent, and fuel by over 500 percent (WFP, December 2023).

**Food utilization:** Household capacity to prepare food that is available or accessible and individual capacity to absorb its nutrients are severely limited. Shortages of water and gas for cooking, as well as safety concerns, impair household ability to prepare meals, and poor quality of food, illness and disease limit individual capacity to derive nutrients. IDPs in the southern governorates reported an average access of less than 2 litres of

water per person per day, well below the 15 litres recommended minimum amount of water needed in an emergency (WFP, December 2023). The absence of cooking gas has resulted in a reliance on firewood, wood residues and waste burning as a primary source of cooking fuel for three out of four households, although few can access it (WHO, December 2023).

**Stability:** The situation at the end of 2023 and through early 2024 was extremely volatile, with active conflict and a lack of humanitarian assistance, particularly in the northern governorates. Households are unlikely to achieve stability in their access to food and basic services in the near future, with war remnants likely to have long-term impacts on livelihoods, basic services and shelter.

MAP 2.18 Conflict-related damage to agricultural land and infrastructure as of 15 February 2024



Source: FAO, 2024.

### Fast-growing nutrition crisis threatening the lives of children and women in the Gaza Strip

Prior to the conflict, wasting levels among children under 5 years old were considered Very Low by WHO thresholds at 1 percent (Global Nutrition Cluster, February 2024). However, since October 2023, the intensifying and rapidly changing conflict dynamics placed all children aged under 5 years in the Gaza Strip at elevated risk of acute malnutrition and death. Areas with limited humanitarian aid are expected to see a more rapid malnutrition deterioration, while areas with better aid access may experience a slower yet ongoing decline, resulting in continued child wasting, maternal undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies.

Between January and March 2024, acute malnutrition deteriorated among children aged 6–23 months, particularly in North Gaza and Gaza governorates where limited aid access led to acute malnutrition rates doubling to 31 percent. Although aid mitigated acute malnutrition in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah governorates, the overall prevalence increased from 1 percent pre-conflict to 6 percent (Global Nutrition Cluster, March 2024).

Some 90 percent of children under 2 years old and 95 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women face severe food poverty, consuming only two or fewer food groups per day. Around 64 percent of households only have one meal daily. More than 80 percent of households lack safe water and at least 90 percent of children aged under 5 years are affected by infectious diseases, with 70 percent experiencing diarrhoea (Global Nutrition Cluster, February 2024).

### Regional repercussions of the conflict

The spillover effects of the conflict on immediately neighbouring countries – already experiencing domestic socioeconomic crises – could be significant. Potential impacts include higher and more volatile oil and gas prices and energy supply disruptions; public debt and fiscal pressures; inflationary pressures and protracted monetary



People, including children, wait in a long line to receive a small amount of food in the city of Rafah. Half of households are facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity in the Gaza Strip in March–July 2024.

tightening; currency depreciation/devaluation; trade diversion; increased transport/logistics costs; sectoral effects, including on tourism and agriculture; higher numbers of displacement; labour market disruptions; higher security provisions; and an overall decline in GDP, lower aggregate demand (including investment and consumer spending) and increases in poverty (UNDP, December 2023).

The impact of the conflict could also have longer-term implications stemming from the higher-risk environment it creates, affecting domestic and foreign direct investment, as well as political and social stability (UNDP, December 2023). The targeting of commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is disrupting critical global trade routes, increasing shipping costs and transit times, creating uncertainty about the availability of commodities such as oil and grain, and applying upward pressure on global prices. This will

have a serious impact on food prices in a region where countries depend on imports (FEWS NET, December 2023).

In the **West Bank**, the conflict is having a grave impact on the economy due to the increased Israeli military presence, violence, road closures and restricted movement. An estimated 86.5 percent of industries indicate a decline in production capacity (WB, February 2024). Trade relationships with Israel, constituting one-third of the West Bank's GDP, have been severed (OCHA, November 2023). The Israeli government's suspension of work permits for West Bank Palestinians led to an estimated 208 000 job losses, approximately 24 percent of total employment in the West Bank (ILO, November 2023). Palestinian farmers in the West Bank had their land access permits revoked by the Israeli authorities after 7 October. Settler violence worsened the situation, leading to significant losses, including over 1 200 tonnes of

olive oil in 2023, amounting to a direct monetary loss of USD 10 million (OCHA, February 2024).

In **Egypt**, tourism has declined, persistently high inflation has eroded household purchasing power, the currency is depreciating, and investor confidence has significantly declined. Egypt is already facing an influx of refugees from the conflict in the Sudan (UNDP, December 2023).

**Jordan**, due to its geographical proximity to the conflict and economic ties with Israel, is facing socioeconomic, diplomatic and security challenges. Tourism, a major component of GDP, has already been affected, with uncertain prospects for revival. Unemployment remains high, and although energy and food price increases have been contained, vulnerable households are seeing their purchasing power eroded (UNDP, December 2023).

In **Lebanon**, the conflict in the Gaza Strip has resulted in more than 89 000 people displaced due to increased tensions on its southern border, with Israeli airstrikes and rockets towards Israel fired from southern Lebanon (OCHA, February 2024). Damaged public infrastructure and reduced tourism are exacerbating the already dire socioeconomic conditions characterized by soaring inflation and high rates of unemployment and poverty (UNDP, December 2023).

In **Yemen**, the ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region increased shipping costs due to rising freight and insurance rates along the Red Sea route, in addition to high fuel costs. These could affect markets and the provision of humanitarian assistance. In December 2023, the volume of imported food items registered a month-on-month decline of 17 percent via Red Sea ports and 62 percent via Aden and Mukalla ports. While staple food items remained accessible in markets throughout 2023, shortages in food supply during the first quarter of 2024 are expected if tensions escalate further in the region (WFP, January 2024).

© UNICEF



# Appendices

## Appendix 1

Trends graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity

.....

## Appendix 2

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024

.....

## Appendix 3

Table of forcibly displaced populations, 2023

.....

## Appendix 4

Indicators


.....

## Technical notes

.....


## Bibliography

Figure A.1 Numbers of people (in millions) in Afghanistan by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024



Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG.


Figure A.2 Numbers of people (in millions) in Benin by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Benin CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.3 Numbers of people (in millions) in Burkina Faso by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Burkina Faso CH.

Figure A.4 Numbers of people (in millions) in Burundi by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2024




Source: Burundi IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population




Figure A.5 Numbers of people (in millions) in Cabo Verde by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023




Source: Cabo Verde CH.

Figure A.6 Numbers of people (in millions) in Cameroon by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2023




Source: Cameroon CH.

Figure A.7 Numbers of people (in millions) in Central African Republic by phase of acute food insecurity, 2015–2024



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG.


Figure A.8 Numbers of people (in millions) in Chad by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Chad CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

Figure A.9 Numbers of people (in millions) in Côte d'Ivoire by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023




Source: Côte d'Ivoire CH.

Figure A.10 Numbers of people (in millions) in Kenya by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024




Source: Kenya IPC TWG.

Figure A.11 Numbers of people (in millions) in Madagascar by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Source: Madagascar IPC TWG.

Figure A.12 Numbers of people (in millions) in Malawi by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024




Source: Malawi IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population




Figure A.13 Numbers of people (in millions) in Mali by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Mali CH.


Figure A.14 Numbers of people (in millions) in Niger by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Niger CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.15 Numbers of people (in millions) in Nigeria by phase of acute food insecurity, 2015–2023




Source: Nigeria CH.

Figure A.16 Numbers of people (in millions) in Senegal by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023




Source: Senegal CH.

Figure A.17 Numbers of people (in millions) in Somalia by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Source: Somalia IPC TWG.


Figure A.18 Numbers of people (in millions) in South Sudan by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2024



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.19 Numbers of people (in millions) in Togo by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Togo CH.



TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 1 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
Afghanistan	GIEWS	HNO	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	43.1	100%	14.3	33%	19.9	46%	HNO	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	43.1	100%	14.3	33%	19.9	46%	IPC	Nov 2023– Mar 2024	44.5	100%	16.4	37%	15.8	36%
Algeria – Sahrawi refugees	External assistance	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Oct 2022	0.2	76%	N/A	N/A	0.1	74%	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Jun 2023	0.2	67%	N/A	N/A	0.04	28%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Angola	External assistance	IPC	Oct 2021– Mar 2022	32.1	9%	0.7	25%	1.6	58%	FEWS NET (RM) <sup>1</sup>	Jan–Apr 2023	34.0	100%	N/A	N/A	1.3	4%	FEWS NET (RM) <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2024 <sup>4</sup>	32.1	100%	N/A	N/A	1–1.5	3–5%
Bangladesh	GIEWS	WFP/ENA <sup>1</sup>	Jan–Dec 2022	164.7	1% <sup>5</sup>	N/A	N/A	1.3	89%	IPC	May–Sep 2023	165.2	23%	12.9	34%	11.9	31%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Benin	External assistance	Not selected for analysis in 2022								CH	Mar–May 2023	13.0	99%	1.9	15%	0.5	4%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024 <sup>4</sup>	13.0	67%	1.1	13%	0.2 <sup>2</sup>	3%
Burkina Faso	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.9	97%	5.3	25%	3.5	16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3	100%	5.1	23%	3.4 <sup>3</sup>	15%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	23.0	100%	5.3	23%	3.0	13%
Burundi	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	12.0	100%	3.7	30%	1.4	12%	IPC	Apr–May 2023	12.3	100%	5.5	44%	2.3	19%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2024 <sup>4</sup>	12.3	100%	5.6	45%	1.2	10%
Cameroon	GIEWS	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	27.2	100%	6.8	25%	3.6	13%	CH	Mar–May 2023	28.5	95%	6.1	22%	3.0	11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024 <sup>4</sup>	28.5	98%	5.2	19%	2.5 <sup>2</sup>	9%
Central African Republic	GIEWS	IPC	Sep 2022– Mar 2023	6.1	100%	2.0	33%	2.7	44%	IPC	Sep 2022– Mar 2023	6.1	100%	2.0	33%	2.7	44%	IPC	Apr–Aug 2024	6.1	100%	2.4	38%	2.5	41%
Chad	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	16.8	94%	4.0	25%	2.1	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	18.0	100%	4.0	22%	2.3	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	18.0	95%	5.3	31%	2.9	17%
Colombia	HNO	Not selected for analysis in 2022								WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Nov–Dec 2023	52.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.6	3%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Colombia – migrants	HRP	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2022	4.6	100%	N/A	N/A	2.9	62%	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2022	4.6	100%	N/A	N/A	2.9	62%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Congo	GIEWS	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Oct–Nov 2023	6.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.9	31%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Congo – refugees	GIEWS	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Aug–Sep 2022	0.1	100%	N/A	N/A	0.04	65%	WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Aug–Sep 2022	0.1	94%	N/A	N/A	0.04	65%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Côte d'Ivoire	External assistance	Not selected for analysis in 2022								CH	Jun–Aug 2023	27.5	79%	3.5	16%	1.0 <sup>2</sup>	5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	27.5	87%	4.1	17%	1.0 <sup>2</sup>	4%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	GIEWS	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	109.6	94%	44.9	44%	26.4	26%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2023	109.6	94%	46.8	45%	25.8	25%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2024	113.6	96%	52.3	48%	23.4	22%
Djibouti	GIEWS	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	1.2	100%	0.4	35%	0.2	16%	IPC	Jul–Dec 2023	1.2	100%	0.4	34%	0.3	24%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Dominican Republic	External assistance	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	10.6	100%	3.4	32%	1.6	15%	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	10.6	100%	3.4	32%	1.6	15%	IPC	Dec 2023– Apr 2024	10.7	100%	2.3	21%	1.1	10%

<sup>1</sup> Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology<sup>2</sup> Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)<sup>3</sup> Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)<sup>4</sup> Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.<sup>5</sup> Bangladesh analysis in 2022 covered refugees population only

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 2 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
Ecuador – migrants	External assistance	WFP/CARI	Jul–Aug 2022	0.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.3	60%	WFP/CARI	Jul–Aug 2022	0.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.3	60%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Egypt – Syrian refugees	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/CARI	Jan–Mar 2023	0.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	69%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
El Salvador	HRP	IPC	Mar–May 2022	6.3	100%	3.3	52%	0.9	14%	HRP	Mar–Jun 2023	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.9	14%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Eswatini	GIEWS	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	1.2	100%	0.4	32%	0.3	29%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	1.2	100%	0.4	36%	0.3	24%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	1.2	100%	0.4	36%	0.3	24%
Ethiopia	GIEWS	HRP <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Jul 2022	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	23.6	21%	FEWS NET*	Jul–Aug 2023	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	19.7	17%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jun–24	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	17–18	15–16%
Guatemala	HRP	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	17.4	100%	7.1	41%	4.6	26%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	17.6	100%	6.3	36%	4.3	24%	IPC	Sep 2023–Feb 2024 <sup>4</sup>	17.6	100%	6.7	38%	3.1	18%
Guinea	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	13.3	84%	3.8	34%	1.2	11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	13.5	85%	2.6	23%	0.7	6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	13.9	100%	2.3	17%	0.7	5%
Haiti	GIEWS	IPC	Sep 2022–Feb 2023	10.9	91%	2.8	28%	4.7 <sup>3</sup>	48%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	10.9	91%	2.7	27%	4.9	49%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2024	11.7	84%	2.4	24%	5.0	50%
Honduras	HRP	IPC	Jun–Aug 2022	9.6	100%	3.7	39%	2.6	28%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	9.7	100%	3.4	35%	2.4	25%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Iraq – Syrian refugees	External assistance	HNO <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2022	41.2	15%	3.7	60%	0.2	3%	WFP/CARI <sup>1</sup>	Aug–Sep 2023	0.3	97%	N/A	N/A	0.02	7%	No projections available as per 7 Jan 2024							
Jordan – Syrian refugees	External assistance	WFP/CARI <sup>1</sup>	Jul–Sep 2022	0.7	100%	N/A	N/A	0.5	82%	WFP/CARI <sup>1</sup>	Jan–Mar 2023	0.7	100%	N/A	N/A	0.5	62%	No projections available as per 7 Jan 2024							
Kenya	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	55.0	27%	5.1	34%	4.4	29%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	51.5	32%	5.9	36%	5.4	32%	IPC	Oct 2023–Jan 2024 <sup>4</sup>	51.5	32%	7.5	45%	1.5	9%
Lebanon	GIEWS	IPC	Sep–Dec 2022	5.8	92%	2.4	45%	2.0	37%	IPC	Jan–Apr 2023	5.8	92%	2.1	40%	2.3	42%	IPC	Apr–Sep 2024	5.6	100%	2.5	46%	1.1	20%
Lesotho	GIEWS	IPC	Jan–Mar 2022	2.1	70%	0.5	36%	0.3	23%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	2.7	55%	0.5	36%	0.3 <sup>2</sup>	22%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	2.7	55%	0.5	36%	0.3 <sup>2</sup>	22%
Liberia	GIEWS	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	4.8	100%	1.0	21%	0.4	8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	4.8	100%	1.4	29%	0.5	11%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Madagascar	GIEWS	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0	21%	2.5	40%	2.2	36%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0	21%	2.5	40%	2.2	36%	IPC	Feb–Apr 2024	30.8	25%	3.4	44%	1.7	22%
Malawi	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	19.3	100%	6.7	35%	3.8 <sup>2</sup>	20%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.7	100%	6.2	31%	4.4	22%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.7	100%	6.2	31%	4.4	22%
Mali	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.7	100%	4.4	20%	1.8	8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3	100%	4.1	18%	1.3 <sup>3</sup>	6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	22.9	100%	4.0	18%	1.4	6%

<sup>1</sup> Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology<sup>2</sup> Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)<sup>3</sup> Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)<sup>4</sup> Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 3 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD– OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
Mauritania	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	4.4	100%	1.4	33%	0.9	20%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	3.5	100%	0.8	23%	0.5	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	4.6	100%	1.0	22%	0.4	8%
Mozambique	GIEWS	IPC	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	32.0	100%	13.0	40%	3.1	10%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	32.4	49%	5.9	37%	3.3	20%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	32.4	49%	5.9	37%	3.3	20%
Myanmar	GIEWS	HNO*	Jan–Dec 2022	56.0	100%	N/A	N/A	15.2	27%	<sup>s</sup>	Sep–Oct 2023	56.5	99%	16.6	30%	10.7	19%	HNRP <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2024	56.5	99%	16.9	30%	12.9	23%
Namibia	GIEWS	IPC	Dec 2021– Mar 2022	2.6	100%	0.8	33%	0.8	30%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	2.6	100%	0.9	36%	0.7	26%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	2.6	100%	0.9	36%	0.7	26%
Nicaragua	External assistance	FEWS NET (RM) <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2022	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	3%	FEWS NET (RM) <sup>1</sup>	Jul–Aug 2023	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	3%	FEWS NET (RM) <sup>1</sup>	Jun 2024	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.1– 0.2	2–5%
Niger	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	24.9	100%	7.3	29%	4.4	18%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	25.9	100%	7.3	28%	3.3	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	26.2	100%	6.7	26%	3.2	12%
Nigeria	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	219.5	72%	40.8	26%	19.5	12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	213.4	91%	64.0	33%	24.9	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	213.4	98%	66.9	32%	26.5	13%
Pakistan	GIEWS	IPC	Sept–Dec 2022	215.3	9%	6.2	32%	8.6	43%	IPC	Nov 2023– Jan 2024	224.8	16%	13.4	36%	11.8	32%	IPC	Nov 2023– Jan 2024	224.8	16%	13.4	36%	11.8	32%
Palestine – Gaza Strip	GIEWS	HNO <sup>1</sup>	May–July 2022	5.5	100%	N/A	N/A	1.5	28%	IPC	Dec 2023 – Feb 2024	2.2	100%	0.0	0%	2.2 <sup>3</sup>	100%	IPC	Dec 2023– Feb 2024	2.2	100%	0.0	0%	2.2 <sup>3</sup>	100%
Palestine – West Bank										FSC <sup>1</sup>	Dec 2023	3.2	100%	N/A	N/A	0.6	18%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Peru – migrants	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	May 2023	1.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.8	50%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Senegal	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	17.7	100%	3.9	22%	0.9	5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	17.9	100%	4.4	24%	1.3	7%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	18.0	100%	4.1	23%	0.7	4%
Sierra Leone	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	8.6	100%	3.6	42%	1.6	19%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	7.5	100%	2.9	39%	1.2	16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	7.7	100%	2.9	38%	1.5 <sup>2</sup>	19%
Somalia	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	17.0	100%	3.1	18%	5.6 <sup>3</sup>	33%	IPC	Apr–Jun 2023	17.0	100%	3.3	19%	6.6 <sup>3</sup>	39%	No projections available as per 7th Jan 2024							
South Sudan	GIEWS	IPC	Apr–Jul 2022	12.4	100%	2.9	24%	7.7 <sup>3</sup>	63%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2023	12.4	100%	3.1	25%	7.8 <sup>3</sup>	63%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2024	12.6	100%	3.5	28%	7.1 <sup>3</sup>	56%
Sri Lanka	GIEWS	FAO-WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	31 May– 17 Jun 2022	22.2	100%	N/A	N/A	6.3	28%	FAO-WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Aug–Oct 2023	22.6	100%	N/A	N/A	5.5	24%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Sudan	GIEWS	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	47.9	100%	17.6	37%	11.7	24%	IPC	Jul–Sep 2023	48.6	100%	17.1	35%	20.3	42%	IPC	Oct 2023– Feb 2024 <sup>4</sup>	48.2	100%	18.0	37%	17.7	37%
Syrian Arab Republic	GIEWS	Vasyr/ CARI	Jul–Nov 2022	22.1	100%	7.9	36%	12.1	55%	Vasyr/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Oct 2023	23.4	100%	N/A	N/A	12.9	55%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							

<sup>1</sup> Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology<sup>2</sup> Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)<sup>3</sup> Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)<sup>4</sup> Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.<sup>5</sup> Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNR<sup>1</sup>

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 4 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
Togo	External assistance	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	8.3	73%	1.4	23%	0.6	9%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	8.3	73%	1.3	22%	0.5	8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	8.8	70%	1.1	18%	0.5 <sup>2</sup>	8%
Türkiye – Syrian refugees	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Sep–Dec 2023	0.1	100%	N/A	N/A	<0.01	8%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Uganda	GIEWS	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jun–Aug 2022	44.2	100%	N/A	N/A	2.3	5%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Apr–Jun 2023	45.6	100%	N/A	N/A	1.8	4%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jun 2024	44.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.5–2	3–5%
Ukraine	GIEWS	REACH- WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Oct–Nov 2021	35.6	100%	N/A	N/A	8.9	25%	REACH- WFP/ CARI <sup>1</sup>	Sep 2023	33.0	100%	N/A	N/A	7.3	22%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
United Republic of Tanzania	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	61.7	17%	3.3	31%	1.1	10%	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	61.7	17%	3.3	31%	1.1	10%	IPC	Nov 2023– April 2024	59.9	12%	2.2	31%	0.9*	13%
Yemen	GIEWS	IPC	Jan–May 2022	31.9	100%	8.6	27%	17.4 <sup>3</sup>	55%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jul–Aug 2023	32.0	100%	N/A	N/A	18.0	56%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jun 2024	32.0	100%	N/A	N/A	18–19	56–59%
Zambia	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022– Mar 2023	18.9	71%	6.6	49%	2.0 <sup>2</sup>	14%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	19.6	47%	3.8	42%	2.0	23%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	19.6	47%	3.8	42%	2.0	23%
Zimbabwe	GIEWS	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Oct–Dec 2022	15.3	100%	N/A	N/A	3.0	20%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Jan–Mar 2023	15.4	100%	N/A	N/A	3.5	23%	FEWS NET <sup>1</sup>	Mar 2024	15.3	100%	N/A	N/A	3–3.5	20–23%

<sup>1</sup> Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology<sup>2</sup> Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)<sup>3</sup> Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)<sup>4</sup> Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.



TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 1 of 3)

 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Afghanistan	5.7 M	5.7 M	IOM	0.05 M	UNHCR	Pakistan; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Tajikistan
Algeria	0.1 M	-		0.1 M	UNHCR	Western Sahara; Syrian Arab Republic; Mali
Angola	0.05 M	-		0.05 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Guinea; Côte d'Ivoire
Bangladesh	1.1 M	0.15 M	IOM	1.1 M	UNHCR	Myanmar; Somalia
Benin	0.01 M	1 200	IDMC	0.01 M	UNHCR	Togo; Burkina Faso; Central African Republic
Burkina Faso	2.1 M	2.1 M	CONASUR	0.04 M	UNHCR	Mali; Central African Republic; Niger
Burundi	0.2 M	0.07 M	IOM	0.09 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Rwanda; Uganda
Cameroon	1.6 M	1.1 M	OCHA and IOM	0.5 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Nigeria; Chad
Central African Republic	0.5 M	0.5 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Chad
Chad	1.3 M	0.2 M	IOM	1.1 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Central African Republic; Cameroon
Colombia	9.4 M	6.9 M	Government of Colombia	2.5 M	UNHCR**	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Ecuador; Cuba
Congo	0.09 M	0.03 M	IDMC	0.07 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Rwanda
Côte d'Ivoire	0.04 M	-		0.04 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Liberia; Central African Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.5 M	6.9 M	IOM	0.5 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Rwanda; South Sudan
Djibouti	0.04 M	0.01 M	IOM	0.03 M	UNHCR	Somalia; Ethiopia; Yemen
Dominican Republic	0.1 M	-		0.1 M	UNHCR**	Data not available
Ecuador	0.6 M	-		0.6 M	UNHCR**	Colombia; Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Cuba
Egypt	0.8 M	-		0.8 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic; Palestine
El Salvador	300	-		300	UNHCR	Honduras; Nicaragua
Eswatini	3 000	-		3 000	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia; Ethiopia
Ethiopia	4.5 M	3.5 M	IOM	1 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Somalia; Eritrea
Guatemala	3 500	-		3 500	UNHCR	El Salvador; Honduras; Nicaragua
Guinea	2 200	-		2 200	UNHCR	Sierra Leone; Liberia; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Haiti	0.3 M	0.3 M	IOM	-	UNHCR	
Honduras	400	-		400	UNHCR	Nicaragua; El Salvador

\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

\*\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHRC, June 2023

TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 2 of 3)


 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Iraq	1.4 M	1.1 M	IOM	0.3 M	UNHCR	Syrian Arab Republic; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Türkiye
Jordan	3.1 M	-		3.1 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq
Kenya	0.7 M	0.03 M	IOM	0.7 M	UNHCR	Somalia; South Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lebanon	1.4 M	0.07 M	IOM	1.3 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq
Lesotho	700	-		700	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Eritrea; Cameroon; Zimbabwe
Liberia	1 900	-		1 900	UNHCR	Côte d'Ivoire; Syrian Arab Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Madagascar	0.09 M	0.09 M	IOM	1 000	UNHCR	Pakistan; Yemen; Mali
Malawi	0.7 M	0.7 M	Government of Malawi	0.05 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Rwanda
Mali	0.4 M	0.4 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Niger; Mauritania
Mauritania	0.1 M	-	IOM	0.1 M	UNHCR	Mali; Central African Republic; Syrian Arab Republic
Mozambique	0.7 M	0.7 M	IOM	0.02 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Somalia
Myanmar	2.6 M	2.6 M	UNHCR	-	UNHCR	
Namibia	7 100	-		7 100	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Rwanda
Nicaragua	400	-		400	UNHCR	El Salvador; Honduras; Cuba
Niger	0.6 M	0.4 M	UNHCR	0.3 M	UNHCR	Nigeria; Mali; Sudan
Nigeria	3.5 M	3.4 M	IOM	0.09 M	UNHCR	Cameroon; Syrian Arab Republic; Niger
Pakistan	2.4 M	0.2 M	IOM	2.1 M	UNHCR	Afghanistan; Somalia; Yemen
Palestine	1.7 M	1.7 M	UNRWA	-	UNRWA	
Peru	1.6 M	0.07 M	IDMC	1.5 M	UNHCR**	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Colombia; Cuba
Senegal	0.02 M	8 400	IDMC	0.01 M	UNHCR	Mauritania; Central African Republic; Gambia
Sierra Leone	-	-		-	UNHCR	Liberia; Côte d'Ivoire; Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Somalia	1.3 M	1.2 M	IOM	0.0 M	UNHCR	Ethiopia; Yemen; Syrian Arab Republic
South Sudan	2.4 M	2 M	IOM	0.4 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Ethiopia
Sri Lanka	600	-		600	UNHCR	Pakistan; Myanmar; Afghanistan

\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

\*\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHCR, June 2023

\*\*\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + UNRWA, September 2023

TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 3 of 3)

 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Sudan	10 M	9.1 M	IOM	1.0 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Eritrea; Ethiopia
Syrian Arab Republic	7.3 M	6.6 M	HNAP	0.6 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Iraq; Afghanistan
Togo	0.05 M	0.02 M	IOM	0.0 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Ghana; Central African Republic
Türkiye	3.6 M	-		3.6 M	UNHCR	Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq; Afghanistan
Uganda	1.6 M	4 800	IDMC	1.6 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia
Ukraine	3.7 M	3.7 M	IOM	3 300	UNHCR	Afghanistan; Syrian Arab Republic; Russian Federation
United Republic of Tanzania	0.3 M	-		0.3 M	UNHCR	Burundi; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia
Yemen	2.9 M	2.8 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Somalia; Ethiopia; Syrian Arab Republic
Zambia	0.08 M	-		0.08 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Somalia
Zimbabwe	0.02 M	-		0.02 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mozambique; Burundi

\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

\*\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHRC, June 2023

\*\*\* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + UNWRA, September 2023

# Indicators

## Access to basic drinking water services

Improved drinking water sources are those which, by nature of their design and construction, can deliver safe water. The WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply Sanitation and Hygiene subdivides the population using improved sources into three groups (safely managed, basic and limited) according to the level of service provided. To meet the criteria for a safely managed drinking water service, people must use an improved source meeting three criteria: accessible on premises; available when needed; and free from contamination. If the improved source does not meet any one of these criteria but a round trip to collect water takes 30 minutes or less, then it is classified as a basic drinking water service. If water collection from an improved source exceeds 30 minutes, it is categorized as a limited service (WHO and UNICEF).

## Annual population growth (WHO)

This expresses the ratio between the annual increase in the population size and the total population for that year, usually multiplied by 100. The annual increase in the population size is defined as a sum of differences: the difference between births less deaths and the difference between immigrants less emigrants, in a given country, territory or geographic area at a given year (WHO).

## Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance

The indicator measures the nutritional significance of imported cereals in meeting the caloric needs of a population. This metric considers both the quantity of cereal imports and their caloric contribution to the overall diet. By weighting cereal imports based on their caloric content, this measure provides a more nuanced understanding of a country's reliance on imported cereals for

meeting dietary energy requirements. It helps assess the vulnerability of a population to fluctuations in cereal imports and highlights the importance of cereals in ensuring food security and nutrition (FAO).

## Crude Death Rate (CDR)

This indicator accounts for all the deaths that have occurred per day per 10 000 people over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis, the CDR should not include trauma-related deaths, but should include deaths due to unknown causes (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

## Exclusive breastfeeding

Exclusive breastfeeding in the first 6 months followed by the timely introduction of safe and nutritionally adequate complementary foods with continued breastfeeding until 2 years of age or beyond ensures children receive all the nutrients they need. This indicator refers to the percentage of infants aged 0–5 months who were fed only breastmilk during the previous day.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
50–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
30–49.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
11–29.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: adapted from UNICEF Breastfeeding Score Card.

## Food Consumption Score (FCS)

The FCS is a composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and the relative nutritional value of the different food groups, and it is considered a proxy of household food intake or caloric consumption. It is based on self-reported information about the household's consumption of eight standard food groups in the seven days prior to the survey.

The FCS is used to classify households based on standard thresholds into one of three food consumption groups: poor, borderline or acceptable food consumption.

## Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)

Food insecurity as measured by the FIES refers to limited access to food, at the level of individuals or households, due to lack of money or other resources. The severity is measured using a set of eight questions asking respondents to self-report conditions and experiences typically associated with limited access to food. For purposes of the Acute Food Insecurity IPC classification, the questions are asked with reference to the 30 days preceding the survey (FAO).

## Food Expenditure Share (FES)

The FES is an indicator used to measure households' economic vulnerability. It determines the economic vulnerability without the need of having reference to a poverty line or minimum expenditure basket. The higher the share of households' consumption expenditure on food – out of the total consumption expenditure – the more vulnerable the households are to food insecurity. Each of the three modules must collect information on the value of purchases made in cash or on credit, as well as the value of consumed items from in-kind assistance and in-kind gifts. The food submodule must also capture the value of consumed food from own production (WFP).

## Human Development Index (HDI) ranking (global)

A country's HDI value is determined by aggregating the country's scores in a vast assortment of indicators including life expectancy, literacy rate, rural populations' access to electricity, GDP per capita, exports and imports, homicide rate, multidimensional poverty index, income inequality, internet availability, and many more. These indicators are compiled into a single number between 0 and 1.0, with 1.0 being the highest possible human development. GRFC 2024 does not report the absolute value of the indicators but rather their ranking across all countries globally (UNDP).

## Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)

The HDDS, developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA) and promoted by FAO, aims to reflect the economic ability of a household to access a variety of foods, as a proxy of household access to food. It is based on the concept of household dietary diversity, or the number of different food groups over a reference period. It is measured based on the households' self-reported consumption of 12 food groups in the previous 24 hours (yesterday).

## Household Economy Analysis (HEA)

This is a livelihoods-based framework founded on the analysis of people in different social and economic circumstances. In particular, the HEA examines the self-reporting of information on: (i) how people access the food and cash they need; (ii) their assets, the opportunities available to them, and the constraints they face; and (iii) the options open to them in times of crisis. Two thresholds define basic needs in the HEA: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. The HEA Survival Threshold represents the most basic needs, including minimum food



energy requirements (calorie requirements), the costs associated with food preparation and consumption if associated inputs are purchased (such as salt, fuelwood or kerosene), and expenditure on water for human consumption (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

### Household Hunger Scale (HHS)

The HHS is a household food deprivation scale that is based on household’s self-reported perception-based information as to whether they have experienced problems of food insecurity in the past 30 days or 4 weeks. It is an indicator developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project to classify the severity of food insecurity during that period. The HHS consists of three standard questions regarding access to food and hunger in the household, and is followed by questions about the frequency of occurrence (rarely, sometimes and often). It is then classified into three household hunger categories: 0–1 = little to no hunger in the household; 2–3 = moderate hunger in the household; 4–6 = severe hunger in the household.

### GDP ranking

This refers to the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity expressed in USD. The total country GDP is divided by the mid-year population figure, where GDP is the total value of goods and services for final use produced by resident producers in an economy, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. In GRFC 2024, ranking of GDP in Asia, Latin America and Caribbean countries is relative to all the countries globally (WHO).

### INFORM Risk

INFORM summarises the multitude of factors contributing to the risk for humanitarian crises and disasters into a single index. It combines 54 indicators into 3 dimensions of risk:

**hazards** (events that could occur) and exposure to them;

**vulnerability** (the susceptibility of communities to those hazards);

**lack of coping capacity** (lack of resources that can alleviate the impact).

The results give an overall risk score out of 10 for each country, and for each of the dimensions, categories and components of risk (EC-JRC).

### Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS)

This indicator is used to better understand the longer-term coping capacity of households. LCS measures the most severe livelihood coping strategy applied by the household during the 30 days prior to the interview, or that has been exhausted by the household within the 12 months prior to the interview, in response to a lack of food or money to buy food. The module includes at least ten coping strategies (four stress strategies, three crisis strategies and three emergency strategies), contextualized to the country context, based on the master list. LCS classifies households into four categories (no coping strategies, stress coping, crisis or emergency coping) based on the highest level of severity applied.

### Minimum Acceptable Diet

This composite indicator combines meal frequency and dietary diversity to assess the proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a diet that meets the minimum requirements for growth and development.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
40–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
20–39.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
10–19.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: Preliminary thresholds suggested by IFE Core Group.

### Minimum Dietary Diversity

This indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from five or more out of eight food groups a day. The eight food groups are: (i) breastmilk; (ii) grains, roots and tubers; (iii) legumes and nuts; (iv) dairy products (infant formula, milk, yoghurt, cheese); (v) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry and liver/organ meats); (vi) eggs; (vii) vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables; (viii) other fruits and vegetables. In some surveys, Minimum Dietary Diversity is calculated based on seven food groups, excluding breastmilk. In these cases, the indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from four or more out of seven food groups a day (UNICEF).

### Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)

An MEB is defined as what a household requires to meet basic needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost. It is a monetary threshold – the cost of these goods, utilities, services and resources – and is conceptually equivalent to a poverty line. It typically describes the cost of meeting one month’s worth of essential needs. Since the MEB sets a monetary threshold for what is needed to cover essential needs, households whose expenditures fall below the MEB are defined as being unable to meet their essential needs. More information is available (WFP).

### Minimum Meal Frequency

The indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–23 months who receive solid, semi-solid or soft foods at least the minimum number of recommended times a day depending on their age and whether they are breastfed (WHO).

### Percentage of crop and rangelands growing period affected by drought conditions

The percentage of crop or rangeland growing period affected by drought conditions indicates how often drought warnings were triggered by the HotSpots of Agricultural Production (ASAP) early warning system based on Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) observations between 2003 and 2023 for crops or rangeland. NDVI is a measure of plant health and biomass. Drought warnings are calculated specifically for cropland and rangelands during their respective growing seasons. Warnings are only issued when significant negative NDVI anomalies are detected across large areas (more than 25 percent of the total active cropland or rangelands). This ensures the anomalies are linked to large-scale droughts, not localized events. Higher percentages in these metrics suggest a country has experienced more frequent large-scale declines in biomass, potentially indicating a greater risk of drought impacting crops or rangeland (EC-JRC, ASAP).

### Percentage of households not consuming micronutrient-rich food (analysed in refugee populations)

This refers to the proportion of households with no member consuming any vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, fish/seafood, or milk/milk products over a reference period of 24 hours (FAO).

### Prevalence of anaemia

This indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–59 months and of reproductive age women (15–49 years) who are anaemic. Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or their oxygen-carrying capacity is insufficient to meet physiological needs, which varies by age, sex, altitude, smoking and pregnancy status. Iron deficiency is thought to be the most common cause of anaemia globally, although other conditions, such as folate, vitamin B12 and vitamin A deficiencies, chronic inflammation, parasitic infections and inherited disorders can all cause anaemia. In its severe form, it is associated with fatigue, weakness, dizziness and drowsiness.

Pregnant women and children are particularly vulnerable (WHO).

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 5.0%	No public health problem
5.0–19.9%	Mild public health problem
20.0–39.9%	Moderate public health problem
≥ 40.0%	Severe public health problem

Source: WHO, 2008.

### Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment

The indicator refers to the proportion of the total employed population engaged in agricultural, forestry and fishery activities within a country or region. This indicator is typically expressed as a percentage and provides insights into the significance of these primary sectors in the overall labour force of an economy (FAO).

### Stunting

Low height-for-age is the result of chronic or recurrent undernutrition, usually associated with poverty, poor maternal health and nutrition, frequent illness and/or inappropriate feeding and care in early life. Stunting prevents children from reaching their physical and cognitive potential (UNICEF).

### Under-5 death rate (U5DR)

This refers to all deaths per day of children aged under 5 (up to 59 months) per 10 000 children over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. The U5DR is typically around twice that of the CDR (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

### Wasting

Low weight-for-height often indicates recent and severe weight loss, although it can also persist for a long time. It usually occurs when a person has not had food of adequate quality and quantity and/or they have had frequent or prolonged illnesses. Wasting in children is associated with a higher risk of death if not treated properly. In this report it is used as a synonym for acute malnutrition (UNICEF).

# Technical notes

FIG. TN.1 Overview of the process of production and publication of the Global Report on Food Crises



All partners are in agreement with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report except where a disclaimer is present. The differences stem from the varying interpretations of the data related to the factors which contribute to or indicate acute food insecurity.

## 1 | PRELIMINARY WORK

### Technical consultations

**Technical consultations held with the Senior Committee at the beginning of the reporting cycle aimed to:**

- Reaffirm the partner organisations' engagement and responsibilities
- Confirm the scope of the report
- Provide initial guidance
- Endorse country selection criteria
- Agree on criteria for endorsement of data/analysis
- Agree on date of release and report workplan.

### Selection of food-crisis countries/territories

**FSIN and the Food Security Technical Working Group (TWG) led this process. The list of countries/territories and the selection rationale was then presented to the Senior Committee for endorsement.**

The process was continuous throughout 2023 and finished on 31 December to ensure inclusiveness. During the year the following were identified:

- Countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) in 2023. FAO-GIEWS classifies and regularly updates the list of countries requiring external assistance for food, dividing them into three categories: (1) countries with an exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production and supplies; (2) countries with widespread lack of access to food; and (3) countries with severe localized food insecurity. External assistance for logistical support, for capacity building, for longer-term poverty reduction or development purposes is not considered as a qualifying factor for a food crisis.
- Countries/territories that had a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in 2023
- Countries/territories considered low or lower/upper-middle-income that had not been identified by FAO-GIEWS assessments and that did not have an HRP, but requested external food assistance because of:
  - having populations affected by conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks.

- hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP.
- having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced.

For countries hosting assisted refugee populations, only the *refugee populations* were selected. The host country was only selected if its *resident population* needed external food assistance.

Countries were excluded if none of the above criteria were met, even if acute food insecurity data were available, e.g. Ghana in 2023, or Côte d'Ivoire in 2022, or if they were high-income countries (according to the World Bank definition).

**73 countries/territories identified as food crises in 2023 as a result of this process.**

## 73 countries/territories selected for the GRFC 2024, by criterion

### GIEWS list

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

### Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)

Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

### Emergency external assistance in response to a shock

Angola, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Tajikistan, Togo, Türkiye and Vanuatu.

### Emergency external assistance in response to hosting refugees

Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Moldova and Rwanda.

## 2 | RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

### Data endorsement

#### FSIN and Technical Working Groups:

- Validate the reliability/relevance of the data source and methodology
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity estimates for 2023
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity projections for 2024
- Identify and endorse malnutrition data
- Identify and endorse displacement data
- Identify and endorse key drivers of acute food insecurity.

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY DATA

**FSIN facilitated discussion with the Food Security TWG on the available acute food insecurity data for the selected countries/territories.**

Data gathered must follow partnership criteria and requirements. The TWG evaluated the following before final endorsement:

#### Methodology

Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis provide an estimate or a projection of acute food insecurity. Did the methodology quantifying acute food insecurity levels provide an equivalence or approximation of IPC Phase 3 or above (see data endorsement).

#### Timeframe

Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis cover at least one month of 2023 and did the projection analysis cover at least one month of 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data referring to Q3/Q4 of 2022.

### Coverage

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis covered the whole country/territory. If not, the Food Security TWG discussed whether for certain countries/territories limited geographical analysis was appropriate and acceptable.

### Consensus and participation

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis was based on multi-stakeholder technical consensus and/or a convergence of evidence and/or based on data collection by a trusted actor and/or endorsed at country level by the national stakeholders.

59

of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises had **data available that met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

Out of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises, **14 did not have data or did not meet the GRFC technical requirements**. Available information is however included in the regional sections.


### Data sources and methodologies

The preferred source of data for acute food insecurity is the IPC/CH. If unavailable, the Technical Working Groups evaluate the use of other sources of evidence. These include:

- FEWS NET analyses which are IPC-compatible;
- WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI);
- food insecurity PiN of the Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs).

Although these alternative sources do not provide comparable disaggregation into Phases 3, 4 and 5, their estimates are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

FIG. TN.2 Population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, by methodology



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

The endorsement of the data gathered in most cases took the following priority ranking:

### Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity.

There are around 30 countries currently implementing the IPC. It provides the 'big picture' evidence base of food crises by assessing the following: how severe, how many, when, where, why, who, as well as the key characteristics of the food crisis. It provides data for two time periods – the current situation and a projection. This information helps governments, humanitarian actors and other decision-makers quickly understand a crisis (or potential crisis) and informs appropriate action.

The IPC makes the best use of the evidence available through a transparent, traceable and rigorous process. Evidence requirements to complete classification have been developed, considering the range of circumstances in which evidence quality and quantity may be limited while ensuring adherence to minimum standards.



FIG. TN.3 IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table

Phase name and description		Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine		
		Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)		
Priority response objectives		Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	Urgent action required to 				
				Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods		
Food security first-level outcomes	First-level outcomes refer to characteristics of food consumption and livelihood change. Thresholds that correspond as closely as possible to the Phase descriptions are included for each indicator. Although cut-offs are based on applied research and presented as global reference, correlation between indicators is often somewhat limited and findings need to be contextualized. The area is classified in the most severe Phase that affects at least 20% of the population.							
	Food consumption (focus on energy intake)	<b>Quantity: Adequate energy intake</b> <b>Dietary energy intake:</b> Adequate (avg. 2 350 kcal pp/day) and stable <b>Household Dietary Diversity Score:</b> 5–12 food groups and stable <b>Food Consumption Score:</b> Acceptable and stable <b>Household Hunger Scale:</b> 0 (none) <b>Reduced Coping Strategies Index:</b> 0–3 <b>Household Economy Analysis:</b> No livelihood protection deficit <b>Food Insecurity Experience Scale:</b> (FIES 30 days recall):<0.58	<b>Quantity: Minimally Adequate</b> <b>Dietary energy intake:</b> Minimally adequate (avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) <b>Household Dietary Diversity Score:</b> 5-FG but deterioration ≥1 FG from typical <b>Food Consumption Score:</b> Acceptable but deterioration from typical <b>Household Hunger Scale:</b> 1 (slight) <b>Reduced Coping Strategies Index:</b> 4–18 <b>Household Economy Analysis:</b> Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80% <b>FIES:</b> Between -0.58 and 0.36	<b>Quantity: Moderately Inadequate</b> – Moderate deficits <b>Dietary energy intake:</b> Food gap (below avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) <b>Household Dietary Diversity Score:</b> 3–4 FG <b>Food Consumption Score:</b> Borderline <b>Household Hunger Scale:</b> 2–3 (moderate) <b>Reduced Coping Strategies Index:</b> ≥19 (non-defining characteristics (NDC) to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) <b>Household Economy Analysis:</b> Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; or survival deficit <20% <b>FIES:</b> > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	<b>Quantity: Very Inadequate</b> – Large deficits <b>Dietary energy intake:</b> Large food gap; well below 2 100 kcal pp/day <b>Household Dietary Diversity Score:</b> 0–2 FG (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) <b>Food Consumption Score:</b> Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) <b>Household Hunger Scale:</b> 4 (severe) <b>Reduced Coping Strategies Index:</b> ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) <b>Household Economy Analysis:</b> Survival deficit ≥20% but <50% <b>FIES:</b> > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	<b>Quantity: Extremely Inadequate</b> – Very large deficits <b>Dietary energy intake:</b> Extreme food gap <b>Household Dietary Diversity Score:</b> 0–2 FG <b>Food Consumption Score:</b> Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) <b>Household Hunger Scale:</b> 5–6 (severe) <b>Reduced Coping Strategies Index:</b> ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) <b>Household Economy Analysis:</b> Survival deficit ≥50% <b>FIES:</b> > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)		
	Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> No stress, crisis or emergency coping observed	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Stressed strategies and/or assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Stress strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and/or assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Crisis strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Emergency strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Near complete collapse of strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Near exhaustion of coping capacity		
Food security second-level outcomes	Second-level outcomes refer to area-level estimations of nutritional status and mortality that are especially useful for identification of more severe phases when food gaps are expected to impact malnutrition and mortality. For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits should be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of the classification.							
	Nutritional status*	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Weight-for-Height Z-score	Acceptable <5%	Alert 5–9.9%	Serious 10–14.9% or > than usual	Critical 15–29.9% or > much greater than average	Extremely Critical ≥30%	
		Global Acute Malnutrition based on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference	<5%		5–9.9%		10–14.9%	≥15%
		Body Mass Index <18.5	<5%	5–9.9%	10–19.9%, 1.5 x greater than baseline		20–39.9%	≥40%
	Mortality*	<b>Crude Death Rate</b> <0.5/10,000/day <b>Under-five Death Rate</b> <1/10,000/day	<b>Crude Death Rate</b> <0.5/10,000/day <b>Under-five Death Rate</b> <1/10,000/day	<b>Crude Death Rate</b> 0.5–0.99/10,000/day <b>Under-five Death Rate</b> 1–2/10 000/day	<b>Crude Death Rate</b> 1–1.99/10,000/day or <2x reference <b>Under-five Death Rate</b> 2–3.99/10,000/day	<b>Crude Death Rate</b> ≥2/10,000/day <b>Under-five Death Rate</b> ≥4/10,000/day		
Food security contributing factors	For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for different phases need to be determined and analysed according to the livelihood context; nevertheless, general descriptions for contributing factors are provided below.							
	Food availability, access, utilization, and stability	Adequate to meet short-term food consumption requirements <b>Safe water</b> ≥15 litres pp/day	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements <b>Safe water</b> marginally ≥15 litres pp/day	Inadequate to meet food consumption requirements <b>Safe water</b> >7.5 to 15 litres pp/day	Very inadequate to meet food consumption requirements <b>Safe water</b> >3 to <7.5 litres pp/day	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements <b>Safe water</b> ≤3 litres pp/day		
	Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or extreme food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits		

To ensure the application of the IPC in settings where access for collecting evidence is limited, specialized parameters have been developed. The IPC provides a structured process for making the best assessment of the situation based on what is known and shows the limitations of its classifications as part of the process.

IPC analysis teams consolidate and analyse complex evidence from different methods and sources (e.g. food prices, seasonal calendars, rainfall, food-security assessments, etc.), but the IPC allows them to describe their conclusions using consistent language and standards and in a simple and accessible form. This harmonized approach is particularly useful in comparing situations across countries and regions, and over time.

The IPC technical manual version 3.1 provides information to understand and critically utilize IPC products and the protocols, including tools and procedures, to conduct the classification itself. See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/IPC-manual/en/>

### Classifying Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

Famine is classified at area level in the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on the following three criteria:

- At least 1 in 5 households face an extreme lack of food.
- At least 30 percent of children suffer from wasting.
- At least two people for every 10 000 or four children under five years old for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

Given the severity and implications of this classification, all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols must be met before an area is classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). See IPC version 3.1.

Areas can be classified in Famine Likely if

minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. This classification should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

The IPC supports Famine prevention by highlighting the following:

- IPC Phase 4 Emergency is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.
- Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not (or not yet) reached Famine thresholds. These households experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This can occur due to the time lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.
- Projections of Famine can be made even if the areas are not currently classified in Famine, thus allowing early warning.

Risk of Famine is an IPC statement that highlights the potential deterioration of the situation compared with the most-likely scenario expected during the projection period. Although it is not an IPC classification, it indicates a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable probability of occurring.

### Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by CILSS for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

It aims to inform national and regional food-crisis prevention and management systems. It considers various indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and contributing factors.

The CH relies on existing food security and nutrition information systems that have been in place in most Sahelian countries since 1985, and more recently in other coastal countries of West Africa.

There are 18 countries currently implementing the CH: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The CH manual version 2.0 clarifies the specific functions and protocols for carrying out an integrated and consensual analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity.

See <http://www.cilss.int/index.php/2019/10/04/cadre-harmonise-manuel-version-2-0/>

### IPC/CH five-phase classification

As a result of technical developments of the CH tools and processes and harmonization efforts carried out over the last decade, the IPC and the CH acute food insecurity approaches are very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity.

The five-phase classification is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of Famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.

Classification into five phases (1) None/Minimal, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, (5) Catastrophe/Famine is based on a convergence of available evidence, including indicators related to food consumption, livelihoods, malnutrition and mortality. Each phase has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene and thus influences priority response objectives. Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance.

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) require a distinct set of actions – ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection interventions.

### FEWS NET

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) classification is IPC-compatible, which means it follows key IPC protocols but is not built on multi-partner technical consensus, so it does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

Funded and managed by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), FEWS NET provides early warning and evidence-based analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian and development response. FEWS NET monitors 30 countries, 22 in presence and eight remotely, where it analyses the dynamics of food, nutrition and livelihood security so policymakers can design programmes that address the root causes of persistent or recurrent acute food insecurity, undernutrition and vulnerability.

### CARI

WFP has developed, and uses, the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology. This methodology is also commonly used by other food security partners in their assessments. CARI is a widespread practice for Multi-Sector Needs Assessments, used in calculating the People in Need figure for countries/territories not covered by IPC/CH analyses.

Before any intervention, WFP analyses the food security situation with partners to perform effective targeting, determines the most appropriate type and scale of intervention and ensures the most efficient use of humanitarian resources.

The CARI addresses the multiple dimensions of food security through five indicators – Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) OR Food Expenditure Share, and Livelihood Coping Strategies.

Each surveyed household is classified into one

of four food security categories –food secure, marginally food secure, moderately acutely food insecure and severely acutely food insecure. The results are presented within the CARI food security console, which provides the prevalence of each available CARI food security indicator. The aggregate results provide the population's overall food security outcome or Food Security Index (FSI).

Populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. In this year's edition, for upper-middle-income countries with WFP CARI analyses only, resident populations classified as "severely food insecure" have been considered.

The indicators included within the CARI approach can be used within IPC/CH analyses, but there are many differences between the two methods. The fundamental difference is that the CARI analyses primary data from a single household survey, while the IPC/CH uses a 'convergence-of-evidence' approach, incorporating and analysing a variety of secondary information. While the CARI assesses the situation at a fixed point in time with no projection, the IPC/CH provides the current snapshot and a projection based on the most likely scenario for any period in the future.

### Change in CARI methodology

The third edition of CARI, launched in December 2021, introduced two changes. First, the food consumption domain included a reduced Coping Strategies Index in addition to Food Consumption Group.

Secondly, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) became the preferred measure for economic vulnerability instead of food expenditure share. This is better for assistance targeting purposes. The main implication for the use in GRFC is the comparison of the CARI findings with prior surveys.

The ECMEN indicator identifies the percentage of households whose expenditures exceed the

**FIG. TN.4 Number of countries by data sources for the 2023 peak estimates and 2023 projection estimates**

Data sources		Methodology	2023*	2024
IPC	IPC/CH five phase classification		24	21
CH	IPC/CH five phase classification		14	13
FEWS NET	In-country presence		4	4
	Remote Monitoring		2	2
WFP	CARI		9	
FAO/WFP	CARI		1	
REACH	CARI		1	
HNO	CARI		1	
HNO/HNRP	Other accepted food security analysis methodology at country level		4	1

\* There are 59 countries/territories with data available and endorsed in 2023, but the Palestine assessment consists of different sources for West Bank and the Gaza Strip, each following a different methodology, so the numbers in this column add up to 60.

Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB). A MEB is defined as what a household requires in order to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its cost.

The MEB covers those needs that households meet fully or partially through the market. It serves as a monetary threshold that can be used to assess a household's economic capacity to meet their needs. To compute the ECMEN, household expenditures are used as a proxy for household economic capacity.

See CARI methodology <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000134704/download/>

### Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and other estimates

OCHA HNOs provide the People in Need (PiN) figure for the Food Security and Livelihoods cluster, based on data collected during the year and it is endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team in each country/territory.

Similarly, food insecurity estimates are provided by OCHA in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Joint Response Plan (JRP). When no other

sources for acute food insecurity estimates are available, the GRFC food security TWG assesses the methodology of the PiN to ensure it is based on acute food insecurity indicators and used as an approximation to Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) for use in the GRFC. Exceptions can be made based on the Food Security TWG discussion and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's food security situation.

In cases where there was no consensus within the TWG, the ultimate decision over country inclusion and what data to use in the report is deferred to the Senior Committee.

**All partners agree with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity** of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries/territories included in this report.

### Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements and data gaps

As a result of this rigorous process, there are countries where food security information is

available, but the source does not use the methods endorsed by the GRFC Food Security TWG. The information is acknowledged but not included until further studies on its comparability with the other methodologies used mean it can be endorsed as equivalent/approximate to IPC Phase 3 and above. This is the case, for instance, for estimates acquired through remote data collection. The Senior Committee validates these data for inclusion in the report.

Such countries are listed in the GRFC as '**data not meeting GRFC technical requirements**' and reported at the end of each regional section.

If no public analysis for the year in question is available, the country/territory selected for inclusion in the GRFC is a **data gap**.

### Acute food insecurity peak for 2023

Among data available for a given country/territory that have been endorsed for 2023 and validated by the TWG according to the criteria listed above, the analysis/assessment reporting the highest number of acutely food-insecure people is selected as the peak. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available.

The **peak** can be either an analysis made for the current period in 2023 or a projection made in 2022 or 2023 and referring to a period of the year 2023. If none of the above are available, an analysis covering Q3/Q4 of 2022 can be used as peak, if considered still relevant by the Food Security TWG.

The **peak projection** is based on the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food-insecurity in 2023, as reported by endorsed data sources available as of January 2024.

For this GRFC 2024 report, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024 so the projection estimates only partially cover 2024.

Analyses that straddle 2023 and 2024 are considered for both years and, if reporting the highest number of people compared to other available analyses in the two years, the same analysis is used as the peak for both 2023 and 2024.

A projection update or a new analysis covering at least part of the previous projection period overrides the original projection findings since it is based on more up-to-date information, hence providing more accurate findings.

Data from non-IPC/CH (FEWS NET, CARI and HNO analyses) sources are presented in the country narratives according to their specific terminology and categorization.

The wording 'high levels of acute food insecurity' or 'IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent' are used to include both IPC/CH estimates and any food security estimates that are based on non-IPC/CH data sources reflecting an approximation of IPC Phase 3 and above.

Information is presented in summary tables as IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent without further breakdown to more specific IPC/CH Phases.

### Major food crises

A country/territory is defined as a major food crisis when its acute food insecurity estimates meet one or more of the following criteria:

- At least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- At least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- Any area classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above.
- Included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3.


**44**

countries/territories were identified as major food crises in 2023.

### Protracted food crises

A country/territory is defined as a protracted food crisis when it is included in all editions of the GRFC.

FIG. TN.5 The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale

Phase name and description	Phase 1 Acceptable	Phase 2 Alert	Phase 3 Serious	Phase 4 Critical	Phase 5 Extremely Critical
	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished.	5-9.9% of children are acutely malnourished..	10-14.9% of children are acutely malnourished.	15-29.9% of children are acutely malnourished. The mortality and morbidity levels are elevated or increasing. Individual food consumption is likely to be compromised.	30% or more children are acutely malnourished. Widespread morbidity and/or very large individual food consumption gaps are likely evident.
	The situation is progressively deteriorating, with increasing levels of acute malnutrition. Morbidity levels and/or individual food consumption gaps are likely to increase with increasing levels of acute malnutrition.				
Priority response objective to decrease acute malnutrition and to prevent related mortality. <sup>2</sup>	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition.	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to acute malnutrition. Monitor conditions and plan response as required.	Urgently reduce acute malnutrition levels through 		
			Scaling up of treatment and prevention of affected populations.	Significant scale-up and intensification of treatment and protection activities to reach additional population affected.	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and disease epidemics by all means.
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on weight for height Z-score (WHZ)	<5%	5.0 to 9.9%	10.0 to 14.9%	15.0 to 29.9%	≥30%
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)	<5%				
	5-9.9%				
			10-14.9%		
			≥15%		
*GAM based on MUAC must only be used in the absence of GAM based on WHZ; the final IPC Acute Malnutrition phase with GAM based on MUAC should be supported by an analysis of the relationship between WHZ and MUAC in the area of analysis and also by using convergence of evidence with contributing factors. In exceptional conditions where GAM based on MUAC is significantly higher than GAM based on WHZ (i.e. two or more phases), both GAM based on WHZ, and GAM based on MUAC should be considered, and the final phase should be determined with convergence of evidence.					



Any country/territory included in all GRFC editions and consistently identified as a major food crisis is then defined as a protracted major food crisis.

**36** countries/territories were identified as **protracted food crises** in 2023, **19** of them as **protracted major food crises**.

## NUTRITION DATA

**FSIN facilitated discussions with the Nutrition TWG on the available malnutrition data for the selected countries/territories.**

Data gathered must follow the partnership criteria and requirements. The Nutrition TWG evaluated the analyses and indicators available for the reporting year, i.e. 2023 in the case of the GRFC 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the Nutrition TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from 2021 and 2022. Projections for 2024 were considered if the analysis covered at least one month of 2024.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

**35** out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024 had data available on acute malnutrition that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

## Data sources and methodologies

The inclusion in the GRFC of data regarding the burden of malnutrition, which covers the number of children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women between 15 and 49 years of age suffering from acute malnutrition during a specific period, adheres to a prioritized list of data

sources as follows:

1. IPC Acute Malnutrition analyses
2. Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO), or Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP)
3. National estimates, from UNICEF and WFP.

Exceptions can be made based on the Nutrition TWG discussions regarding the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's nutritional situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, periods of analysis or when a country/territory has information from several sources.

For reporting on outcome levels, which refer to the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 and pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), the following sources are considered:

1. Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys
2. Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and DHS national surveys
3. Standardised Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS)
4. and DHS national surveys.

## The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale


This scale classifies the severity of acute malnutrition in the population under assessment. The IPC analysis process reviews all contributing factors affecting acute malnutrition in the area of analysis, such as dietary intake, disease, feeding and care practices, health and WASH environment, and contextual information such as access to services and mortality (*see figure TN.5*).

## SMART surveys

Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) is an inter-agency initiative launched in 2002 by a network of organizations and humanitarian practitioners.

The SMART Methodology is an improved survey method that balances simplicity (for rapid assessment of acute emergencies) and technical soundness. It draws from the core elements of

**FIG. TN.6 UNICEF's conceptual framework was used as an 'entry point' for the drivers (lack of food, inadequate practices and inadequate services).**



several methodologies and it is based on the two most vital and basic public health indicators for the assessment of the magnitude and severity of a humanitarian crisis (*see Indicators in Appendix 4*):

- Nutritional status of children under five.
- Mortality rate of the population.

For categorizing wasting from SMART surveys the World Health Organization (WHO) cut-off values for public health significance are used.

## Malnutrition peak for 2023

Among the data endorsed for the GRFC 2024 and validated by the TWG based on the criteria outlined above, the analysis or assessment that reports the highest number of acutely malnourished children and PBW during a specific

period of the year is selected as the peak. This selection does not necessarily coincide with most recent analyses available.

The peak data may originate from an analysis conducted in 2023 or from projections made in 2022 or 2023, pertaining to any period within 2023. If such data are unavailable, most recent analyses from 2021 or 2022 may serve as the peak for those years, provided the Nutrition TWG deems it still relevant.

For this edition of the GRFC, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024.

**FIG. TN.7 Severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6–59 months**

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–< 5%	Low
5–< 10%	Medium
10–< 15%	High
≥ 15%	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. *Public Health Nutrition*, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

## DISPLACEMENT DATA

### FSIN facilitated discussions with the Displacement TWG on the available displacement data for the selected countries/territories.

Gathered data must follow the partnership criteria and requirements.

The TWG evaluated the analyses and data available for the reporting year. If no data were available for 2023, the Displacement TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from the previous year.

Analyses covering the whole country/territory are generally preferred, but for certain countries/territories only some areas were analysed.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

Out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024, **35** had data for all categories of forcibly displaced persons that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

## Data sources and methodologies

The data for refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are provided by UNHCR

The data sources for internally displaced people adhere to the following priority ranking:

1. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2. International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)
3. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Exceptions to the above priority rankings can be made based on the Displacement TWG discussions and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's displacement situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, timings or when a country/territory has information from several sources. For example, UNRWA is the source for Palestine displacement data for global and regional aggregations in the report.

### Displacement figures for 2023

The recentness of available data varies. The most recent UNHCR data for refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are from mid-year 2023. UNHCR also provides nowcasting data that estimates displacement figures for refugees and asylum-seekers for the end of December 2023. GRFC uses UNHCR's nowcasting data for regional and global aggregations when available. UNRWA data on Palestine refugees and asylum-seekers are from September 2023.


Data used for regional and global aggregations for internally displaced persons are the most recent available and vary depending on when the analysis is conducted at the country level. When IOM data are not available and the most recently available data (2022) from IDMC's GRID are used for regional and global aggregations.

## DRIVERS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

**The drivers of food crises are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific trigger or main driver for each food crisis.**

The GRFC 2023 takes a practical approach by estimating which is the most salient driver for each country/territory out of:

- Conflict/insecurity
- Weather extremes
- Economic shocks.

 **Conflict/insecurity** includes interstate and intra-state conflicts, internal violence, banditry and criminality, civil unrest or political crises often leading to population displacements and/or disruption of livelihoods and food systems.

It is a key driver of acute food insecurity because in conflict situations civilians are frequently deprived of their income sources and or have difficulties in accessing food as food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself.


Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc.

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities, increasing poverty levels and diverting government spending towards the war effort.

Health systems are usually damaged or destroyed, leaving people reliant on humanitarian support – yet increasingly, insecurity and roadblocks prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching the most vulnerable, or aid agencies face lengthy delays, restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security guarantees. Parties to conflict can deny people access to food as a weapon of war, especially in areas

under blockade/ embargo. Food insecurity itself can become a trigger for violence and instability, particularly in contexts marked by pervasive inequalities and fragile institutions. Sudden spikes in food prices tend to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflict (FAO et al., 2017).


For countries with conflict/insecurity as the primary driver during the past year, change to another primary driver needs serious consideration as recovery from conflict/insecurity takes a long time and may remain as the underlying cause of food insecurity. In cases where conflict/insecurity has reduced and/or localized, with other drivers showing a predominant effect, the change in the primary driver from the previous year is considered.

 **Weather extremes** include droughts, floods, dry spells, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and the untimely start of rainy seasons.

Weather extremes drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests push up food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities and pastoralists' terms-of-trade, lowering purchasing power and access to food, and triggering an early lean season when households are more market-reliant because of reduced food stocks.

Adverse weather events are particularly grave for smallholder farmers and pastoralists who rely on agriculture and livestock-rearing to access food and often lack the resilience capacities to withstand and recover from the impacts of such shocks. People's vulnerability to weather shock events rests on their capacity to adapt and bounce back after their livelihood has been affected, as well as the scale and frequency of shocks. Repeated events further erode capacity to withstand future shocks.

Weather events and changes in climate can lead to an intensification of conflict, such as between pastoralist herders and farmers over access to water and grazing. There is ample evidence suggesting that natural disasters – particularly droughts – can aggravate existing civil conflicts.

 **Economic shocks** at country level can affect the food insecurity of households or individuals through various channels. Macroeconomic shocks may lead to increases in acute food insecurity through for instance, a contraction in GDP leading to high unemployment rates and consequent loss of income for those affected households, or a significant contraction in exports and/or a critical decrease in investments and other capital inflows, bringing a significant currency depreciation and high inflation, increasing production costs and food prices and worsening terms of trade which may lead to increases in acute food insecurity.

High debt and limited fiscal space constrain economic growth, increase vulnerability to economic shocks and detract from development spending.

Increases in world market prices of staple grains, oil and agricultural inputs can affect food availability, push up domestic food prices for consumers and reduce their purchasing power. Economic shocks can also occur at a more localized level or hit only a particular socioeconomic category of households. For instance, pastoralists' facing lack of animal feed, veterinary services, subsequent deteriorating livestock body conditions and depressed livestock prices are likely to be affected by a reduction in purchasing power and face a constrained access to food as a result.

**Crop pests, livestock disease and natural disasters** are also indicated as primary/secondary/tertiary drivers when relevant.

FSIN and the Food Security TWG agree the primary driver of acute food insecurity for each selected country based on what happened in the country during the year and information on the number of people affected by each of the shocks. For countries with two or more drivers affecting different parts of the country or different population groups, the primary driver is chosen by estimating which driver affected the largest number of people and their food security at country level. While acknowledging that other

drivers underlie the acute food insecurity numbers in each country in addition to the primary driver, the GRFC aggregates the number of countries by primary driver at the global level.

For countries where the analysis is purely focused on the displaced populations, the primary driver reflects the reason those populations are displaced from their country of origin.

It is also acknowledged that food insecurity is not driven solely by the occurrence of a shock, but rather by the interaction between shocks and structural vulnerabilities. Some of the main indicators of vulnerability for each country are discussed in the regional sections of chapter 2.

## Drafting

FSIN initiates the drafting process based on data endorsed by the Technical Working Groups. Some sections of the report are open to partners to contribute to the drafting directly in a shared document environment.

### Visualising the data

FSIN produces relevant infographics and maps to facilitate communication of the data.

Where infographics show numbers of acutely food-insecure people, they are disaggregated by phase where possible. In order to better contextualize the levels of acute food insecurity, the total country population and numbers of people in IPC/CH phases 1 and 2 are also shown.

### Maps

Boundaries and names shown, and designations used on the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

## 3 | REVIEW AND CLEARANCE

### Review and quality control check

#### FSIN shares all drafts produced with the Technical Working Groups for technical review.

In case of controversies, discussions within the TWG take place until consensus is reached on the draft report. Otherwise it is referred to the Senior Committee to provide guidance on addressing gaps and lack of consensus as well as troubleshoot on remaining technical challenges. Comments from this first review round ensuring the technical accuracy and internal consistency of the draft report are then incorporated into the second draft of the GRFC.

The Senior Committee reviews and comments on the second draft providing recommendation on, but not limited to, the overall structure and messaging of the report. FSIN and Technical Working Groups implement Senior Committee recommendations and refine the draft.

For the GRFC 2024, there have been two iterations of review by the Senior Committee. After each review period, a discussion among partners is facilitated by FSIN to ensure consensus is reached on all aspects and information reported in the GRFC.

At the end of this process, the final draft is proof-read by FSIN.

### Institutional clearance

Each member of the Senior Committee facilitates the validation of the report by each partner organisation.

## 4 | RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION

### FSIN produces the digital and physical publication of the full GRFC report and related products.

In coordination with the Global Network Against Food Crises, a communications campaign is developed and implemented to maximize visibility and outreach. The GRFC-related products include the English, Spanish and French versions of the GRFC In Briefs, the interactive version, and stand-alone assets including maps, country pages, spotlights, technical notes and more.

The GRFC is launched during a hybrid event with the main partners.

During the calendar year and according to the assessment calendars in different regions, FSIN, in coordination with regional partners produces and publishes regional reports to provide in-depth information on specific areas and regions. Dissemination, including outreach campaigns and events, is organized in coordination with regional partners.

# GRFC 2024

## Limitations and data challenges

There are no estimates for populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) due to the use of non-IPC/CH data sources in 20 countries/territories: Algeria (refugees), Angola, Colombia (residents and migrants), Congo (residents and refugees), Ecuador (migrants), Ethiopia, Egypt, Arab Rep (refugees), Iraq (refugees), Jordan (refugees), Nicaragua, Palestine (West Bank), Peru (migrants), Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye (refugees), Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

### Lack of/low data availability for refugee food security

Refugee food security is measured in various ways across refugee populations and data are not systematically collected, disaggregated, consolidated or shared.

WFP ENA assessments are available for refugee populations in Rwanda and Moldova but considered as ‘insufficient evidence’.

### Limited availability and frequency of IPC acute malnutrition analyses

Only 18 countries conducted an IPC acute malnutrition analysis covering a portion of 2023: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. Angola had an IPC acute malnutrition analysis covering a portion of 2022.

### Limited availability of updated information and frequency of national nutrition surveys

Seven out of the 44 major food-crisis countries/territories do not have national updated/recent malnutrition prevalence and IYCF data at the sub-national or national level beyond 2019.

### Limited 2024 projections (acute food insecurity)

For several countries with no IPC/CH or compatible products where alternative estimates are used, 2024 projections are not available.

IPC-compatible analyses offer range values for projection rather than precise estimates.

### Comparability of assessments

Assessments are only considered comparable across two years if the coverage of the analysis changed by less than 10 percent, and if carried out using the same methodology and covering the same geographical areas.

The same methodology used for the peak analysis must also be used for the projection, but a difference in analysis coverage is permitted – as in Benin, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and United Republic of Tanzania.

The following food-crisis countries included in the GRFC 2024, do not have comparable data between 2022 and 2023.

**Angola** The data source and coverage changed. In 2022, the peak was derived from an IPC analysis which covered only 9 percent of the country, whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET (remote monitoring) analysis with 100 percent coverage.

**Bangladesh** The methodology and data source changed. In 2022, the peak was derived from the Joint Response Plan on the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, analysing Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox's Bazar. In 2023, the estimate is based on a new IPC analysis covering 15 districts across Bangladesh, including FDMNs in camps. This substantial increase in the analysed population from 1.4 million to 38.2 million, along with the change in methodology, makes the two periods not comparable.

**Chad** While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the analysed population increased by 14 percent between the two years, notably due to the inclusion of the capital city in the 2023 analysis.

**Ethiopia** There was a change in data source. The 2022 peak was derived from the HRP 2023, whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

**Iraq** There was a change in data source and population group analysed. The 2022 peak was derived from HTO, covering IDPs and returnees whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a WFP CARI analysis, covering Syrian refugees.

**Jordan (refugee population)** Although both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on WFP's CARI methodology, the analysed population increased by 11 percent between the two years.

**Kenya** While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the analysed population increased by 12 percent.

**Mauritania** Although both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the population analysed declined by 19 percent.

**Mozambique** Despite both 2022 and 2023 analyses being based on IPC methodology, the analysed population declined by 50 percent.

**Myanmar** The methodology and data source changed between the two years. In 2022, the peak was derived from an HNO analysis, primarily based on rCARI methodology, whereas the 2023 estimate is derived from an HNR, based on a methodology that meets GRFC technical requirements.

**Nigeria** The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 are not comparable due a significant expansion in the coverage of the CH analysis. The population analysed increased by 22 percent, up from 21 states and the FCT in 2022 to 26 states and the FCT in 2023. The analysed population increased from 159.1 million to 193.6.

**Pakistan** While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the geographical coverage increased from 28 to 43 districts. The analysed population increased from 19.8 million to 36.7 million.

**Palestine** The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Palestine cannot be directly compared

due to a change in methodology. In 2022, the peak was determined through an HNO analysis, encompassing both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The 2022 numbers are based on the Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) which uses different indicators including FIES with a 30-day recall period and ECMEN. The 2023 estimate for the Gaza Strip is based on an IPC analysis, while the estimate for the West Bank relies on the previous year's HNO with updated assumptions provided by the gFSC.

**Sierra Leone** While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the lack of comparability is mainly due to an official revision of the country's population estimate based on a recent census conducted by the government, which found a 12 percent decline in the population.

**Yemen** The data source changed. The 2022 peak was derived from an IPC analysis, while the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

**Zambia** While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the population analysed declined by 19 percent and the geographical coverage changed significantly (from 91 to 76 districts analysed).

## Historical inclusion of countries/territories in the GRFC, 2016–23

Over the eight years of the GRFC's existence, 51 countries/territories have been systematically identified as food crises each year following the rigorous selection process: 36 have had data in all GRFC editions.

Nineteen countries have been classified as major food crises in all eight editions.

In earlier editions, several regional crises featured in the GRFC, allowing for coverage of countries that otherwise might not have qualified for inclusion as food crises individually. The Lake Chad Basin region, encompassing the Extrême Nord region of Cameroon, Chad's Lac region, Nigeria's Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states; and Niger's Diffa region, was included in the 2017, 2018 and



2019 editions. The Central Sahel region, covering Burkina Faso, Mali and the western Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of the Niger, was in the GRFC 2020. The Central American Dry Corridor region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) was included in the 2018, 2019 and 2020 editions.

See figure TN.1 on page 165: Country selection criteria and coverage for the GRFC 2024.

FIG. TN.8 Number of food crises and major food crises, GRFC 2016–2023

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Selected food crises</b>	65	61	66	71	79	77	73	73
<b>Analysed food crises</b>	48	51	53	55	55	53	58	59
<b>Major food crises</b>	23	29	32	35	34	35	42	44

FIG. TN.9 Countries/territories identified as major food crises (MFC) in the GRFC, 2016–2023

<b>8 years (protracted MFC)</b>	<b>19 countries</b> Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Zimbabwe
<b>7 years</b>	<b>6 countries/territories</b> Bangladesh, Burundi, Kenya, Pakistan, Palestine, Uganda
<b>6 years</b>	<b>3 countries</b> Guatemala, Honduras, Zambia
<b>5 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Angola, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Mali
<b>4 years</b>	<b>5 countries</b> Djibouti, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania
<b>3 years</b>	<b>2 countries</b> El Salvador, Namibia
<b>2 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Colombia, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Myanmar, Sri Lanka
<b>Once</b>	<b>6 countries</b> Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

FIG. TN.10 Frequency of inclusion of food crises countries/territories with data meeting the GRFC requirements, 2016–2023

<b>8 years</b>	<b>36 countries/territories</b> Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
<b>7 years</b>	<b>10 countries/territories</b> Angola, Djibouti, El Salvador, Gambia, Libya, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania
<b>6 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Myanmar
<b>5 years</b>	<b>1 country</b> Jordan
<b>4 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Cabo Verde, Colombia, Ecuador, Türkiye
<b>3 years</b>	<b>5 countries</b> Congo, Egypt, Arab Rep., Sri Lanka, Togo
<b>2 years</b>	<b>7 countries</b> Algeria, Benin, Dominican Republic, Nepal, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa
<b>Once</b>	<b>3 countries</b> Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ghana, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

# Bibliography

## Introduction

**Committee on World Food Security.** Framework for action for food security and nutrition in protracted crises. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/bc852e/bc852e.pdf>

**FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO.** 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural-urban continuum.* Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en>

**EGRIS.** International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRRS). [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://egrisstats.org/recommendations/international-recommendations-on-idp-statistics-irrs/>

**EGRIS.** International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS). [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://egrisstats.org/recommendations/international-recommendations-on-refugee-statistics-irrs/>

**HLPE.** 2020. *Food security and nutrition: building a global narrative towards 2030. A report by the High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, Rome, Italy.* <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=cc8166en>

**UNHCR.** Master glossary of terms. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary>

## Chapter 1

**ACLED.** 2024. ACLED Conflict Index January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 11 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/>

**CH.** 2024. Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, mars 2024. [Online] [Accessed 17 April 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE\\_COMMUNICATION\\_-\\_MARS\\_2024\\_VF.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE_COMMUNICATION_-_MARS_2024_VF.pdf)

**European Union.** June 2023. European Union brings relief to victims of cyclone Mocha in Myanmar. [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/myanmar-burma/european-union-brings-relief-victims-cyclone-mocha-myanmar\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/myanmar-burma/european-union-brings-relief-victims-cyclone-mocha-myanmar_en)

**FAO.** 1996. Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action. World Food Summit 13-17 November 1996. Rome, Italy.

**FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crisis Mid-Year 2023. May 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-hi-res.pdf>

**Global Nutrition Cluster.** 2024. Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situational-analysis-gaza>

**IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March 2023 and Projection for April - June 2023. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed 13 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156310/?iso3=SOM>

**IPC.** 2023. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed 13 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/#:~:text=Between%2024%20November%20and%207,above%20\(Crisis%20or%20worse\).](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/#:~:text=Between%2024%20November%20and%207,above%20(Crisis%20or%20worse).)

**IPC.** 2024. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for January - March 2024 and Projection for April - June 2024. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156834/?iso3=SOM>

**IPC.** 2024. Haiti: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update for March-June 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156884/?iso3=HTI>

**IPC.** 2024. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February-15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March-15 July 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872/>

**UNCTAD.** 2022. A Double Burden: The effects of food price increases and currency depreciations on food import bills. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/a-double-burden#:~:text=These%20countries%20face%20a%20double,placed%20in%20a%20vulnerable%20position.>

**UNHCR.** 2024. Sudan situation - Operational Data Portal. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>

**UNICEF.** 2021. Conceptual Framework on the Determinants of Maternal and Child Nutrition. November 2021. [Online] [Accessed on February 23, 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/media/113291/file/UNICEF%20Conceptual%20Framework.pdf>

**WFP.** 2023. Annual Performance Report for 2022. June 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] [https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document\\_download/WFP-](https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000148942?_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752)

[0000148942?\\_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752](https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000148942?_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752)

**WMO.** 2024. WMO confirms that 2023 smashes global temperature record. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://wmo.int/media/news/wmo-confirms-2023-smashes-global-temperature-record#:~:text=Six%20leading%20international%20datasets%20used,December%20set%20new%20monthly%20records>

## Spotlight on displacement

**ACLED.** 2023. Assessing Al-Shabaab's Threat to the Region as Somalia Joins the East Africa Community. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/12/08/special-report-kenya-somalia-assessing-al-shabaabs-threat-to-the-region-as-somalia-joins-the-east-africa-community/>

**ACLED.** 2023. Global Data Dashboard. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

**CH.** 2023. Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/Fiche\\_com\\_Mars\\_2023\\_VF.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/Fiche_com_Mars_2023_VF.pdf)

**FAO.** 2022. Restoring degraded land in Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc0518en/cc0518en.pdf>

**FSNAU & IPC.** 2024. Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit - Somalia: Population - 2024 (Apr-June) Summary. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://results.ipc.fsnau.org/so/>

**IDMC.** 2023. Global Report on Internal Displacement 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2023/>

**IOM.** 2023. PROGRESS 2023: Periodic Global Report on the State of Solutions to Internal Displacement. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/progress#partner>

**IOM.** 2023. Regional Sudan Response Situation Update, 12 December 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/regional-sudan-response-situation-update-12-december-2023>

**IOM.** 2022. Somalia Drought Response. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] [https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/situation\\_reports/file/IOM-Somalia-Drought-Response-November-2022.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Somalia-Drought-Response-November-2022.pdf)

[int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/situation\\_reports/file/IOM-Somalia-Drought-Response-November-2022.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Somalia-Drought-Response-November-2022.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/?iso3=PSE>

**IPC.** 2021. IPC Technical Manual Version 3.1. August 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC\\_Technical\\_Manual\\_3\\_Final.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Lebanon: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Lebanon\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Oct2023\\_Sept2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Oct2023_Sept2024_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/Somalia-Multi-Partner-Technical-Release-on-the-March-2023-Follow-up-Assessment-Results-25-Apr-2023.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/Somalia-Multi-Partner-Technical-Release-on-the-March-2023-Follow-up-Assessment-Results-25-Apr-2023.pdf)

**IPC.** 2022. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot - October 2022 - June 2023. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Somalia\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Snapshot\\_Oct2022Jun2023.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Somalia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Snapshot_Oct2022Jun2023.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_South\\_Sudan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_Sep2023\\_July2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf)

**OCHA.** 2023. Global Humanitarian Overview 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfrs>

**OCHA.** 2022. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023: Syrian Arab Republic. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2023-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2022-enar>

**OCHA.** 2023. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024: Syrian Arab Republic. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2023>

**UNHCR.** 2022. Jordan issues record number of work permits to Syrian refugees. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/news-releases/jordan-issues-record-number-work-permits-syrian-refugees>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Jordan: Operational Data Portal. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/jor>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Mid-Year Trends Report 2023. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/mid-year-trends>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Over 1 million people internally displaced in Somalia in record time. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/over-1-million-people-internally-displaced-somalia-record-time>

**UNHCR.** 2024. Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation Summary 2024. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 5 March 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106210>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Rohingya emergency: Emergency Appeal. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/us/emergencies/rohingya-emergency>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/>

**UNHCR.** 2022. South Sudan: Regional Refugee Response Plan 2022. March 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91426>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS) Final Report: White Nile State South Sudanese Refugee Camps. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-report-white-nile-state-south-sudanese-refugee-camps-sudan-aljameya-khor-alwaral-um-sangour-al-radis-1-2-el-kashafa-jouri-alagaya-algana-dabat-bosin-camps-november-2022>

**UNHCR.** 2024. Sudan situation. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 19 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>

**UNHCR.** 2024. UNHCR Bangladesh 2023 Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS). January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unhcr-bangladesh-2023-standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-executive-summary>

**UNHCR.** 2022. VASyR 2021 – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2021-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon?gad\\_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA35urBhDCARiAOU7QwmfJ5V-JPNqUvfZy223kMQl1p8ZVtc70hz3IY3QWcjF1MzG0AMXaQAoyzEALw\\_wcB](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2021-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA35urBhDCARiAOU7QwmfJ5V-JPNqUvfZy223kMQl1p8ZVtc70hz3IY3QWcjF1MzG0AMXaQAoyzEALw_wcB)

**UNHCR.** 2023. VASyR 2022 – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2022-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

**UNHCR & WFP.** 2023. UNHCR/WFP Joint Post Distribution Monitoring: South Sudan. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000152712/download/>

**UNRWA.** 2024. UNRWA situation and response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 19 February 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-61-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>

**WFP.** 2023. 2023 in pictures: Ration cuts threaten catastrophe for millions facing hunger. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/stories/2023-pictures-ration-cuts-threaten-catastrophe-millions-facing-hunger>

**WFP.** 2023. Food Security in Numbers: Refugees in Jordan. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151223/download/?\\_ga=2.83991193.1635763400.1705779013-1803802559.1703376351](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151223/download/?_ga=2.83991193.1635763400.1705779013-1803802559.1703376351)

**WFP.** 2021. Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard. June 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a>

**WFP.** 2022. Regional Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-5) Report. June 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140947/download/>

**WFP.** 2023. Regional Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-6) Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/refugee-influx-emergency-vulnerability-assessment-reva-6-report-june-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face grim choices as more cuts to food assistance imminent. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/news/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-face-grim-choices-more-cuts-food-assistance-imminent>

**WFP.** 2023. South Sudan Global Food Distribution (GFD) 2022 Round 1 Post Distribution Monitoring Summary Report. [Accessed on 13 February 2024]

**WFP.** 2024. Global Operational Response Plan 2024 – Update #10. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156760/download/?\\_ga=2.120202123.206544037.1712657268-943906844.1671179002](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156760/download/?_ga=2.120202123.206544037.1712657268-943906844.1671179002)

## Chapter 2

### CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

**DHS.** 2023. Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (TDHS-MIS). September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR382/FR382.pdf>

**FAO.** 2023 Crop Prospects and Food Situation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Southern Africa Alert: Strong El Niño will drive high needs across Southern Africa through early 2025. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fewsn.net/sites/default/files/2023-11/Alert-Southern-Africa-ElNino-20231108.pdf>

**IOM.** 2023. Record High Displacement in DRC at Nearly 7 Million. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million>

**IPC.** 2022. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë et de la malnutrition aiguë de l'IPC July 2022 – June 2023. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_DRC\\_Acute\\_FoodInsec\\_Malnutrition\\_July2022Jun2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_FoodInsec_Malnutrition_July2022Jun2023_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë October 2022 – August 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Oct2022\\_Aug2023\\_report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Central_African_Republic_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Aug2023_report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Análise IPC da insegurança alimentar aguda e desnutrição aguda May 2023 – March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Mozambique\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_May\\_2023\\_March\\_2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mozambique_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_May_2023_March_2024_report.pdf)

**OCHA.** Southern Africa: Cholera Situation Snapshot. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/southern-africa-cholera-situation-snapshot-28-january-2024>

**OCHA.** 2024. Central African Republic: Situation Report. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 15 March 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-situation-report-5-jan-2024>

**OCHA.** 2024. Southern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/madagascar/southern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-february-2024>

**UN.** 2024. United Nations Responds to Zambia's Drought Disaster and Emergency. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed

28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/zambia/united-nations-responds-zambias-drought-disaster-and-emergency>

**UNICEF.** 2023. Children at Risk of Cholera in Aftermath of Cyclone Freddy. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/esa/press-releases/children-risk-cholera-aftermath-cyclone-freddy-unicef>

**UNICEF.** 2024. Central African Republic Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/unicef-central-african-republic-humanitarian-situation-report-no-4-01-january-31-december-2023>

**UNHCR.** 2024. Central African Republic Situation. Global Focus. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/central-african-republic-situation>

**WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: Food inflation. November 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)

**WFP.** 2023. Critical Funding Shortage Forces WFP to Slash Food Rations for Refugees in Tanzania. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.wfp.org/news/critical-funding-shortage-forces-wfp-slash-food-rations-refugees-tanzania>

### Angola

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Brief on Angola [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AGO>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Southwest Angola Expected to Improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) by July 2023. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://fewsn.net/southern-africa/angola/remote-monitoring-report/february-2023>

**IPC.** 2021. Angola: Acute Food Insecurity Situation and Acute Malnutrition Situation April 2021– March 2022. September 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Angola\\_FoodSecurity&Nutrition\\_2021July2022Mar\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Angola_FoodSecurity&Nutrition_2021July2022Mar_Snapshot_English.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Country brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/43ae04fa42b7420a85274329d051a0a2/download/>

### Central African Republic

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>



**FEWS NET.** 2023. Despite New Harvests, Staple Cereal Prices Remain High, Particularly in Conflict Zones. October 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/west-africa/central-african-republic/remote-monitoring-report/october-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Central African Republic Acute Food Insecurity. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/central-african-republic>

**IPC.** 2023. République Centrafricaine: Insécurité alimentaire préoccupante mais relativement stable. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_CAR\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Sept2023\\_Aug2024\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_CAR_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2023_Aug2024_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Central African Republic: Acute Malnutrition Situation for September 2023 - February 2024 and Projection for March–August 2024. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156687/?iso3=CAF>

**WFP.** 2023. République Centrafricaine – Bulletin #40. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000154250/download/>

## Congo

**OCHA.** 2024 Today's Top News: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Congo. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-syria-congo>

**UN.** 2024. Inondations au Congo: 350.000 personnes ont besoin d'une aide humanitaire. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2024/01/1142472>

**UNHCR.** 2021. UNHCR Data Dashboard – SENS Republic of Congo. April 2021 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrJmMDQ2MTMzMmUtYmRiY>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Southern Africa Operational Update. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/southern-africa-operational-update-6917>

**WFP.** 2022. Republic of Congo Country Brief. September 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/wfp-republic-congo-country-brief-september-2022>

**World Bank.** Republic of Congo overview. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/congo/overview>.

## Democratic Republic of the Congo

**ECHO.** 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo – floods ECHO daily flash. 12 January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-floods-media-noaa-cpc-echo-daily-flash-12-january-2024>.

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Acute food insecurity remains high in conflict zones during the lean season. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/republique-democratique-du-congo/perspectives-sur-la-securite-alimentaire/octobre-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Continuing violence is the season A harvest in the North and Central-East. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/democratic-republic-congo/food-security-outlook-update/december-2023>

**IOM.** 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo Displacement Tracking Matrix. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/democratic-republic-congo>

**IPC.** 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Malnutrition Situation July–December 2022 and Projection for January–June 2023. October 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155974/?iso3=COD>

**IPC.** 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Food Insecurity Situation Projection Update for January - June 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156354/?iso3=COD>

**IPC.** 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July–December 2023 and Projection for January–June 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156611/?iso3=COD>

**IPC.** 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Malnutrition Situation July–December 2023 and Projection for January–June 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156760/?iso3=COD>

## Eswatini

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Brief on Eswatini. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SWZ>

**IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity analysis June 2023 –March 2024. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] [www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Eswatini\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Jun23\\_Mar24\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Eswatini_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jun23_Mar24_Report.pdf)

## Lesotho

**IPC.** 2023. IPC acute food insecurity analysis July 2023 – March 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Lesotho\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Jul2023\\_Mar2024\\_Report\\_.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lesotho_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jul2023_Mar2024_Report_.pdf)

## Madagascar

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Madagascar Food Security Outlook October 2023 –May 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/madagascar/madagascar-food-security-outlook-october-2023-may-2024>

**FEWS NET.** 2024. Dry Conditions Improve in parts of Southern Africa; flooding continues in parts of Central and East Africa. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://fews.net/global/global-weather-hazards/january-2024-0>

**IPC.** 2022. Acute food insecurity situation November–December 2021 and projections for January–April 2022 and May–August 2022. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155379/?iso3=MDG>

**IPC.** 2022. Acute food malnutrition situation June–September 2023 and projections for October–December 2023 and January–April 2023. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156531/?iso3=MDG>

**IPC.** 2023. Acute malnutrition analysis, June 2023–April 2023. August 2023. [Accessed on 20 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Madagascar\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Jun2023\\_Apr2024\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Madagascar_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2023_Apr2024_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2024. Madagascar: Acute food insecurity situation for October 2023–January 2024 and projections for February– April 2024 and May–September 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156778/?iso3=MDG>

**IPC.** 2024. Acute malnutrition situation for October 2023–January 2024 and Projections for February–April 2024 and May–September 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156779/?iso3=MDG>

**OCHA.** 2023. Southern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/madagascar-southern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-october-2023>

## Malawi

**FAO.** 2023. FPMA Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Malawi Country Brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=MWI&lang=ar>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message update – Crisis (IPC Phase 3) expected amid high food prices and insufficient assistance. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/malawi/key-message-update/september-2023#:~:text=Recommended%20Citation%3A%20FEWS%20NET,prices%20and%20insufficient%20assistance%2C%202023>

**IPC.** 2023. IPC acute food insecurity analysis July 2023–March 2024. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Malawi\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Jul2023\\_Mar2024Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Malawi_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jul2023_Mar2024Report.pdf)

**UNHCR.** 2023. Picking up the pieces in Mozambique and Malawi after Tropical Cyclone Freddy. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 December 2023] <https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/stories/picking-pieces-mozambique-and-malawi-after-tropical-cyclone-freddy>

**UNICEF.** 2023. Over half a million children at risk of malnutrition in Malawi. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] [https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/over-half-million-children-risk-malnutrition-malawi#:~:text=In%202023%20alone%2C%20it%20is,SAM\)%2C%20often%20called%20wasting](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/over-half-million-children-risk-malnutrition-malawi#:~:text=In%202023%20alone%2C%20it%20is,SAM)%2C%20often%20called%20wasting)

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Malawi Country Brief. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000152515/download/?\\_ga=2.208552402.1786647325.1700479735-1921871277.1696859448](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000152515/download/?_ga=2.208552402.1786647325.1700479735-1921871277.1696859448)

**WHO.** 2023. Weekly Regional Cholera Bulletin: 28 August 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/weekly-regional-cholera-bulletin-28-august-2023-data-reported-27-august-2023>

## Mozambique

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message update: below-average rainfall and high temperatures threaten planted crops in parts of southern and central Mozambique. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique/key-message-update/november-2023#:~:text=Recommended%20citation%3A%20FEWS%20NET,southern%20and%20central%20Mozambique%2C%202023>



- IPC.** 2021. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis, February 2021–January 2022. June 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1\\_IPC\\_Mozambique\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_2021Feb2022Jan\\_Report\\_Portuguese.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1_IPC_Mozambique_Acute_Malnutrition_2021Feb2022Jan_Report_Portuguese.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Acute malnutrition situation for May–September 2023 and Projection for October 2023–March 2024. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156718/?iso3=MOZ>
- IPC.** 2023. Mozambique: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for May 2023–September 2023 and Projection for October 2023–March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156717/?iso3=MOZ>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Operation Data Portal Mozambique. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/moz>
- UNICEF.** 2023. UNICEF Geneva Palais briefing note: Triple impact of cyclone, cholera and flooding threatening survival and well-being of children in Mozambique. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-geneva-palais-briefing-note-triple-impact-cyclone-cholera-and-flooding#:~:text=MAPUTO%2C%2025%20April%202023%20E%20%93%20E%20%9C,families%20at%20ever%20more%20risk>
- UNICEF.** 2021. The State of the World's Children. October 2021 [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://data.unicef.org/resources/sowc-2021-dashboard-and-tables/>
- WFP.** 2023. Mozambique country brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/wfp-mozambique-country-brief-december-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Mozambique – Food Price Bulletin November 2023, Post-cyclone food security assessment (May – June 2023). December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/wfp-mozambique-food-price-bulletin-november-2023-post-cyclone-food-security-assessment-may-june-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: food inflation. Mozambique. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170)
- WHO.** 2023. Weekly Regional Cholera Bulletin: 28 August 2023 (Data reported as of 27 August 2023). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/weekly-regional-cholera-bulletin-28-august-2023-data-reported-27-august-2023>
- Namibia**
- IPC.** 2023. Namibia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July – September 2023 and Projections for October 2023 – March 2024 and April – June 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156545/?iso3=NAM>
- WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: food inflation. Namibia. [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)
- United Republic of Tanzania**
- DHS.** 2023. Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (TDHS-MIS). September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR382/FR382.pdf>
- IPC.** 2022. Acute food insecurity situation November 2021–April 2022 and May–September 2022. February 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155426/>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity situation October 2022–February 2023 and March–May 2023. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156131/?iso3=TZA>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity situation November 2023–April 2024 and May–October 2024. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156759/?iso3=TZA>
- WFP.** 2023. DataViz. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)
- WFP.** 2023. Movement Alert ReOK- I'port –102 (08 - 27 Feb. 2024) | Displacement Tracking Matrix (iom.int)
- Zambia**
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>
- IPC.** 2023. Zambia IPC acute food insecurity analysis August 2023 – March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 22 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Zambia\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Aug2023\\_Mar2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Zambia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aug2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf)
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Zambia Country Brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 22 November 2023] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153702/download/\\_ga=2.256770632.292899905.17006466721921871277169.6859448&\\_gac=1.137313971700559436.CjwKCAiAxGqBhBQEIwAIDNAZvqqlGSFScBE1kQeo7C8HVLj7UGLr0df8vGiJs051JlghRO3RBgoCvZyQAvD\\_BwE](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153702/download/_ga=2.256770632.292899905.17006466721921871277169.6859448&_gac=1.137313971700559436.CjwKCAiAxGqBhBQEIwAIDNAZvqqlGSFScBE1kQeo7C8HVLj7UGLr0df8vGiJs051JlghRO3RBgoCvZyQAvD_BwE)
- Zimbabwe**
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/zimbabwe>
- FAO.** November 2023).
- FAO-GIEWS.** October 2023). <https://fews.net/southern-africa/zimbabwe/key-message-update/november-2023>
- <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc8566en>
- <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ZWE>
- Zim VAC 2022
- ZimVAC, 2023
- A lack of access to clean water and good sanitation drove the national cholera outbreak from February 2023, with more than 13 000 suspected cases by the end of the year (WHO, December 2023)
- EAST AFRICA**
- ACAPS.** 2024. ACAPS Briefing Note – Chad: Food security crisis. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/acaps-briefing-note-chad-food-security-crisis-04-january-2024>
- ACLED.** 2024. Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sudan/>
- CILSS.** 2023. Situation Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'ouest et au Cameroun – Fiche November 2023. Niamey, Niger. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
- European Commission.** 2023. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations: Uganda. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] [https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/uganda\\_en](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/uganda_en)
- FAO.** 2023. World Food and Agriculture – Statistical Yearbook 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/?details=cc8166en>
- FAO, IGAD & Interpeace.** 2023. Conflict, climate change, food security, and mobility in the Karamoja Cluster – A study to analyse interactions among conflict, food security, climate change, migration and displacement factors. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc7672en>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Conflict, high prices, and flooding sustain elevated humanitarian needs in much of the region. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/food-security-outlook/november-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Drought-induced crop failure leads to Emergency in conflict-affected north. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook-update/december-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected in northern Ethiopia. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 04 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will expand during the post-harvest period. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Clashes in Sudan's breadbasket threaten national food availability. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/alert/february-2024>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2023] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023>
- IFPRI.** 2023. End of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Implications for sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/end-black-sea-grain-initiative-implications-sub-saharan-africa>
- IMF.** 2024. IMF Staff Completes 2023 Article IV Mission to Djibouti. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/01/25/pr2425-djibouti-imf-staff-completes-2023-article-iv-mission>
- IMF.** 2023. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023>
- IOM.** 2023. DTM Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IOM.** 2023. République Centrafricaine — Suivi des Flux de Populations: Am-Dafock (frontière Soudanaise) (Mai-Juin 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/republique-centrafricaine-suivi-des-flux-de-populations-am-dafock-frontiere-soudanaise-mai>
- IOM.** 2023. Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 17 (August - September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia->

- national-displacement-report-17-august-september-2023?close=true
- IOM.** 2024. DTM Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2023 and Projections for December 2023 - March 2024 and for April - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156667?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Kenya acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis July 2023-January 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Kenya\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_2023\\_Jul2024Jan\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2023_Jul2024Jan_Report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for October 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156730?iso3=SDN>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda: Acute Malnutrition Situation April - September 2023 and Projection for October 2023 - March 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fr/c/1156714?iso3=UGA>
- Joint Statement.** 2023. Seeking Safety Amidst Crisis – East Africa and the Great Lakes' multi-layered displacement crises. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/seeking-safety-amidst-crisis-east-africa-and-great-lakes-multi-layered-displacement-crises>
- OCHA.** 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact - September 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/eastern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-september-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño Impact Snapshot - November 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/eastern-africa-el-nino-impact-snapshot-november-2023#:~:text=The%20confirmation%20of%20the%20presence,%2C%20Sudan%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20and%20Uganda>
- OCHA.** 2023. Ethiopia: Humanitarian impact of drought - Flash Update #1, 22 December 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-impact-drought-flash-update-1-22-december-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Horn of Africa Drought Regional Humanitarian Overview & Call to Action (Revised 26 May 2023). New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February, 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/horn-africa-drought-regional-humanitarian-overview-call-action-revised-26-may-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 (Revised 17 May 2023). New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-revised-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-revision-issued-17-may-2023-enar>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- OPHI.** 2020. Understanding poverty in Africa, OPHI Briefing 56. Oxford. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://ophi.org.uk/publications/B-56>
- OPHI & UNDP.** 2022. Leaving no one behind: Poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://ophi.org.uk/publication/OPHI%E2%80%93UNDP-brief-SSA-Leaving-2022>
- UNCTAD.** 2023. UN list of least developed countries. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/list>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Ethiopia Situation Report. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-10-jan-2024>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Uganda Population Dashboard: Overview of Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Uganda. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/uganda-overview-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-6683>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation Map Weekly Regional Update – 26 Dec 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105668>
- UNICEF.** 2023. Humanitarian Action for Children 2024 – Sudan. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/humanitarian-action-children-2024-sudan>
- WFP.** 2022. Implications of the War in Ukraine on Food Access and Availability in the East Africa Region – Update #7. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/implications-conflict-ukraine-food-access-and-availability-east-africa-region-update-7-october-2022#:~:text=The%20conflict%20in%20Ukraine%20continues,on%20the%20most%20vulnerable%20households>
- WFP.** 2023. Drought in the Horn of Africa: Situation Update, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/drought-horn-africa-situation-update-july-2023#:~:text=Despite%20the%20improved%20rains%20during,affected%20populations%20to%20fully%20recover>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. 'Fleeing danger, finding despair': hunger emergency looms for South Sudanese fleeing conflict in Sudan, warns WFP. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/news/fleeing-danger-finding-despair-hunger-emergency-looks-south-sudanese-fleeing-conflict-sudan#:~:text=Almost%20all%20of%20those%20who%20have%20crossed%20the,families%20are%20experiencing%20moderate%20or%20severe%20food%20insecurity>
- WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?\\_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571)
- WHO.** 2024. Multi-country outbreak of cholera, External situation report #11 - 12 February 2024. ????. [Online] [Accessed on 20 February 2024] [https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-cholera-external-situation-report-11-12-february-2024#:~:text=Download%20\(1.3%20MB\)-,Overview,the%20South%2DEast%20Asia%20Region](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-cholera-external-situation-report-11-12-february-2024#:~:text=Download%20(1.3%20MB)-,Overview,the%20South%2DEast%20Asia%20Region)
- World Bank.** 2023. The World Bank in Djibouti: Context. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/djibouti/overview#:~:text=The%20global%20economic%20impact%20of,its%20lowest%20level%20since%202000>
- World Bank.** 2023. The World Bank in South Sudan: Context. Washington, DC [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>
- Sudan Focus**
- ACAPS.** 2024. Briefing Note. Chad: Food Security Crisis. January 2024. [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20230104\\_ACAPS\\_briefing\\_note\\_Chad\\_food\\_security\\_crisis.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230104_ACAPS_briefing_note_Chad_food_security_crisis.pdf)
- CILSS.** 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication November 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
- FAO.** 2024. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 1. March 2024. <https://www.fao.org/3/cd0022en/cd0022en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Key Message Update. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will expand during the post-harvest period. January 2024. <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Alert. Clashes in Sudan's breadbasket threaten national food availability. February 2024. <https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/alert/february-2024>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crisis Mid-Year Update 2023. August 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-MYU.pdf>
- IOM.** 2023. Displacement Tracking Matrix Central African Republic. Suivi des Flux des population : Mise à jour #1. July 2023. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/republique-centrafricaine-suivi-des-flux-de-populations-am-dafock-frontiere-soudanaise-mai>
- IOM.** 2024. Displacement Tracking Matrix Sudan. Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. January 2024. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation. August 2023. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Sudan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Jun2023\\_Feb2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jun2023_Feb2024_report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Nutrition Analysis. November 2023. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_South\\_Sudan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_Sep2023\\_July2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation. December 2023. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Sudan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Oct2023\\_Feb2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Oct2023_Feb2024_Report.pdf)
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 (Revision issued on 17 May 2023). May 2023. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. December 2023. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation: Regional Displacement Update. December 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106871>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Sudan Situation: Regional Displacement Update. February 2024. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106871>

**UNICEF.** 2023. Humanitarian Action for Children. December 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/media/149971/file/2024-HAC-Sudan.pdf>

## Burundi

**FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Burundi, November 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/giews-country-brief-burundi-14-november-2022>

**FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Burundi, September 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BDI>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Persistent high food and fuel prices driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the north. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/burundi/food-security-outlook/october-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Above-average 2023 Season C harvest increases access to food in the lean season. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/burundi/key-message-update/november-2023>

**FSIN.** 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2020>

**IPC.** 2017. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for April - May 2017 and Projection for June - July 2017. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1026220/?iso3=BDI>

**IPC.** 2022. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation June - September 2022 and Projection for October - December 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155945/?iso3=BDI>

**IPC.** 2022. Analyse de la Malnutrition Aiguë de l'IPC, Mars 2022 – Février 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Burundi\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_2022Mar2023Feb\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burundi_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Mar2023Feb_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April - May 2023 and Projection for June - September 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156379/?iso3=BDI>

**IPC.** 2023. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, Avril - Septembre 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Burundi\\_AcuteFoodInsecurity\\_Apr\\_Sept2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burundi_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Apr_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2023 and Projections for October - December 2023 and for January - March 2024. Rome. [Online]

[Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156698/?iso3=BDI>

**UNICEF.** 2022. SMART Survey Burundi. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://data.unicef.org/country>

**WHO.** 2021. Anaemia in Women and Children Data Set: Burundi. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia\\_in\\_women\\_and\\_children](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children)

## Djibouti

**ACAPS.** 2023. Djibouti: Drought. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20230310\\_acaps\\_briefing\\_note\\_drought\\_in\\_djibouti\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230310_acaps_briefing_note_drought_in_djibouti_0.pdf)

**FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Djibouti, 07 August 2023. Rome. [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=DJI&lang=fr>

**IPC.** 2023. Djibouti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March - June 2023 and Projection for July - December 2023. Rome. [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156388/?iso3=DJI>

**IPC.** 2023. Djibouti: Acute Malnutrition Situation March - July 2023 and Projection for August - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156389/?iso3=DJI>

**IPC.** 2023. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë et de la malnutrition aiguë de l'IPC, Janvier – Décembre 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Djibouti\\_Acute\\_FoodInsec\\_Malnutrition\\_JanDec2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Djibouti_Acute_FoodInsec_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_French.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>

**WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?\\_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571)

## Eritrea

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief Eritrea. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ERI>

**GEOGLAM.** 2023. Crop Monitor Early Warning. No. 89. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/crop-monitor-early-warning-no-89-december-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Food Security and Nutrition Update Eastern Africa Region: Q1 & Q2 2023. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151799/download/>

## Ethiopia

**ACLED.** 2023. Ethiopia Peace Observatory September 2023 Monthly Report: Multiple coinciding conflicts and Ethiopia's rank in the ACLED Conflict Index. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/10/12/epo-september-2023-monthly-multiple-coinciding-conflicts-and-ethiopias-rank-in-the-acled-conflict-index/>

**FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Ethiopia, 15 June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ETH>

**FAO.** 2023. Third Crop Prospects and Food Situation – November 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Lasting, severe impacts of conflict and drought leave millions struggling to cope. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook/june-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Food security emergency persists across Ethiopia in aftermath of severe shocks. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook-update/august-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Food Security Assistance Outlook Brief – December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 05 January 2024] <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-12/FAOB-December%202023.pdf>

**FSC.** 2023. Nutrition Cluster - Tigray Region SMART Survey pooled report – August 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fsccluster.org/ethiopia/document/nutrition-cluster-tigray-region-smart>

**IOM.** 2023. Ethiopia — Flow Monitoring Dashboard 45 (June 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-flow-monitoring-dashboard-45-june-2023?close=true>

**IOM.** 2023. DTM Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 17 (August - September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 21 December 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-national-displacement-report-17-august-september-2023?close=true>

**OCHA.** 2023. Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] [https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-february-2023?gad\\_source=1&gclid=EALaQobChMlr\\_b5eadgwMV2TbUAR05Wg7gEAYASAAEgK4rvD\\_BwE](https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-february-2023?gad_source=1&gclid=EALaQobChMlr_b5eadgwMV2TbUAR05Wg7gEAYASAAEgK4rvD_BwE)

**OCHA.** 2023. Ethiopia: Cholera Outbreak - Flash Update #8 (as of 20 June 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-cholera-outbreak-flash-update-8-20-june-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño Impact Snapshot, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eastern-africa-el-nino-impact-snapshot-november-2023>

**OCHA.** 2024. Ethiopia Situation Report – January 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 28 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-10-jan-2024>

**Tigray Nutrition Cluster.** 2023. Urgent Resumption of Lifesaving Nutrition Interventions in Tigray Region: A top priority for the Nutrition Cluster. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 14 December 2023] [https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2022-11/Urgent%20Nutrition%20Interventions%20in%20Tigray\\_Action%20required%5B58%5D.pdf](https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2022-11/Urgent%20Nutrition%20Interventions%20in%20Tigray_Action%20required%5B58%5D.pdf)

**UNDP.** 2023. From Debt to Development: What are Ethiopia's Choices? New York. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-04/UNDP%20-%20Shock%20Document%20-%20Working%20Paper%20Series%203%20-%20Final%20April%20132023.pdf>

**UNICEF.** 2023. Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10, 30 November 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 05 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/documents/ethiopia-humanitarian-situation-report-no-10-30-november-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>

**WFP.** 2024. DataViz: Ethiopia – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/eastern-africa/ethiopia/economic/inflation>

**WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?\\_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571)

## Kenya

**ACAPS.** 2023. Kenya: Flooding in eastern and northern counties. Geneva. [Accessed on 22 November 2023] [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20231116\\_ACAPS\\_Briefing\\_note\\_Kenya\\_flooding.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231116_ACAPS_Briefing_note_Kenya_flooding.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Situation February 2023 and Projection for March - June 2023.



- Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156210/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Malnutrition Situation February 2023 and Projection for March - May 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156211/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, July 2023 - January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Kenya\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_2023\\_Jul2024Jan\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2023_Jul2024Jan_Report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July - September 2023 and Projection for October 2023 - January 2024 (ASAL). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156541/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: IPC Food Security & Nutrition Snapshot - Acute food insecurity, July 2023 to January 2024; Acute Malnutrition April- October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Kenya\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_Jul2023\\_Jan2024\\_snapshot.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Jul2023_Jan2024_snapshot.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Malnutrition Situation April - July 2023 and projection for August - October 2023 (ASAL). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156542/?iso3=KEN>
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Kenya, 12 June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=KEN>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. 2023 Long rains expected to support gradual improvements in food security. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/kenya/food-security-outlook-update/april-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #1, April 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000148789/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>
- ### South Sudan
- IPC.** 2018. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation in January 2018 and Projections for February-April 2018 and May-July 2018. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1110688/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October - November 2022 and Projections for December 2022 - March 2023 and April - July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2023 and Projections for December 2023 - March 2024 and for April - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156667/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis, September 2023 - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 December 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_South\\_Sudan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_Sep2023\\_July2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Malnutrition Situation for July - September 2023 and Projections for October 2023 - March 2024 and April- June 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156668/?iso3=SSD>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Large-scale arrival of South Sudanese returnees driving higher food assistance needs, May 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/may-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Emergency will persist in many areas of South Sudan through the harvest, June 2023 - January 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Emergency: Six months impact update - 6 November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/104604>
- ### Somalia
- ACLED.** 2023. Somalia: Al-Shabaab Regains Lost Territories as Tax Dispute Halts Counter-Insurgency Operation, 2 June 2023. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://acleddata.com/2023/06/02/somalia-situation-update-may-2023-al-shabaab-regains-lost-territories-as-a-dispute-over-tax-halts-counter-insurgency-operation/>
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Somalia, 07 April 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SOM>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Many households face difficult road to recovery despite good gu rains, April 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook-update/april-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023a. Food assistance needs remain high amid ongoing recovery from drought, June 2023 - January 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook/june-2023>
- IPC.** 2022. Somalia: Acute Malnutrition Situation July - September 2022 and Projection for October - December 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155886/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March 2023 and Projection for April - June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156310/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Malnutrition Situation for August - September 2023 and Projection for October - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156564/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis. August - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-ipc-acute-food-insecurity-and-acute-malnutrition-analysis-august-december-2023-published-18-september-2023#:~:text=The%20increase%20in%20the%20number,flooding%20and%20anticipated%20decline%20in>
- OCHA.** 2023. Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-february-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Somalia: 2023 Deyr Season Floods Situation Report No. 5 (As of 24 December 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 10 March 2024]. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-2023-deyr-season-floods-situation-report-no-5-24-december-2023#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20people%20affected%20by%20the%20floods%20is%20estimated,in%20all%20the%20affected%20states>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- ### Rwanda
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Rwanda, 17 November 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=RWA>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Season B stocks and interseason crops driving Minimal (IPC Phase 1). Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/rwanda/remote-monitoring-report/october-2023>
- UNHCR.** 2024. UNHCR Operations Portal: Rwanda. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] [https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa?\\_gl=1\\*7voz4w\\*\\_ga\\*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.\\*\\_ga\\_23PSTKMFD6\\*MTcwODI1OTA1OS4xLjEuMTcwODI2MDMzOS4wLjAuMA.\\*\\_rup\\_ga\\*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.\\*\\_rup\\_ga\\_EVDQTJ4LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.\\*\\_ga\\_23PSTKMFD6\\*MTcwODI1OTA1OS4xLjEuMTcwODI2MDMzOS4wLjAuMA.\\*\\_ga=2.194076909.1367447130.1708259059-533404429.1705940080](https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa?_gl=1*7voz4w*_ga*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.*_ga_23PSTKMFD6*MTcwODI1OTA1OS4xLjEuMTcwODI2MDMzOS4wLjAuMA.*_rup_ga*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.*_rup_ga_EVDQTJ4LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.*_ga_23PSTKMFD6*MTcwODI1OTA1OS4xLjEuMTcwODI2MDMzOS4wLjAuMA.*_ga=2.194076909.1367447130.1708259059-533404429.1705940080)
- WFP.** 2024. WFP DataViz: Rwanda - Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://dataviz.wfp.org/eastern-africa/rwanda/economic/inflation>
- ### Uganda
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Uganda, 17 July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=UGA>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes projected among refugees amid assistance cuts. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/uganda/food-security-outlook/june-2023#key-messages>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief, December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-12/FAOB-December%202023.pdf>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April - August 2023 and Projection for September 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156423/?iso3=UGA>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda (Karamoja): IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis, February 2023 - January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Uganda\\_Karamoja\\_AcuteMalnutrition\\_Feb2023\\_Jan2024\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Uganda_Karamoja_AcuteMalnutrition_Feb2023_Jan2024_report.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda (Refugee Settlements and Host Districts): IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis, April 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Uganda\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_April\\_2023\\_March\\_2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Uganda_Acute_Malnutrition_April_2023_March_2024_Report.pdf)



**WFP.** 2024. DataViz: Uganda – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)  
**WFP,** Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2023. Situation of Food Security and Nutrition in Karamoja 2023. Kampala, Uganda. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] [docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155179/download/](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155179/download/)

## WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

**ACLED.** 2024. ACLED Dashboard. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

**CH.** 2024. Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, mars 2024. [Online] [Accessed 17 April 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE\\_COMMUNICATION\\_-\\_MARS\\_2024\\_VF.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE_COMMUNICATION_-_MARS_2024_VF.pdf)

**CILSS.** 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication March 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>  
**CILSS.** 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication November 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Data in Emergencies Monitoring – DIEM – Impact Assessment. November 2023. [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/apps/51693d84f32c498982f128151db091c8/explore>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Mauritanie. Mise à jour des messages clés. Les déficits localisés en zones agropastorale et pastorale maintiennent les populations pauvres en Stress. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://fews.net/node/31139>

**IPC.** 2022. Mali. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Mali\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Jun2022May2023\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mali_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2022May2023_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2022. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Nigeria\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_May22\\_April23\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May22_April23_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Tchad. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Chad\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Oct2022\\_Sept2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Chad_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Niger. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Niger\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_2022Aug2023July\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Niger_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Aug2023July_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2024. Burkina Faso. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Aug2023\\_Jul2024\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burkina_Faso_Acute_Malnutrition_Aug2023_Jul2024_Report_French.pdf)

**UNHCR.** 2023. RBWCA – Monthly Statistics. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106296>

United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. 2024. List of LDCs. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.un.org/ohrls/content/list-ldcs>

**UNHCR-WFP.** 2023. Mission d'évaluation conjointe (JAM) PAM-UNHCR auprès des populations réfugiées, déplacées internes et hôtes au Niger June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://wfp-unhcr-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/WFP-0000151149.pdf>

**World Bank.** 2023. Western and Central Africa. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/western-and-central-africa>  
**WFP.** 2024. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 March 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## Benin

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Benin Country Brief. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BEN>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>

## Burkina Faso

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de

l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**IPC.** 2024. Burkina Faso. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Aug2023\\_Jul2024\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burkina_Faso_Acute_Malnutrition_Aug2023_Jul2024_Report_French.pdf)

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire. L'aide humanitaire reste essentielle pour sauver des vies dans le nord du Burkina Faso. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/node/31312>

## Cameroon

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>  
**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key Message Update. Persistent violence in the Far North region maintaining Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes during the harvest. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/cameroon/key-message-update/november-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Cameroon Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-march-2023>

**WHO.** 2023. Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and other Emergencies: Week 46: 13 - 19 November 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/374828/OEW46-1319112023.pdf>

## Chad

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Tchad: Mise à jour des résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle. July 2023. [Accessed on 10 December 2023] [https://sisaaptchad.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/TCHAD\\_Fiche\\_communication\\_Mise\\_a\\_jour\\_juillet2023-.pdf](https://sisaaptchad.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/TCHAD_Fiche_communication_Mise_a_jour_juillet2023-.pdf)

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**IPC.** 2023. Tchad. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Chad\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Oct2022\\_Sept2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Chad_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf)

## Côte d'Ivoire

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## Ghana

**FAO.** 2023. Ghana Country Brief. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 25 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=GHA>

**IOM.** 2024. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Situation in central sahel, liptako gourma and coastal countries. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/LIPTAKO%20GOURMA%20-%20December%202023%20%28EN%29.pdf?iframe=true>

**UNHCR.** 2024. Ghana. UNHCR Operational Data Portal. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/gha>

**World Bank.** 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>

## Guinea

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

**LIBERIA**

**CH.** 2022. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Liberia Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=LBR>

## Mali

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Mali. Key Message Update. Despite seasonal improvement in food consumption across the country, Gao and Menaka remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/mali/key-message-update/november-2023>

**IPC.** 2022. Mali. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Mali\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Jun2022May2023\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mali_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2022May2023_Report.pdf)

## Mauritania

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Mauritanie. Mise à jour des messages clés. Les déficits localisés en zones agropastorale et pastorale maintiennent les populations pauvres en Stress. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://fews.net/node/31139>

## Niger

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë

courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**IPC.** 2023. Niger. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Niger\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_2022Aug2023July\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Niger_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Aug2023July_Report_French.pdf)

**FAO.** 2024. Niger Country Brief. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 25 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=NER>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Niger. Key Message Update. Acute food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists in conflict-affected areas. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/niger/key-message-update/november-2023>

## Nigeria

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**Focus Economics.** 2024. Nigeria Inflation Data. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February] <https://www.focus-economics.com/country-indicator/nigeria/inflation/#:-:text=Nigeria%20Inflation%20Data&text=Inflation%20came%20in%20at%2029.9,rose%20at%20a%20stronger%20pace.>

**IPC.** 2022. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Nigeria\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_May22\\_April23\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May22_April23_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/>

[fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Nigeria\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_May2023\\_Apr2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May2023_Apr2024_Report.pdf)

## Senegal

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**UNICEF-WFP.** 2023. Sahel & West Africa Food Security and Nutrition Hotspot Analysis. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149826/download/>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## Sierra Leone

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

## Togo

**CH.** 2022. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**CH.** 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle

aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

**FAO.** 2024. Togo Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=TGO>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>

## ASIA

**ACAPS.** 2023. Afghanistan: Risk Overview. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/archives/detail/afghanistan-risk-overview-1>

**ACAPS.** 2023. Bangladesh and Myanmar: Impact of Cyclone Mocha. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/acaps-briefing-note-bangladesh-and-myanmar-impact-cyclone-mocha-23-may-2023>

**ACAPS.** 2023. Myanmar: Humanitarian impacts of recent clashes. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20231123\\_ACAPS\\_Briefing\\_note\\_Myanmar\\_humanitarian\\_impacts\\_of\\_recent\\_clashes.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231123_ACAPS_Briefing_note_Myanmar_humanitarian_impacts_of_recent_clashes.pdf)

**CARE.** 2022. The Impact on the Food Crisis on Women and Girls in Afghanistan. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] [https://www.care.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Report-Food-crisis\\_Final-design\\_28-November-2022.pdf](https://www.care.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Report-Food-crisis_Final-design_28-November-2022.pdf)

**European Commission.** 2023. INFORM Risk Index 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Results-and-data/moduleId/1782/id/469/controller/Admin/action/Results>

**FAO.** 2023. Country Gender Spotlight: Pakistan. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc5970en/cc5970en.pdf>

**FAO.** 2023. Tropical cyclone Mocha, Myanmar. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/apps/a97314f4fec34a448721f320829acfb/explorer>

**IDMC.** 2023. Global Report on Internal Displacement 2023. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2023/>

**IFRC.** 2023. Sri Lanka Flood 2023, DREF Operation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrk018>

**IOM.** 2023. Bangladesh: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Response Monthly Situation Report. November

2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] [https://bangladesh.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11006/files/documents/2024-01/iom-rohingya-crisis-response-external-sitrep\\_november-2023.pdf](https://bangladesh.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11006/files/documents/2024-01/iom-rohingya-crisis-response-external-sitrep_november-2023.pdf)

**IOM.** 2023. DTM Pakistan: Bi-Weekly Flow Monitoring of Afghan Returnees. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] [https://pakistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1121/files/documents/2024-01/fm\\_bi-weekly-report\\_31dec\\_final.pdf](https://pakistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1121/files/documents/2024-01/fm_bi-weekly-report_31dec_final.pdf)

**IPC.** 2021. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September – October 2021 and Projection for November 2021 – March 2022. October 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/es/c/1155210/?iso3=AFG>

**IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2022 – October 2022 and Projection for November 2022 – March 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156270/?iso3=AFG>

**IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis October 2023 – March 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Afghanistan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_Oct2023\\_Mar2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insec_Oct2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Bangladesh: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March – September 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Bangladesh\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Mar\\_Sep2023\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Sep2023_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2022. Bangladesh IPC Chronic Food Insecurity Report. June 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Bangladesh\\_Chronic\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_2022June\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Chronic_Food_Insecurity_2022June_report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Pakistan: IPC Acute Food Security Analysis April 2023 – January 2024. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Pakistan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_April\\_2023\\_January\\_2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Pakistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_April_2023_January_2024_Report.pdf)

**IRC.** 2023. Emergency Situation Report Pakistan. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/international-rescue-committee-emergency-situation-report-pakistan-heavy-rainfall-and-flood-alert-august-11-2023#:~:text=The%20rainfall%20recorded%20in%20month,July%20during%20past%2063%20years>

**JRP.** 2023. Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/2023-joint-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-january-december-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online]

[17 January 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023?gad\\_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnyWeH2ZUX9VOm\\_kVsGUJ6Y6PeTBVBS6V3SlpWxMkDTV3jTBa9t1TRoCR3lQAvD\\_BwE](https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnyWeH2ZUX9VOm_kVsGUJ6Y6PeTBVBS6V3SlpWxMkDTV3jTBa9t1TRoCR3lQAvD_BwE)

**OCHA.** 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad\\_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnyYsN1xf3dG44sxYCU7yU75PaOaZymF4ccWPWdsmYzBu8pc6pllqBhoC7VYQAvD\\_BwE](https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnyYsN1xf3dG44sxYCU7yU75PaOaZymF4ccWPWdsmYzBu8pc6pllqBhoC7VYQAvD_BwE)

**UN DESA.** 2024. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] [https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP\\_2024\\_Web.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP_2024_Web.pdf)

**UNHCR.** 2023. Bangladesh: UNHCR Global Focus. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/bangladesh#:~:text=As%20of%20September%202023%2C%2096%2C467,cent%20comprise%20women%20and%20girls>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Myanmar Emergency Update. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/myanmar-emergency-regional-update-6584>

**UNHCR.** 2023. UNHCR Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=sH5pnE>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation: Midyear Report 2023. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/regional-refugee-response-plan-afghanistan-situation-midyear-report-2023#:~:text=Over%201.4%20million%20IDPs%20have,returned%20to%20Afghanistan%20in%202022>

**UNICEF.** 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/media/150091/file/Bangladesh-Humanitarian-SitRep-Floods-Landslides-13-December-2023.pdf>

**WFP.** 2023. Cox's Bazar: Ration Cuts Alert. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] [https://www.wfp.org/publications/coxs-bazar-wfp-bangladesh-ration-cuts-alert-may-2023-update#:~:text=In%20March%2C%20WFP%20had%20to,%24%2010%20to%20US\\$%24%208](https://www.wfp.org/publications/coxs-bazar-wfp-bangladesh-ration-cuts-alert-may-2023-update#:~:text=In%20March%2C%20WFP%20had%20to,%24%2010%20to%20US$%24%208)

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-25-june-2023#:~:text=Sustained%20humanitarian%20assistance%20has%20effectively,and%20hunger%20rates%20from%20increasing>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023.

[Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

**WFP.** 2023. Household Food Security Survey Sri Lanka: Preliminary Findings. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155412/download/>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP to increase food ration from US\$8 to US\$10 for all Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/wfp-increase-food-ration-us8-us10-all-rohingya-refugees-coxs-bazar>

**WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149636/download/>

**World Bank.** 2024. Food security update. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-CII-March-18-2024.pdf>

**World Bank.** 2024. Global Economic Prospects: South Asia. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/661f109500bf58fa36a4a46eeace6786-0050012024/related/GEP-Jan-2024-Analysis-SAR.pdf>

**World Bank.** 2023. Myanmar economic recovery falters as conflict and inflation weigh. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/12/12/economic-recovery-falters-as-conflict-and-inflation-weigh>

**World Bank.** 2023. Revenue Mobilization is Fundamental for Sri Lanka to Get on a Sustainable Fiscal Path. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/02/revenue-mobilization-is-fundamental-for-sri-lanka-to-get-on-a-sustainable-fiscal-path>

## Afghanistan

**IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2023 – March 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Afghanistan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_Oct2023\\_Mar2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insec_Oct2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan Acute Malnutrition Analysis, September 2022 – April 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Afghanistan\\_Acute\\_Malnutrition\\_Oct2022\\_Apr2023\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Apr2023_report.pdf)

**REACH.** 2022. Mid-Year Whole of Afghanistan Assessment. April 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 2 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/mid-year-whole>



afghanistan-assessment-woaa-key-sectoral-findings-april-2022

**WFP.** 2023. Afghanistan Food Security Update. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000154406/download/\\_ga=2.245301701.134873580.1704221869-1803802559.1703376351](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000154406/download/_ga=2.245301701.134873580.1704221869-1803802559.1703376351)

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Afghanistan Situation Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-25-june-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)

## Bangladesh

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Brief on Bangladesh. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BGD&lang=ZH#:~:text=Despite%20record%20cereal%20harvests%20in,inflation%20has%20gradually%20strengthened%20since>

**IFRC.** 2023. Population Movement Operation (PMO) Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh: Monthly Operation Update No. 88. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-red-crescent-society-population-movement-operation-pmo-coxs-bazar-monthly-operation-update-july-2023>

**IOM.** 2023. Cyclone Mocha Response Situation Report (May 15 – 18). May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iom-myanmar-bangladesh-cyclone-mocha-response-situation-report-may-15-18th>

**IPC.** 2023. Bangladesh: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March – September 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Bangladesh\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Mar\\_Sep2023\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Sep2023_Report.pdf)

Trading Economics. 2024. Bangladesh Inflation Rate. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 6 January 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/inflation-cpi>

**UN.** 2023. Chattogram Division Flash Floods and Monsoon Rain HCTT Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/chattogram-division-flash-floods-and-monsoon-rain-hctt-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-august-2023-january-2024>

**UNHCR.** 2023. UNHCR Bangladesh 2023 Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS). January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unhcr-bangladesh-2023-standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-executive-summary>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Afghanistan Situation Update. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105137>

**UNICEF.** 2023. UNICEF Bangladesh Dengue Outbreak Situation Report No. 5. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unicef-bangladesh-humanitarian-situation-report-no-5-dengue-outbreak-15-november-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Bangladesh Market Monitor – May – July 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-market-monitor-may-july-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Refugee Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-6) Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150568/download/>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170)

## Democratic People's Republic of Korea

**Government of China.** 2023. Customs Statistics. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 January 2024] <http://stats.customs.gov.cn/indexEn>

**WFP.** 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 January 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/state-food-security-and-nutrition-world-sofi-report-2023>

**WPK Central Committee.** 2023. Rodong Sinmun (English) Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee 31 December 2023.

## Kyrgyzstan

**ACLED.** 2023. ACLED Data Dashboard. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

**ACLED.** 2023. South Caucasus and Central Asia: Threat of Sporadic Outbreaks of Violence Across the Region. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 21 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/south-caucasus-and-central-asia/>

**FAO.** 2024. Country Brief on Kyrgyzstan. [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=KGZ>

**IFRC.** 2023. Kyrgyzstan Flood 2023 - DREF Operation (MDRKG017). August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrkg017>

**IMF.** 2023. IMF countries: Kyrgyz Republic. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/KGZ>

National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic and IOM. 2024. Migration of the Population of the Kyrgyz

Republic. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed 20 February 2024] [https://kyrgyzstan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11321/files/documents/2024-02/stat\\_kniga\\_finish\\_print.pdf](https://kyrgyzstan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11321/files/documents/2024-02/stat_kniga_finish_print.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Kyrgyz Republic Food Security Monitoring Update: June 2023. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-republic-food-security-monitoring-update-june-2023>

**World Bank.** 2022. Personal remittances received (% of GDP) - Kyrgyz Republic. 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=KG>

## Lao People's Democratic Republic

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Profile: Lao People's Democratic Republic. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=LAO&lang=ar>

Trading Economics. 2024. Laos Food Inflation. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/laos/food-inflation>

**USDA.** 2024. Laos Country Summary: Corn. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/countrysummary/Default.aspx?id=LA&crop=Corn>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP Lao PDR: Country Brief. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lao-peoples-democratic-republic/wfp-lao-pdr-country-brief-january-2024>

## Myanmar

**ACLED.** 2023. ACLED Data Dashboard. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

**OCHA.** 2023. Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal: Myanmar. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-cyclone-mocha-flash-appeal-may-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad\\_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAkp6tBhB5EiwANTCxF1dkgU54BXvipj8dlhxflR4FI\\_yusd2DGC-oHTmzCz3\\_4BKpGTxoCOuUQAvD\\_BwE](https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAkp6tBhB5EiwANTCxF1dkgU54BXvipj8dlhxflR4FI_yusd2DGC-oHTmzCz3_4BKpGTxoCOuUQAvD_BwE)

**OCHA.** 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 35. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 26 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-35-2023-year-review>

**WFP.** 2024. Market Monitoring Dashboard v2 Myanmar. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 26 February 2024] <https://analytics.wfp.org/#/views/MarketMonitoringDashboardv2/Basket?=&null&iid=2>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?iso3=MMR](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?iso3=MMR)

## Pakistan

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Briefs: Pakistan. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=PAK>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation #3. November 2023. [Accessed online 10 March 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**IPC.** 2023. Pakistan: IPC Acute Food Security Analysis April 2023 – January 2024. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Pakistan\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_April\\_2023\\_January\\_2024\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Pakistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_April_2023_January_2024_Report.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Market Monitor Report: Pakistan. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150445/download/>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP DataViz – Pakistan Exchange Rate. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/economic/exchange-rates>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Pakistan Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/economic/inflation>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Pakistan Floods Situation Report. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/wfp-pakistan-floods-situation-report-september-2023>

## Sri Lanka

**IFRC.** 2023. Sri Lanka Flood 2023, DREF Operation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrk018>

**OCHA.** 2023. Sri Lanka Multi-Dimensional Crisis: Humanitarian Needs and Priorities (HNP), Response Overview. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-multi-dimensional-crisis-humanitarian-needs-and-priorities-hnp-response-overview-9-jun-2022-31-mar-2023#:~:text=The%20HNP%20targeted%20the%20most,million%20to%20cover%20June%2D%20September.>

**UNICEF and WFP.** 2023. National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey in Sri Lanka: 2022. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.mri.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/National-Nutrition-and-Micronutrient-Survey-Sri-Lanka-2022.pdf>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Sri Lanka Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://>



[dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170)

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Sri Lanka Country Brief. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/wfp-sri-lanka-country-brief-october-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Sri Lanka – Market Monitor. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/wfp-sri-lanka-market-monitor-september-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Household Food Security Survey. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/GetUrlReputation>

**WFP and FAO.** 2022. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc1886en/cc1886en.pdf>

**WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149636/download/>

## Tajikistan

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Profile: Tajikistan. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=TJK&lang=ar>

**World Bank.** 2022. Tajikistan: Personal remittances received (% of GDP). December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=true](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=true)

**WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Republic of Tajikistan. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/details=CC8954EN>

**World Bank.** 2022. The World Bank in Tajikistan. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview>

## Vanuatu

**Council for International Development.** 2023. End of South Pacific Cyclone Season Report 2022 – 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/end-south-pacific-cyclone-season-report-2022-2023#:~:text=The%202022-23%20tropical%20season,at%20length%20in%20this%20report.>

**IFRC.** 2023. Cyclone Lola – Emergency Appeal: Vanuatu. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/vanuatu-asia-pacific-cyclone-lola-emergency-appeal-operational-strategy-mdrv011>

**IOM.** 2022. South Pacific Islands Crisis Response Plan 2023 – 2025. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/fiji/south-pacific-islands-crisis-response-plan-2023-2025>

**World Bank.** 2021. Climate Risk Country Profile: Vanuatu. November 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] [https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/country-profiles/15825-WB\\_Vanuatu%20Country%20Profile-WEB.pdf](https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/country-profiles/15825-WB_Vanuatu%20Country%20Profile-WEB.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Vanuatu mVAM Bulletin Round 1 (May – Jun) [Accessed on 10 March 2024]. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2023-vanuatu-mvam-bulletin-round-1-may-jun>

## EUROPE

### Ukraine Focus

**European Commission.** 2023. Press release: Following the expiry of the restrictive measures on Ukrainian exports of grain and other foodstuff to the EU, Ukraine agrees to introduce measures to avoid a renewed surge in EU imports. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2023] [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_23\\_4497](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4497)

**European Commission.** 2024. EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes\\_en](https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en)

**FAO.** 2023. The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine, July 2023 Update. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6797en/cc6797en.pdf>

**FAO.** 2024. FAO Food Price Index, January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/>

**FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023>

**FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023: Mid-Year Update. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023-mid-year-update>

**IFPRI.** 2023. Eastern European farmers protest gluts of Ukraine food exports: The struggle to keep solidarity lanes open. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/eastern-european-farmers-protest-gluts-ukraine-food-exports-struggle-keep-solidarity-lanes>

**IFPRI.** 2024. Ukraine and global agricultural markets two years later, February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024].

<https://www.ifpri.org/blog/ukraine-and-global-agricultural-markets-two-years-later>

**IFPRI.** 2024. Impacts of Red Sea shipping disruptions on global food security. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/impacts-red-sea-shipping-disruptions-global-food-security>

**IFPRI.** 2024. Ukraine and global agricultural markets two years later. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/ukraine-and-global-agricultural-markets-two-years-later>

**IMF.** 2023. Fall 2023 Global Food Crisis Update—Recent Developments, Outlook, and IMF Engagement. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/IMF-Notes/2023/English/INSEA2023002-S001.ashx>

**IOM.** 2023. Ukraine internal displacement report general population survey round 14 October 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024].

[https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8e6215de-7a79-4f77-a63a-3fa226779095/IOM\\_Gen%20Pop%20Report\\_R14\\_Displacement\\_0.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8e6215de-7a79-4f77-a63a-3fa226779095/IOM_Gen%20Pop%20Report_R14_Displacement_0.pdf)

**NASA Harvest.** 2023. Farming Amidst a War: Satellite Data Reveals Productive Yet Challenging Season For Ukraine. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://nasaharvest.org/news/farming-amidst-war-satellite-data-reveals-productive-yet-challenging-season-ukraine#:~:text=Satellite%20imagery%20reveals%20that%20approximately,Source%3A%20NASA%20Harvest%20J>

**National Bank of Ukraine.** 2024. Inflation report. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. [https://bank.gov.ua/admin\\_uploads/article/IR\\_2024-Q1\\_eng.pdf?v=7](https://bank.gov.ua/admin_uploads/article/IR_2024-Q1_eng.pdf?v=7)

**Reuters.** 2023. Ukraine says 151 ships have used Black Sea corridor. London. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-151-ships-have-used-black-sea-corridor-2023-11-17/>

**United Nations.** 2023. Decrying Escalating Attacks on Ukraine's Civilian Infrastructure, Security Council Speakers Renew Call for Russian Federation to Cease War of Aggression. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15502.doc.htm>

**United Nations.** 2023. Black Sea Grain Initiative: Data. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/data>

**USDA.** 2022. Ukraine Agricultural Production and Trade, April 2022. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf>

**US EIA.** 2024. Short-term Energy Outlook, February 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/Feb24.pdf>

**WFP.** 2023. Syria Country Office: Market Price Watch Bulletin, December 2023. Damascus. [Online] [Accessed

on 01 March 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156214/download/>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP DataViz: Economic Explorer – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

**WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO—WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?\\_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571)

**World Bank.** 2024. Updated Ukraine recovery and reconstruction needs assessment. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024].

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released>

**World Bank.** 2024. Ukraine - Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099021324115085807/p1801741bea12c012189ca16d95d8c2556a>

World Bank; Government of Ukraine; European Union; **United Nations.** 2023. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099184503212328877/p1801740d1177f03c0ab180057556615497>

## Ukraine

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the war on acute food insecurity remain highest near frontlines. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023#:~:text=Population%20Displacement,and%20Poland%20\(1.0%20million\).](https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023#:~:text=Population%20Displacement,and%20Poland%20(1.0%20million).)

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the war on acute food insecurity remain highest near frontlines. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023>

**IOM.** 2023. Ukraine: General Population Survey - Round 14 - Snapshot Report | Population Figures and Geographic Distribution (3–25 September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/iom-ukraine-general-population-survey-round-14-snapshot-report-population-figures-and-geographic-distribution-3-25-september-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024]

- <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enuk>
- OCHA.** 2023. Ukraine Humanitarian Response 2023: Situation Report, 11 October 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-response-2023-situation-report-11-october-2023-enuk?\\_gl=1\\*ek7k9t\\*\\_ga\\*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.\\*\\_ga\\_E60ZNX2F68\\*MTcwNjUzNTI0NC4xNS4xLjE3MDY1MzUyNjcuMzcuMC4w](https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-response-2023-situation-report-11-october-2023-enuk?_gl=1*ek7k9t*_ga*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNjUzNTI0NC4xNS4xLjE3MDY1MzUyNjcuMzcuMC4w)
- REACH.** 2023. Ukraine: 2023 MSNA Bulletin, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/35b338e0/2023-MSNA-Bulletin.pdf>
- REACH & WFP.** 2023. MSNA 2023 - Food Security Preliminary Findings, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2023] <https://fsccluster.org/ukraine/document/reach-wfp-multi-sector-needs-assessment>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan - January-December 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024]
- WFP.** 2023. Ukraine External Situation Report #44 (27 November 2023). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wfp-ukraine-external-situation-report-44-27-november-2023?\\_gl=1\\*1maxro0\\*\\_ga\\*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.\\*\\_ga\\_E60ZNX2F68\\*MTcwNjUzNTI0NC4xNS4xLjE3MDYxODM1MDMuMTUuMC4w](https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wfp-ukraine-external-situation-report-44-27-november-2023?_gl=1*1maxro0*_ga*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNjUzNTI0NC4xNS4xLjE3MDYxODM1MDMuMTUuMC4w)
- Moldova**
- REACH.** 2023. MSNA: Moldova 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/fae3c95f/REACH\\_MDA\\_2304\\_MSNA2023\\_Presentation\\_October2023.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/fae3c95f/REACH_MDA_2304_MSNA2023_Presentation_October2023.pdf)
- REACH.** 2023. Moldova: MSNA Factsheet, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/78e4196e/REACH\\_Factsheet\\_MSNA\\_2023\\_final\\_version.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/78e4196e/REACH_Factsheet_MSNA_2023_final_version.pdf)
- REACH.** 2023. Moldova: MSNA Situation Overview, December 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/ddadb4a5/MDA\\_MSNA\\_SO\\_final\\_version.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/ddadb4a5/MDA_MSNA_SO_final_version.pdf)
- UNHCR.** 2024. Ukraine Refugee Situation – Republic of Moldova. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10784>
- LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>
- FSIN.** 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%20ONLINE%20FINAL%202020\\_1.pdf](https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%20ONLINE%20FINAL%202020_1.pdf)
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>
- IOM.** 2023. Haiti. Displacement Tracking Matrix. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti>
- IPC.** 2023. Haiti. Mise à jour de projection de l'analyse de Septembre 2022 Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aigüe Mars - Juin 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Haiti\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_ProjectionUpdate\\_Mar\\_June2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Mar_June2023_Report_French.pdf)
- IPC.** 2024 Haiti: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update for March-June 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156884/?iso3=HTI>
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF diciembre 2022 – agosto 2023. May 2023. [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_AcuteFoodInsecurity\\_Dec2022Aug2023\\_Report\\_Spanish.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Dec2022Aug2023_Report_Spanish.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF marzo de 2023 – febrero de 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Mar2023Feb2024\\_Report\\_Spanish.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar2023Feb2024_Report_Spanish.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Haiti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aigüe août 2023 – juin 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Haiti\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Aout\\_2023\\_Juin\\_2024\\_Report\\_Francais.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aout_2023_Juin_2024_Report_Francais.pdf)
- IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis September 2023 - November 2023 and Projection for December 2023 - April 2024 and May 2024 - August 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on March 10 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156758/?iso3=DOM>
- OCHA.** 2024. Colombia: Plan de Respuesta a Prioridades Comunitarias 2024–2025. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-plan-de-respuesta-prioridades-comunitarias-2024-2025-marzo-2024>
- OCHA.** 2023. El Salvador: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-humanitarian-response-plan-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Haiti. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-apercu-des-besoins-humanitaires-2023-mars-2023-fren>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Colombia. Operational Data Portal. 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024]
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de Seguridad Alimentaria: Migrantes y Comunidades de Acogida. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150380/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de seguridad alimentaria: Migrantes y comunidades de acogida, Colombia. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/evaluacion-de-seguridad-alimentaria-migrantes-y-comunidades-de-acogida-colombia-mayo-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Inclusion of Venezuelan Migrants in Ecuador. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150262/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- World Bank.** 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>
- Colombia**
- ACAPS.** 2024. ACAPS Anticipatory note: Colombia - Impact of El Niño on Magdalena Medio region. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/acaps-anticipatory-note-colombia-impact-el-nino-magdalena-medio-region-24-january-2024#:~:text=Since%20August%202023%2C%20below-average,02%2F11%2F2023\).](https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/acaps-anticipatory-note-colombia-impact-el-nino-magdalena-medio-region-24-january-2024#:~:text=Since%20August%202023%2C%20below-average,02%2F11%2F2023).)
- ACLED.** 2024. ACLED Conflict Index. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/#:~:text=The%20world%20is%20getting%20far,both%20Afghanistan%20and%20Syria%20raged>
- ACLED.** 2023. Regional Overview: Latin America & the Caribbean. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] [https://acleddata.com/2023/08/04/regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023/?utm\\_source=rss&utm\\_medium=rss&utm\\_campaign=regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023](https://acleddata.com/2023/08/04/regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023)
- DANE.** 2023. Encuesta nacional de arroz mecanizado (ENAM). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/agropecuaria/encuesta-de-arroz-mecanizado>
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Briefs: Colombia. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=COL>
- Food Security Cluster and Nutrition Cluster. 2024. Colombia. Nota Metodológica: Estimación de las Personas en Necesidad - Clúster de Seguridad alimentaria y Nutrición (SAN) PiN 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/nota-metodologica-estimacion-de-las-personas-en-necesidad-cluster-de-seguridad-alimentaria-y-nutricion-san-pin-2024>
- OECD.** 2022. OECD Economic Surveys: Colombia 2022. March 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/04bf9377-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/04bf9377-en>
- R4V.** 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>
- WFP.** 2022. Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment for Migrant Populations and Host Communities – Brief. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/emergency-food-security-and-nutrition-assessment-migrant-populations-and-host-communities-brief>
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de Seguridad Alimentaria: Migrantes y Comunidades de Acogida. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150380/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- Dominican Republic**
- FAO.** 2024. Dominican Republic GIEWS Country Brief. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=DOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October 2022 - February 2023 and Projection for March - June 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156125/?iso3=DOM>

**IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis September 2023 - November 2023 and Projection for December 2023 - April 2024 and May 2024 - August 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156758/?iso3=DOM>

**World Bank.** 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>

## Ecuador

**ACAPS.** 2023. Ecuador: Migration of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20230919\\_ACAPS\\_briefing\\_note\\_Ecuador\\_Venezuelan\\_migrants.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230919_ACAPS_briefing_note_Ecuador_Venezuelan_migrants.pdf)

**ACLEED.** 2023. The Killing of Villavicencio: A Symptom of Rising Political Violence Ahead of Ecuador's Snap Elections. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/08/14/the-killing-of-villavicencio-a-symptom-of-rising-political-violence-ahead-of-ecuadors-snap-elections/>

**European Commission.** 2023. ECHO Daily Flash of 07 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4804>

**Human Rights Watch.** 2023. Ecuador: Events of 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/ecuador#:~:text= Fighting%20for%20territorial%20control%2C%20the,criminal%20groups%20continues%20to%20grow>

**IFRC.** 2023. Ecuador: Floods related to the El Niño phenomenon - Early Action Protocol Activation. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ecuador/ecuador-floods-related-el-nino-phenomenon-early-action-protocol-activation-eap2020ec02-operation-no-mdrec023-23-august-2023>

**R4V.** 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Ecuador: Refugee Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download?url=7LARHo>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Inclusion of Venezuelan Migrants in Ecuador. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150262/download/>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Ecuador Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156053/download/?\\_ga=2.45907876.1272387923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156053/download/?_ga=2.45907876.1272387923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351)

## El Salvador

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. El Salvador: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-humanitarian-response-plan-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## Guatemala

**FAO.** 2024. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key Message Update. Delayed harvests of staple grains keep prices high. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/guatemala/key-message-update/september-2023>

**IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF marzo de 2023 – febrero de 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Mar2023Feb2024\\_Report\\_Spanish.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar2023Feb2024_Report_Spanish.pdf)

**Guatemala, Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y**

**Alimentación.** 2023. Informe Situacional de Granos Básicos en Guatemala 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://precios.maga.gob.gt/archivos/situacionales/Informe%20Situacional%20>

[de%20Granos%20Ba%CC%81sicos%20en%20Guatemala%202023.pdf](https://precios.maga.gob.gt/archivos/situacionales/Informe%20Situacional%20)

## Haiti

**CDC.** 2023. Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report: Cholera Outbreak Haiti. September 2022-January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/72/wr/mm7202a1.htm#:~:text=Haiti%20was%20declared%20cholera-free,years%20with%20no%20>

**FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Mise à jour messages clés. Les impacts des intempéries accentueront les déficits de production locale, lesquels entraîneront une augmentation des prix, dans un contexte de détérioration de la stabilité sociopolitique. Novembre 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/fr/latin-america-and-caribbean/haiti/mise-jour-des-messages-cles/novembre-2023>

**IPC.** 2023. Haïti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë Mars - Juin 2023. March 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Haiti\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_ProjectionUpdate\\_Mar\\_June2023\\_Report\\_French.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Mar_June2023_Report_French.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. Haïti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë Août 2023 – Juin 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Haiti\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Aout\\_2023\\_Juin\\_2024\\_Report\\_Francais.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aout_2023_Juin_2024_Report_Francais.pdf)

**OCHA.** 2023. Haiti. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-des-besoins-humanitaires-2023-mars-2023-fren>

**UNICEF.** 2023. Press Release. Nearly 3 million children need support in Haiti – highest number on record. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/nearly-3-million-children-need-support-haiti-highest-number-record>

## Honduras

**Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S).** 2024. C3S multi-system precipitation 3-month. Seasonal spatial millimeter rain forecast [March-May 2024]. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] [https://climate.copernicus.eu/charts/packages/c3s\\_seasonal/products/c3s\\_seasonal\\_spatial\\_mm\\_rain\\_3m?area=area06&base\\_](https://climate.copernicus.eu/charts/packages/c3s_seasonal/products/c3s_seasonal_spatial_mm_rain_3m?area=area06&base_)

[time=202403010000&type=tsum&valid\\_time=202404010000](https://climate.copernicus.eu/charts/packages/c3s_seasonal/products/c3s_seasonal_spatial_mm_rain_3m?area=area06&base_time=202403010000&type=tsum&valid_time=202404010000)

**FAO.** 2023. Honduras GIEWS Country Brief. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=HND>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Informe de Monitoreo Remoto. El Niño continuará ocasionando una baja en la disponibilidad y el acceso a alimentos en los hogares pobres. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/node/31009>

**IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF diciembre 2022 – agosto 2023. May 2023. [Accessed on 11 December 2023] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_AcuteFoodInsecurity\\_Dec2022Aug2023\\_Report\\_Spanish.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Dec2022Aug2023_Report_Spanish.pdf)

## Nicaragua

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FAO.** 2024. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 1. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 20 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9657en/cc9657en.pdf>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Informe de Monitoreo Remoto. Atraso en la cosecha de Primera extenderá la época de escasez de alimentos. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/es/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-y-nicaragua/informe-de-monitoreo-remoto/junio-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>

**WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## Peru

**Connecting Business Initiative (CBI).** 2023. The historical impact of coastal El Niño in Peru and how local businesses are preparing for the global El Niño. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.connectingbusiness.org/news->



events/blog/Peru-dengue-EI-Nino?\_gl=1\*1txgodf\*\_ga\*MT\_MyODI4ODAzNC4xNzA0MjlyMzAz\*\_ga\_E60ZNX2F68\*MTcwNjc1NjA\_yN54yOC4xLjE3MDY3NTYwNDkuMzYuMC4w

**R4V.** 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Peru: Factsheet. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/peru-factsheet-october-2023>

**UNHCR.** 2023. Peru: Refugee Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=7LARHo>

**WFP.** 2022. Peru: Annual Country Report 2022. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000148004/download/?\\_ga=2.243284101.12723.87923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000148004/download/?_ga=2.243284101.12723.87923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351)

**WFP.** 2024. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

## COUNTRIES OF CONCERN

### Ecuador (residents)

**ECHO.** 2023. ECHO Daily Flash of 07 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4804>

**IFRC.** 2024. Ecuador: Floods related to the El Niño phenomenon - Early Action Protocol Operations Update, 22 January 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ecuador/ecuador-floods-related-el-nino-phenomenon-early-action-protocol-operations-update-22-january-2024-eap2020ec02>

**IMF.** 2023. Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments, Outlook, and Policies. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9798400254567/CH001.xml>

**IRC.** 2024. Press Release. Crises in Ecuador and Haiti will shape migration in Latin America in 2024: IRC. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/crises-ecuador-and-haiti-will-shape-migration-latin-america-2024-irc>

**US Customs and Border Protection.** 2024. U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations Encounters by State. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Ecuador Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156053/download/>

### Bolivia

**IFRC.** 2023. Bolivia Drought - DREF operation. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia-plurinational-state/bolivia-drought-dref-operation-mdrbo015>

**NASA.** 2023. A Fiery October in Bolivia. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/152047/a-fiery-october-in-bolivia>

**OCHA.** 2023. Situation Report. Latin America & The Caribbean Weekly Situation Update (As of 11 September 2023). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia-plurinational-state/latin-america-caribbean-weekly-situation-update-11-september-2023>

### Peru (residents)

**Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP).** 2023. Reporte de inflación: Panorama actual y proyecciones macroeconómicas 2023-2025. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Reporte-Inflacion/2023/diciembre/report-de-inflacion-diciembre-2023.pdf>

**Connecting Business Initiative (CBI).** 2023. The historical impact of coastal El Niño in Peru and how local businesses are preparing for the global El Niño. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.connectingbusiness.org/news-events/blog/Peru-dengue-EI-Nino>

**IDMC.** 2023. IDMC Country Profile: Peru. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/peru/>

**Save the Children.** 2023. Preparación ante sequías contribuye a proteger a la niñez de comunidades altoandinas en Junín y Huancavelica. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.savethechildren.org.pe/noticias/preparacion-ante-sequias-contribuye-a-proteger-a-la-ninez-de-comunidades-altoandinas-en-junin-y-huancavelica/>

**WFP.** 2023. WFP Peru Country Brief, April 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/wfp-peru-country-brief-april-2023#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20national,57%20percent\)%20were%20food%20insecure](https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/wfp-peru-country-brief-april-2023#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20national,57%20percent)%20were%20food%20insecure)

### Bolivian Republic of Venezuela

**FAO.** 2024. Venezuela: GIEWS Country Briefs. February 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 11 April 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=VEN>

**OCHA.** 2024. Venezuela: Informe de situación, enero-febrero 2024. April 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 11 April 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/venezuela-informe-de-situacion-enero-febrero-2024>

### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

**3RP.** 2023. Regional Strategic Overview 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] [www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024RSO.pdf](http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024RSO.pdf)

**CDC Global.** 2024. Global Measles Outbreaks. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 20 March 2024] <https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/measles/data/global-measles-outbreaks.html>

**ECHO.** 2024. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional Crisis. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-syria-regional-crisis-echosrbud202491000-version-1>

**FAO.** 2023. Agriculture and Food Security Monitoring System (AFSMS) Bulletin (July–August 2023). October 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://fscluster.org/syria/document/fao-agriculture-and-food-security-9>

**FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation Triannual Global Report No 3 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

**FAO & WFP.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots: Early Warnings on Acute Food Insecurity, November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-november-2023-april-2024>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Syrian Arab Republic - 11-January-2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/giews-country-brief-syrian-arab-republic-11-january-2023>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Yemen Acute Food Insecurity Classification (June 2023–January 2024) [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://lb.fews.net/yemen-acute-food-insecurity-classification-june-2023-january-2024>

**FEWS NET.** 2024. Yemen Acute Food Insecurity. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 17 February 2024] <https://fewsn.net/east-africa/yemen#:~:text=In%20January%202024%2C%20a%20total,the%20monthly%20average%20of%202023>

**IOM.** 2022. Syrian Arab Republic Crisis Response Plan 2023. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/syrian-arab-republic-crisis-response-plan-2023>

**IOM.** Syrian Arab Republic Crisis Response Plan 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 2 February 2024] <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/syrian-arab-republic-crisis-response-plan-2024>

**IPC.** 2023. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/>

**IPC.** 2023. Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October 2023–March 2024 and Projection for April 2024–September 2024 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156728/>

**IPC.** 2024. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February–15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March–15 July 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872/>

**IPC.** 2022. Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update October–December 2022 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156028/>

**IDMC.** 2023. Shaken to the core in Syria. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/shaken-core-syria#:~:text=Despite%20recent%20reductions%20in%20conflict,earthquake%20\(see%20below%20map](https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/shaken-core-syria#:~:text=Despite%20recent%20reductions%20in%20conflict,earthquake%20(see%20below%20map)

**Middle East Council on Global Affairs.** 2023. Breaking the cycle: How can the MENA region tackle food insecurity? February 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] <https://mecouncil.org/publication/breaking-the-cycle-how-can-the-mena-region-tackle-food-insecurity/>

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact, day 108. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-108>

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | flash update #99. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99>

**OCHA.** 2024. Syrian Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-february-2024>

**OCHA.** 2023. Global Humanitarian Overview 2024, Middle East and North Africa [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2024/article/middle-east-and-north-africa-1>

**OCHA.** 2023. Syrian Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview (December 2023) [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2023>

**OCHA.** Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt) Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/occupied-palestinian-territory-opt-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-january-2023>



**OCHA.** Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-december-2022-enar#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20an%20estimated%2021.6,people%20in%20need%20in%202022.>

**UNDP.** 2023. Gaza War: Preliminary Findings on the Socio-Economic and Environmental Impact on Lebanon. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.undp.org/lebanon/publications/gaza-war-preliminary-findings-socio-economic-and-environmental-impact-lebanon>.

**UNHCR.** 2023. UNHCR Algeria Fact Sheet - April 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/algeria/unhcr-algeria-fact-sheet-april-2023>

**UN Women.** 2024. Gender Alert: The Gendered Impact of the Crisis in Gaza. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 20 February 2024] <https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/Gender%20Alert%20The%20Gendered%20Impact%20of%20the%20Crisis%20in%20Gaza.pdf>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP Yemen Food Security Update, January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 3 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-food-security-update-january-2024>

**WHO.** 2023. Yemen: Alarming Surge in Measles and Rubella Cases. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 3 February 2024] <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1140272>

## Gaza focus

**FAO, European Union & CIRAD.** 2023. Food Systems Profile – Palestine. Catalysing the sustainable and inclusive transformation of food systems. Rome, Brussels and Montpellier, France. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 February 2024] <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en>

**FAO.** 2024. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/geospatial/resources/detail/en/c/1676364/>

**FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip on markets in the Middle East region. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://fewsn.net/sites/default/files/202312/Middle%20East%20Regional%20Markets%20Analysis.pdf>

**Global Nutrition Cluster.** 2024. Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situation-analysis-gaza>

**IFPRI.** 2024. Long-lasting devastation to livelihoods from damage to agricultural lands in Gaza. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 25 February 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/long-lasting-devastation-livelihoods-damage-agricultural-lands-gaza>

**IMF.** 2023. West Bank and Gaza: Selected Issues. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2023/327/article-A001-en.xml>

**IPC.** 2023. IPC Famine Review Committee. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Famine\\_Review\\_Report\\_Gaza.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Gaza.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. IPC Global Initiative: Special Brief Gaza Strip. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Gaza\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Nov2023\\_Feb2024.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf)

**IPC.** 2024. Gaza Strip: Famine is imminent as 1.1 million people, half of Gaza, experience Catastrophic food insecurity. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 20 March 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en/>

**MSF.** 2023. No safe place in Gaza as people are crushed by continuous bombing. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.msf.org/no-safe-place-gaza-people-are-crushed-continuous-bombing>

**MSNA.** 2024. MSNA 2022 Cross-Sectoral Findings: Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory. July 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf>

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel Flash Update #100. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-100-enhe>

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel: Flash Update #106. January 2024. [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-106>

**OCHA.** 2023. Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 29 January 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-needs-overview-and-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-dashboard>

**OCHA.** 2024. Lebanon: Flash Update #12 - Escalation of hostilities in south Lebanon. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 28 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-12-escalation-hostilities-south-lebanon-21-february-2024>

**PCBS.** 2023. Presents the Main Findings of Labour Force Survey in 2022. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&itemID=4421>

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99 [Online] [Accessed 15 April 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99-enarhe>

**UNCTAD.** 2024. Preliminary assessment of the economic impact of the destruction in Gaza and prospects for economic recovery. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] [https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery#:~:text=The%20International%20Labour%20Organization%20\(ILO-,unemployment%20reached%2079.3%20per%20cent](https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery#:~:text=The%20International%20Labour%20Organization%20(ILO-,unemployment%20reached%2079.3%20per%20cent)

**UNCTAD.** 2023. Prior to current crisis, decades-long blockade hollowed Gaza's economy, leaving 80% of population dependent on international aid. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/press-material/prior-current-crisis-decades-long-blockade-hollowed-gazas-economy-leaving-80>

**UNDP.** 2023. Expected socioeconomic impacts of the Gaza war on neighbouring countries in the Arab region. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-12/2302056e-policybrief-expected-socio-economic-impacts-escwa-undp-web-2.pdf>

**UNRWA.** 2024. State of Palestine: Gaza Supplies and Dispatch Tracking. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 March 2024] [https://data.humdata.org/dataset/state-of-palestine-gaza-aid-truck-data?force\\_layout=desktop](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/state-of-palestine-gaza-aid-truck-data?force_layout=desktop)

**UNRWA.** 2024. UNRWA Situation Report #81 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-81-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>

**UNRWA.** 2023. Where we work: Gaza Strip. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 30 January 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip>

**UNESCO.** 2017. Gaza ten years later. July 2017. [Online] [Accessed on 29 January 2024] [https://unesco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/gaza\\_10\\_years\\_later\\_-\\_11\\_july\\_2017.pdf](https://unesco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/gaza_10_years_later_-_11_july_2017.pdf)

**WFP.** 2023. Gaza - Food Security Assessment. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/gaza-food-security-assessment-december-2023>

**WHO.** 2023. Gaza food utilization. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 28 January 2024] <https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/3160/3160358/>

**WHO.** 2024. oPt Emergency Situation Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 February 2024] [https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep\\_-\\_issue\\_22.pdf](https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_issue_22.pdf)

## Algeria

**SRRP.** 2023. Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan (SRRP). February 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 12 February 2024] <https://algeria.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/SRRP%20-%20English.pdf>

## Armenia

**ACAPS.** 2023. Armenia-Azerbaijan Briefing note 06 October 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh: Humanitarian impact of the military offensive. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] [https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data\\_Product/Main\\_media/20231006\\_ACAPS\\_briefing\\_note\\_Armenia\\_Azerbaijan\\_Nagorno-Karabakh\\_Humanitarian\\_impact\\_of\\_the\\_military\\_offensive.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231006_ACAPS_briefing_note_Armenia_Azerbaijan_Nagorno-Karabakh_Humanitarian_impact_of_the_military_offensive.pdf)

**UNHCR.** 2023. Armenia Refugee Response Plan. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/libraries/pdf.js/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Freporting.unhcr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2023-10%2FArm-enia%2520Emergency%2520RRP%2520-%2520Inter-Agency%2520Appeal%2520-9%2520October%25202023-PDF.pdf>

**WFP.** 2023. Market Price Monitoring Bulletin (Issue No. 21: November 2023). [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/market-price-monitoring-bulletin-issue-no-21-november-2023>

## Egypt

**UNHCR.** UNHCR: New Population Movement from Sudan - Egypt (As of 11 January 2024). [Online] [Accessed: 9 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/egypt/unhcr-new-population-movement-sudan-egypt-11-january-2024>

**3RP.** Regional Strategic Overview 2024 (advanced version). January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] [https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO\\_advanced\\_version.pdf](https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO_advanced_version.pdf)

**UNHCR.** Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/afghanistan-regional-refugee-response-plan-summary>

**Trading Economics.** Iran indicators. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/indicators>

## Jordan (Syrian refugees)

**3RP.** Regional Strategic Overview 2024 (advanced version). January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] [https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO\\_advanced\\_version.pdf](https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO_advanced_version.pdf)

## Lebanon

**IPC.** 2023. Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October 2023 - March 2024 and Projection for April 2024 - September 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156728?iso3=LBN>

**IPC.** 2023. Lebanon's food insecurity persists as economic crisis continues. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Lebanon\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_May2023\\_Oct2023\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2023_Oct2023_Report.pdf)

**OCHA.** Lebanon: At a Glance - Escalation of hostilities in South Lebanon, as of 16 January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 5 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-glance-escalation-hostilities-south-lebanon-16-january-2024>

**UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF.** 2022. Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149219/download/>

**WFP.** WFP Lebanon Country Brief, September 2022. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/wfp-lebanon-country-brief-september-2022>

## Libya

**IFRC.** 2023. November 2023. Revised Emergency Appeal. Libya- Flood Storm Daniel. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/libya-storm-daniel>

**OCHA.** 2023. Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 (December 2022). January 2023. [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-humanitarian-overview-2023-december-2022>

**OCHA.** 2023. Libya Flood Response Flash Appeal September to December 2023. September 2023. [Accessed on 11 February 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-flood-response-flash-appeal-sept-2023-dec-2023-issued-september-2023-enar?\\_gl=1\\*ojtud2\\*\\_ga\\*MTY0NjQ4NDAwOC4xNzAwMTQyNDgy\\*\\_ga\\_E60ZNX2F68\\*MTcwNzgZNTg4NS43Ny4wLjE3MDc4MzU4ODUuNjAuMC4w](https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-flood-response-flash-appeal-sept-2023-dec-2023-issued-september-2023-enar?_gl=1*ojtud2*_ga*MTY0NjQ4NDAwOC4xNzAwMTQyNDgy*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNzgZNTg4NS43Ny4wLjE3MDc4MzU4ODUuNjAuMC4w)

**UNHCR.** 2024. Libya Registration Dashboard. 1 January 2024. January 2024. [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/lby>

**World Bank.** 2024. Libya Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment. January 2024. [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099353101242428521/pdf/IDU153d4e1711e33e145321b8881cf996ea3acf7.pdf>

## Palestine (Gaza)

**Global Nutrition Cluster.** 2024. Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed

on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situation-analysis-gaza>

**IPC.** 2023. IPC Global Initiative: Special Brief Gaza Strip. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Gaza\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Nov2023\\_Feb2024.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf)

**IPC.** 2023. IPC Famine Review Committee. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Famine\\_Review\\_Report\\_Gaza.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Gaza.pdf)

**UNICEF.** 2024. Intensifying conflict, malnutrition and disease in the Gaza Strip creates a deadly cycle that threatens over 1.1 million children. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle>

**UNRWA.** 2024. UNRWA Situation Report #81 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-81-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP Gaza Market Monitor Flash Update #5. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155435/download/>

**UNICEF.** December 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/stories/winter-weather-heightens-dangers-gazas-children> (TO BE CONFIRMED)

## Palestine (West Bank)

**ACLED.** 2023. The Resurgence of Armed Groups in the West Bank and Their Connections to Gaza. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/12/14/the-resurgence-of-armed-groups-in-the-west-bank-and-their-connections-to-gaza/Food-Security-Cluster.2023>

**ILO.** 2023. Palestinian unemployment rate year-on-year is set to nearly double as a result of escalation of hostilities in Gaza. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] [https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS\\_907149/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_907149/lang-en/index.htm)

**OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel Flash Update #87. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-87>

**UNDP.** November 2023. General Assembly Informal Briefing On The Humanitarian Situation in Gaza. Accessed March 10 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.undp.org/speeches/general-assembly-informal-briefing-humanitarian-situation-gaza>

## Syrian Arab Republic

**ACAPS.** 2024. Syria country analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/syria>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Syrian Arab Republic Country Brief. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SYR&lang=es#:::text=Despite%20the%20below%20%80%91average%20production,the%20country's%20ability%20to%20finance>

**Insecurity Insight.** 2023. Syria: Humanitarian Operations and Conflict-related Sensitivity (October 2023). [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-humanitarian-operations-and-conflict-related-sensitivity-october-2023>

**OCHA.** 2023. Syria: Facing the dual challenge of climate change and conflict. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://unocha.exposure.co/syria-facing-the-dual-challenge-of-climate-change-and-conflict>

**OCHA.** 2023. Syrian Arab Republic: Cross-Border Humanitarian Reach and Activities from Türkiye (July 2023). November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-cross-border-humanitarian-reach-and-activities-turkiye-july-2023>

**REACH.** 2023. Three Years into the Water Crisis in Northeast Syria: Main Gaps and Adaptation Efforts Going Ahead. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/30e49387/REACH-SYR\\_Brief\\_Water-Crisis-in-NES\\_November2023.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/30e49387/REACH-SYR_Brief_Water-Crisis-in-NES_November2023.pdf)

**World Bank.** 2023. Syria Economic Monitor, Summer 2023 : The Economic Aftershocks of Large Earthquakes (English). [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/0995540309012311026/idu0a8823acd034ac04efd0abc20842c479023f4>

## Türkiye

**DGMM.** 2024. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Managment. February 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 4 March 2024] <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>

**Trading Economics.** 2024. Türkiye food inflation. <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/food-inflation#:~:text=Cost%20of%20food%20in%20Turkey,percent%20in%20April%20of%202016>.

**UNHCR.** Inter-Agency Protection Needs Assessment, Round 7 – August 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/inter-agency-protection-needs-assessment-round-7-august-2023>

**WB.** 2024. Türkiye country overview. [Online] [Accessed 30 April 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview>

**WFP.** 2024. Annual Country Reports – Türkiye. 29 March 2024. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/annual-country-reports-turkiye>

## Yemen

**ACLED.** 2024. Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/yemen/>

**European Commission.** 2023. Echo Daily Flash – 13 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4808>

**FAO.** 2023. Yemen Quarterly Food Security Update. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-quarterly-food-security-update-december-2023>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Profile: Yemen. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=YEM&lang=zh>

**IEP.** 2023. Global Peace Index 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf>

**IOM.** 2023. Yemen – Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (10 – 16 December 2023). December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] [https://dtm.iom.int/reports/yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-update-10-16-december-2023#:~:text=From%201%20January%20to%2016,individuals\)%20displaced%20at%20least%20once](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-update-10-16-december-2023#:~:text=From%201%20January%20to%2016,individuals)%20displaced%20at%20least%20once)

**IPC.** 2023. Yemen IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis January – December 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Yemen\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Malnutrition\\_JanDec2023\\_Report\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_English.pdf)

**UNDP.** 2023. The Impact of Climate Change on Human Development in Yemen. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.undp.org/arab-states/publications/impact-climate-change-human-development-yemen>

**WFP.** 2024. WFP Yemen Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-food-security-update-january-2024>



Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP in 2016, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and finding lasting solutions to them, through shared analysis and knowledge, strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses and collective efforts across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.



The Food Security Information Network (FSIN) is a technical global platform for the exchange of expertise, knowledge and best practices on food security and nutrition analysis. Its purpose is to promote timely, independent and consensus-based information about food crises, while also highlighting and addressing critical data gaps. As a key partner of the GNAFC, FSIN coordinates the publication of the *Global Report on Food Crises*.